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ABSTRACT 
 
 Why did President Richard Nixon visit communist China in February 1972? And 
why was his July 1971 announcement of that trip the subject of such public euphoria, 
particularly given the intense antipathy towards the Chinese communists during the 
previous two decades? To answer these questions, this dissertation travels on two 
interconnected paths. First, it is the backstage story of a diplomatic revolution, 
chronicling how initially mid-level and then upper-level Executive Branch officials 
sought to change first the preconceptions which supported existing China policy, and 
then the policy itself. Second, it details how first the informed public and then the mass 
public reversed their once-steadfast positions on this issue, making change not only 
possible but profitable. The efforts of these officials inspired pundits and academics to 
call for change, which in turn altered the opinions of prominent senators and 
congressmen, who went from enforcing the status quo to calling for its upending. 
Underlying everything, particularly after 1960, was growing fear of a rising China. Now 
that a hostile communist regime ruling the world’s most populous nation was no longer 
“a passing phase,” the question of how to come to terms with Chinese power became 
pressing. A new policy of “Containment Without Isolation” became increasingly popular 
as a means of taming a powerful China and incorporating it into a U.S.-led global order. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: BANNED IN D.C.: 
RISING POWERS AND BREAKING TABOOS 
 
“China – there lies a sleeping giant. Let him sleep, for when he wakes he shall shake the 
world.” 
Napoleon Bonaparte1 
 
 Having fought the Chinese to a stalemate on the Korean Peninsula in July 1953, 
the U.S. Army finally surrendered in November 1954. In New Jersey. Rather than debate 
the Rutgers University forensics team over whether or not the U.S. should grant 
diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China, the West Pointers forfeited the 
contest. That fall, the Department of Defense had forbidden debating teams from the 
military academies from participating in any competitions which touched upon this 
specific issue. According to the Pentagon, this was because “it is a controversial subject” 
upon which “national policy has been established.” Therefore, to have military personnel 
offering opinions the matter would be “inappropriate.”2 That debating season, the 
question of diplomatic recognition of China was the most frequently asked in U.S. 
                                                          
1
 “A Long Look at China,” Saturday Evening Post, Final Draft, 31 December 1958, 1, Folder 0604, Box 
238, Series 11, Group 628, Chester Bowles Papers, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, New 
Haven, Connecticut. 
2
 “Midshipmen, Cadets Can’t Debate China,” Washington Post, 17 November 1954, 15. 
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intercollegiate forensics competitions.
3
 It was thus considered a topic of great interest 
and import at the time. Yet it was apparently too interesting, and too important, for 
Cadets and Midshipmen, who might in the future fight the Chinese, as their predecessors 
recently had, to even pretend to have an opinion on in a competition. 
 After the forfeit led to the revelation of the ban, officials at Princeton University 
protested to their distinguished alumnus, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. 
Believing the ban was due to influence exercised over the Pentagon by Dulles’s State 
Department, they appealed to him as a Princetonian to uphold the principles of academic 
freedom and open debate.
4
 They did not receive a response. When asked about the ban, 
President and West Point alumnus Dwight Eisenhower claimed to be in opposition, 
arguing that “debaters should be allowed to argue any question that troubled the world.” 
However, he declined use his authority as Commander-in-Chief to rescind the ban. As 
with acts of censorship during the recently ended McCarthy Era, Eisenhower opposed 
actions after the fact, but only symbolically and half-heartedly. Rear Admiral W.F. 
Boone, who was the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, affirmed that he would lift 
the ban with a “cheerful aye, aye” once ordered to do so by a higher authority.5 But that 
order never came, and for its part West Point affirmed the continuation of the China 
Debate ban two weeks later.
6
 
                                                          
3
 Elie Abel, “President Sorry Academies Forbade Red China Debate,” New York Times, 24 November 
1954, 1. 
4
 “Midshipmen, Cadets Can’t Debate China.” 
5
 “President Sorry Academics Forbade Red China Debate.” 
6
 “West Point Keeps Ban on Red China Debate,” New York Times, 27 November 1954, 14. 
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 This long-forgotten and seemingly trivial episode was in fact a microcosm of 
U.S. policy towards communist China not only during the 1950s, but well into the 
following decade. The Defense Department’s claims that the issue of recognition was 
both controversial and settled were seemingly contradictory. But it was the fact that it 
was “settled” which created the controversy. For those opposing the existing policy, the 
anathematizing of public discussion of the issue was galling. For those among this group 
who had been personally targeted by McCarthy and his allies in the previous years, it 
represented an especially painful continuation of that era, at least on this one issue. 
Supporters of the policy, on the other hand, viewed any questioning of that policy as a 
sort of heresy. Such speech might not have been technically forbidden, but it was most 
unwelcome. Public figures who questioned China policy risked ostracism, unless they 
were fortunate enough to be ignored. 
 Ultimately, the value of this minor controversy was to reveal that, especially on 
this issue, especially between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s, words possessed 
immense power. Supporters of the status quo sought to either shut down the debate or, at 
times when that proved impossible, monopolize the conversation. The goal was to have 
no individual of official stature publicly question the policy of isolating the Chinese 
communists on four levels: diplomatic nonrecognition, exclusion from the United 
Nations, a ban on all U.S. trade with the Chinese mainland, and a ban on all travel by 
U.S. citizens to the Chinese mainland. Buttressing this strategy of containment through 
isolation was a belief that communist rule in China was inherently unstable and liable to 
collapse eventually, if not imminently. Outreach to the communists through a breaching 
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of any of the four levels of isolation would only legitimize and strengthen the regime, 
allowing its unnatural rule to continue. Thus, claims that communist rule over China was 
permanent, or at the very least would survive for the indefinite future, were also 
forbidden. 
 That words had such power showed the fragility of this policy consensus. Unable 
to withstand sustained attack, its supporters had no choice but to intimidate potential 
attackers into silence. That the policy survived not only the Eisenhower years but for 
over a decade after he left office illustrated its strength. Those who believed in it saw the 
Chinese communists as being like a sword whose blade was hard but brittle. With its 
immense population, massive armed forces, and deep control over the populace, it 
appeared formidable. In reality, they believed, it was liable to shatter under the stress of 
one hard strike. History would prove the irony that while the People’s Republic of China 
was anything but brittle, the forces who opposed U.S. engagement with the regime most 
certainly were. 
 To endure, that side of the debate required a strong shield, and that shield was the 
overwhelming support of informed and mass public opinion in the United States. So 
long as the public remained angry over Chinese involvement in the Korean War and 
fearful of appeasing a threatening regime, even politicians who came to oppose the 
policy would be wary of speaking out, let alone of taking action. This created a classic 
Catch-22. Only through speaking out could those who supported policy change convince 
the public to agree with them. Yet such individuals only dared speak out if they believed 
the public was no longer adamantly opposed to their point of view. Therefore, before 
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these leaders could say the magic words, events in China had to intervene which would 
begin to cause public opinion to shift, if only slightly. Specifically, the fear Americans 
felt towards the Chinese communists would have to switch from a reason to oppose 
outreach into a reason to support a new approach. Fear would have to lead to favor. The 
path to this shift, while long and winding, was quite simple in terms of reasoning. The 
present policy at its core was based on a belief in the impermanence of communist rule 
over China. If one believed the regime to be for all practical intent permanent, that 
individual might very well decide outreach was now the best policy, lest a powerful and 
hostile China prove a far graver threat to U.S. interests and world peace than a powerful 
and at least partially friendly China. Once people believed the regime was there to stay, 
the game would eventually be up, and policy change would become an inevitability. 
 With this conception in mind, the path taken by policy reformers made perfect 
sense. The first major breach in the wall of silence was a 1963 speech by Undersecretary 
of State Roger Hilsman. In this address, he did not propose any concrete policy changes, 
not even minor ones like relaxing the travel and trade bans. Instead, the Kennedy and 
Johnson official emphasized his belief in the permanence of communist rule in China, 
and the consequent need to open the door to engagement with that regime. That the 
speech was well-received by the media and occasioned no significant condemnations 
emboldened others to speak out, at first in the media and then in the congress. This led to 
well-publicized 1966 hearings conducted by Senator William Fulbright’s Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, where leading academics who were acknowledged experts on 
China did call for wholesale policy alterations. Once again, press coverage was 
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overwhelmingly positive, with many leading outlets celebrating the lifting of the taboo 
on speaking out against the China policy status quo. The hearings converted both liberal 
Democrats and Republicans, showed moderates active opposition to change on this issue 
was no longer politically beneficial, and left conservative true believers isolated. Over 
the next three years, momentum for change only increased, such that by the time 
Eisenhower’s former Vice-President assumed the presidency, if he chose to change 
China policy he would be pushing on an open door, rather than running into a great wall. 
 The central research question of this dissertation is two-pronged: why did 
Richard Nixon decide to travel to China in 1972, and why was his 1971 announcement 
of that trip greeted with such overwhelming public approval? The existing conventional 
explanations focus on triangular diplomacy, specifically the need for an insecure United 
States, reeling from its negative experiences in Vietnam, to balance against the 
apparently rising power of the Soviet Union. Such a move was made possible by the 
Sino-Soviet split, a complete rupture between the two great communist powers having 
been confirmed by a series of armed border clashes in 1969 along the Ussuri River. 
Nixon was simply playing the weaker adversary against the stronger in a classic 
application of balance of power politics. 
 This explanation, while parsimonious and not without a certain measure of 
validity, has several shortcomings. Nixon’s private writings and public utterances on the 
subject focused far more on his fear of the long-term rise of Chinese power to the 
exclusion of any emphasis on the short-term augmentation of Soviet power. This 
reflected domestic concerns of a rising and hostile China going back to the start of the 
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1960s, as well as similar concerns among prominent allies in both Europe and Asia 
which Nixon heard during the extensive travels he undertook before commencing his 
1968 presidential campaign. Nearly all evidence indicates that the Sino-Soviet split 
affected the timing of the shift on China policy, but not the decision to undertake it. 
Second, such a cynical exercise in realpolitik has rarely if ever occasioned the sort of 
widespread public euphoria experienced in the U.S. in the summer of 1971. There was 
much more going on than eagerness to gain an advantage over a Cold War adversary, or 
even bring about an accelerated end to the Vietnam War. To understand the public’s 
reaction in 1971, one must go back at least a decade. It was during the early 1960s that 
polls showed Americans by a wide margin had come to view the Chinese as a greater 
threat to world peace than the Soviets. That continued to be the case throughout the rest 
of the decade, and in fact even a month after Nixon’s celebrated announcement, which 
was the last time the question was asked. 
 Over that same decade, other public opinion polls showed gradually but 
inexorably increasing numbers of Americans coming to support such steps as lifting the 
travel and trade bans, allowing the Chinese communists into the United Nations, and 
even according the regime diplomatic recognition. Since the questions measuring views 
of China and those measuring support for rapprochement were never asked in the same 
survey, it is impossible to quantitatively discover a correlation between the two. Yet 
there is abundant qualitative evidence among the utterances of individual citizens, 
opinion leaders, and policy makers to support such a contention. The vast majority of the 
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voices calling for an end to the policy of containment through isolation claimed to be 
doing so out of a fear of present – and particularly future – Chinese power. 
 The theoretical explanations of how such a shift in opinion can occur are 
simultaneously sparse, diverse, and contentious. However, certainly prominent scholarly 
theories of both recent and distant vintage seem applicable to the historical evidence in 
this particular case. James Rosenau divided public opinion into a three-step pyramid, 
with the mass public on the bottom, the informed public above, and the decision-making 
elite at the pinnacle.
7
  Coincidentally, he developed this model during the early 1960s, 
when opinion on this particular issue began to shift. The model is unidirectional and top-
down, with elites influencing the informed public, who in turn influenced those members 
of the mass public paying attention. This roughly though inexactly conforms to the case 
of China policy. Hilsman’s speech inspired academics to speak out, leading to the 
Fulbright Hearings, causing a decisive shift in the media, which influenced the mass 
public and encouraged decision-making leaders to eventually change policy in accord 
with the new consensus. Thus, while largely top-down, the process was not entirely 
unidirectional. There was feedback between the various levels. Nonetheless, the 
pyramidal conception of public opinion is useful to this particular example. 
 Fellow political scientist V.O. Key, who focused – also during early 1960s – on 
the bottom-up influence of opinion on policy, viewed mass opinion as creating “a system 
of dikes” which worked to set “the range or limits of policy.”8 This is applicable to the 
                                                          
7
 Rosenau, James N. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy. (New York: Random House, 1961). 
8
 Key, V.O. Public Opinion and American Democracy. (New York: Knopf, 1961). 
 9 
 
 
halting and cautious China polices of both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. 
Widespread public opposition to any sort of significant change in the nation's policy 
towards the Chinese communists appeared to limit room for maneuver to almost nothing. 
The only hope for those desiring a change in policy would have been to move public 
opinion, which according to Rosenau would entail first converting elites, who would 
then evangelize informed observers, who would convert the mass public. As George 
Edwards has demonstrated in more recent times, this is an exquisitely difficult if not 
impossible task for any president to achieve.
9
 
 Filling the remaining theoretical gaps is the work of Adam Berinsky, who has 
argued that it is possible to mobilize those individuals predisposed toward policy change 
on a given issue by altering “elite discourse.”10 Using the Vietnam War as an example, 
he concluded that the end of elite consensus for the continuation of that war, and the 
public expressions of doubt about or opposition to the war by leading politicians, foreign 
policy experts, and journalists led to a decrease in support for the war as revealed 
through opinion polls. According to Berinsky, it was the substantial numbers of 
undecideds who shifted from uncertainty to dissent. However, in the case of communist 
China, the percent of undecideds on questions of diplomatic recognition never exceeded 
ten percent, and the number of China “doves” who could be mobilized was always lower 
than the number of Vietnam “doves.” Thus, dissent within the elite would not be 
                                                          
9
 Edwards, George C. III. On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit. (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2003). 
10
 Berinsky, Adam J. Silent Voices: Public Opinion and Political Participation in America. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), 106. 
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sufficient. What was needed to move mass opinion was elite unanimity – unanimous 
opposition to the existing policy. This required substantial exogenous shocks in the form 
of momentous foreign events, and signals from government officials that it was 
permissible for elites to respond to these shocks by calling for policy alterations. The 
Vietnam War itself would provide the most obvious exogenous shock, reinforcing the 
danger of a hostile China with which the U.S. had limited means of communicating. 
 Multiple monographs have appeared in recent years on U.S. China policy during 
this period, inspiring the obvious question of why one more is necessary. First, the fact 
that numerous scholars have investigated this subject indicates it is worthy of study. 
Second, it would seem to imply that the issue is not yet settled, that existing evaluations 
have yet to be deemed definitive. Third, and most importantly for this work, nearly all 
these recent volumes have focused on either a specific fragment of time or a particular 
theme. Thus, they lack narrative sweep and topical totality. Grasping only a portion of 
the proverbial elephant, these previous works have been unable to tell the full story and 
adequately answer my research question. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker’s 2012 effort The 
China Threat: Myths and Realities in the 1950s sought to overturn the prevalent notion 
that the Eisenhower administration’s approach to China was inflexible. Tucker viewed 
him as desiring change, but trapped by adverse public opinion.
11
 Despite what the title 
would indicate, the author failed to consider the full implications of a threatening China 
                                                          
11
 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, The China Threat: Myths and Realities in the 1950s (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2012), 184. 
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to U.S. policy, specifically the question of whether an increasing perception of threat 
could lead to a greater desire for outreach. 
 Noam Kochavi’s 2002 A Conflict Perpetuated: China Policy during the Kennedy 
Years provided a valuable overview of what I view as the turning point in the process of 
policy change. As his title would indicate, Kochavi emphasized continuity over 
change.
12
 While acknowledging policy ferment among mid-level officials in the State 
Department and on the National Security Council, he downplayed their importance. This 
dissertation differs from Kochavi by categorizing the Kennedy years less as a 
continuation of Eisenhower’s tenure than as the beginning of the push for undoing 
Eisenhower’s policy by first questioning presumptions on which that policy was based. 
The most important of these presumptions was that Mao’s regime was fragile and liable 
to fall. Once that was no longer assumed to be the case, change became inevitable, if by 
no means imminent. Michael Lumbers’ 2008 Piercing the bamboo curtain: Tentative 
bridge-building to China during the Johnson Years fulfilled the promise of its title by 
emphasizing the “policy innovation” of that administration, and sought to cast 
Kennedy’s successor as a would-be peacemaker held back by his impressions of public 
opinion.
13
 However, Lumbers said little about what was influencing this public opinion, 
and therefore failed to make more than a cursory mention of the role played by 
academics and senators in shifting public sentiment decisively during these years. It is an 
                                                          
12
 Kochavi, Noam, A Conflict Perpetuated: China Policy During the Kennedy Years (Westport, 
Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), 5. 
13
 Michael Lumbers, Piercing the Bamboo Curtain: Tentative bridge-building to China during the 
Johnson Years (New York: Manchester University Press, 2008), 246. 
 12 
 
 
excellent overview of the work of an administration at a time when the administration 
was the least interesting, and possibly also the least consequential, actor on this matter. 
 In contrast to Lumbers, whose general argument about Johnson’s approach I 
support, Chris Tudda’s 2012 A Cold War Turning Point: Nixon and China, 1969-1972 
used the most recently available U.S. archival materials to counter that Johnson and his 
foreign policy team had a “skeptical” or “pessimistic” attitude towards Chinese 
receptivity to American outreach, which Nixon “boldly” rejected.14 Tudda roundly 
dismissed the notion of continuity, and endeavored to restore Nixon’s primacy, albeit 
while accepting the longstanding notion of a president trying to play a “China Card” in a 
game of triangular balance-of-power diplomacy. Tudda was correct to argue that Nixon 
was willing to take risks Johnson was not. Yet he failed to acknowledge the debt Nixon 
owed his predecessor for laying the groundwork for his own actions. Also, unlike his 
historical subjects, Tudda did not consider public opinion to be a significant factor. He 
provided almost no information on its shifts, Nixon’s awareness of those shifts, or how 
Nixon sought to mold and influence public opinion in the period leading up to his trip to 
China. Tudda’s top-down, or rather top-only, focus failed to consider Nixon’s political 
motivations, which allowed the author to employ a realist framework emphasizing 
triangular diplomacy to the exclusion of the issue of China’s long-term threat. Thus, his 
highly competent chronicle of Nixon’s actions was analytically incomplete. 
                                                          
14
 Chris Tudda. A Cold War Turning Point: Nixon and China, 1969-1972 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 2012), 6-7. 
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 By compartmentalizing the subject matter through their focus on a single 
administration, all these albeit highly informative works were unable to track the 
common threads existing across the period, as well as actors and trends which 
reappeared throughout. This most likely accounted for their eliding of the roles of 
influential outside actors, specifically the media, academics, and members of congress. 
These three sets of participants were interconnected both with each other and with 
policymakers within the various administrations. They created the feedback loop which 
both established the elite consensus of the need for policy change and altered public 
opinion in its favor. Both steps were essential preconditions for Nixon’s actions, and the 
primary reason those actions were so well-received and politically influential. At the 
center of these activities were a small group of academic China specialists who 
presented their ideas in newspapers and magazines, testified before congressional 
committees, and consulted with presidents. Their contribution has to date been little 
noted, and never investigated in-depth.
15
 
 Guangquiu Xu did bring the U.S. Congress into the picture with his 2007 work 
Congress and the U.S.-China Relationship, 1949-1979. That author noted the 
“educational” effect of a series of hearings held beginning in 1965 in which academic 
experts made public pleas for significant changes in China policy and pointed out how 
Nixon valued the efforts in 1969 of Senator (and former East Asian history professor) 
Mike Mansfield to reach out to Zhou Enlai at a time when members of the executive 
                                                          
15
 Even Paul Evans’s John Fairbank and the American Understanding of China devotes at most five pages 
to the influence of China scholars on China policy: Paul M. Evans, John Fairbank and the American 
Understanding of China (New York: Blackwell, 1988). 
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branch could not.
16
 Xu made use of valuable archival and published Chinese-language 
primary sources to illustrate the influence of congressional actions on Chinese 
perceptions, which was the strongest part of his work. But for the U.S. side of the story, 
which was ostensibly his primary subject matter, Xu relied almost entirely on transcripts 
from congressional hearings, and made little use of the archival records of individual 
members of congress. That left the author unable to explain how and why senators like 
Mansfield, or Jacob Javits, or William Fulbright, came to change their views on the 
issue, or why others such as Paul Douglas did not. 
 There are two works focusing on the executive branch which did cover my 
subject over a longer time period. Gordon Chang’s 1990 monograph Friends and 
Enemies: The United States, China and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 set the benchmark 
for all future studies of the subject, including my own. Given the overlap between his 
time period and mine, one might conclude I am simply rewriting or updating his work. 
Yet fully half of the content of Friends and Enemies dealt with the Eisenhower 
administration, while half of the rest covered the Truman years. Thus, fully eighty 
percent of this work addresses a dozen-year-long stretch of time to which Chang only 
devoted a quarter of his work. In addition, due to limited archival access at that time, his 
discussion of the periods of the Johnson and particularly the Nixon administrations were 
by necessity cursory at best. In addition, I come to differing conclusions from that author 
on at least two matters. First, Chang considered the “China Lobby,” as represented by 
                                                          
16
 Guangqiu Xu. Congress and the U.S.-China Relationship, 1949-1979(Akron: Oh.: University of Akron 
Press, 2007), 193, 211. 
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the Committee of One Million, to have been “spent” by the end of the 1950s.17 Utilizing 
the extensive archival documents produced by its leaders, as well as the sentiments 
expressed by members of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, I argue this lobby 
had more staying power than Chang and other historians have given it credit for. Even if 
by the mid-1960s its influence was based largely on a bluff, it was one which had yet to 
be called. Second, Chang made much of the influence of the racial prejudices of 
Eisenhower and Dulles on their policies. Much as I searched for evidence of this sort of 
“Yellow Peril” mentality in the halls of power, I found it either oddly lacking or 
decidedly non-influential. To discover this phenomenon, one must look to the artifacts of 
popular culture at that time, where it existed in abundance. However, few if any 
historians concerned with this topic have incorporated considerations of popular culture 
into their diplomatic histories. 
 Evelyn Goh benefitted from the availability of archival documents denied to 
Chang in her 2005 work Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974. 
As indicated by the title, Goh worked within a consciously constructivist framework, 
and drew heavily from notions of discourse promulgated by postmodernist thinkers such 
as Michel Foucault who served as inspirations for early constructivist international 
relations theorists such as Alexander Wendt. Goh did allude to the theories of Italian 
Marxist Antonio Gramsci when she mentioned the creation of an “epistemic 
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community” around the desire for policy change between 1964 and 1965.18 Yet Goh’s 
focus on the writings of mid-level government officials and senior policy makers blinded 
her to the interaction between her subjects and the outside community of China experts, 
or to the role of congress. Thus, she treated her subjects largely in isolation, which was 
not how they existed or acted at the time. Such an isolated, administration-centric 
approach to the subject matter led this student of Tucker’s to focus far more on the 
creation of ideas than on their promulgation. Therefore, Goh only told half the story. 
 My approach is two-fold. On one level, like the works I have already discussed, 
it is an interior tale, the backstage story of a diplomatic revolution. Unlike these previous 
works, it contains a complete narrative arc, covering the entire period from the 
establishment of the initial policy until its overthrow and replacement by the policy of, to 
use the phrase of one-time Columbia University Professor of Government Arthur Doak 
Barnett, containment without isolation. With minor alterations, this is the U.S. policy 
towards China still being followed. On a second level, it is an exterior story of how the 
American people, primarily elites but also to as great an extent as possible the mass 
public, viewed China during the early Cold War. This exterior focus confirms the 
essential role of a threatening and rising China to support for rapprochement. On this 
issue, the public and the government moved together, if not always at the same pace. 
Both evaluated similar if in all cases limited evidence of Chinese actions and intentions, 
and altered their views accordingly. Those pushing for policy change were acutely aware 
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of the need for the public’s backing. Often, they were afraid it was lacking, though some 
searched desperately for signs of its existence. No one would consider acts of policy 
change unless they believed they would prove popular. On this matter, above all others 
in U.S. Cold War diplomacy, public opinion mattered. How over the course of a decade 
dealing with the Chinese went from being the political Third Rail of U.S. foreign policy 
to something a president could exploit to help secure reelection is a vital question which 
has yet to be adequately addressed by the literature. 
 This dissertation proceeds chronologically over the course of five chapters. The 
first covers the establishment during the Eisenhower administration of the policy of 
isolating China, as represented by the “Four Nos” of nonrecognition, no U.N. 
membership, a trade ban, and a travel ban. I argue that, contrary to the received historical 
memory, Eisenhower’s contemporaries continually expected this policy to be a passing 
phase, and refused to believe the repeated denials of the president, his Secretary of State, 
or others within his administration. While possessing doubts about the wisdom of this 
policy, Eisenhower felt constrained not only by his perception of public opinion but also, 
and perhaps even more importantly, by a fear that outreach toward a Cold War adversary 
would be seen as a sign of weakness at home and abroad. But his efforts to avoid the 
appearance of appeasement led to two militarized crises with the Chinese which raised 
the specter of nuclear war, discredited his New Look policy, and most importantly over 
the long-term encouraged the Chinese leadership to maintain a posture of hostility 
towards the U.S. The second chapter investigates the Kennedy years, when I argue the 
process of policy change began. Believing both that Eisenhower’s and especially 
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Dulles’s hostile actions and words made the U.S. appear to be to blame for bad relations 
with the Chinese, and that the P.R.C. was not going to collapse, officials within the 
administration such as Chester Bowles, Robert Komer, and James Thomson pushed for 
short-term tactical alterations in posture which would enable a long-term alteration of 
policy. Their efforts culminated in Roger Hilsman’s address less than a month after 
Kennedy’s assassination. This well-received repudiation of Dulles and his approach 
began the public debate over China policy, ending nearly a decade of almost complete 
silence from the existing policy’s opponents. 
 The third and fourth chapters cover the years of the Johnson administration. 
Fulbright’s March 1966 hearings provide a convenient dividing line. During the first half 
of his tenure, Johnson avoided discussing the issue, and those working for him on the 
matter felt little urgency to push for even the most minor policy changes. As during the 
Eisenhower years, the focus was on crisis management, specifically France’s diplomatic 
recognition of the regime and China’s successful test of an atomic weapon in 1964, 
increasingly close U.N. votes on admission, and of course the onset of direct U.S. 
combat involvement in the Vietnam War. This last action risked direct military 
confrontation with the Chinese, highlighting the need for contact with the regime, if only 
to avoid a repeat of the Korean War experience. After the hearings, Johnson became the 
first president to directly address China policy, presenting conciliatory words and the 
hope of more amicable relations in the future. But that future seemed distant, and was 
not expected to arrive until after Mao Zedong’s death. The goal was to encourage 
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moderation among future Chinese leaders and undo the hostility spiral initiated by 
Dulles and Eisenhower. Still, the policies established in the 1950s remained in force. 
 Nixon built upon the debate begun during Kennedy’s time and the actions of 
Johnson to achieve a breakthrough. He benefitted from shifts in public opinion which 
began in the early 1960s and accelerated after the 1966 hearings. He also was able to 
exploit the increasing moderation of a Chinese regime trying to reign in the Cultural 
Revolution internally, manage the Soviet threat on its borders, and reestablish diplomatic 
contacts overseas. Nixon differed from his immediate predecessor in his willingness to 
take a chance on the possibility of rapprochement while Mao was still alive. Yet he 
would not have taken such a risk in political isolation. He needed to build upon the prior 
efforts of the members of previous administrations as well as those of academics, 
journalists, and congressman, actors whose advice he and Kissinger sought on this issue. 
This study concludes before Nixon set foot on Chinese soil because by that point three of 
the “Four Nos” had become yesses, while the fourth was well on its way out. To 
paraphrase Woody Allen, in terms of what occurred during the February 1972 visit, 80 
percent of Nixon’s achievement was showing up. 
 To tell this story, I utilize the archival collections of presidents, senators, 
professors, lobbyists, and other prominent individuals, as well as abundant news sources 
and relevant artifacts from popular culture. Overseas sources, particularly those from 
China, will be conspicuously lacking. While some of this documentation would no doubt 
shed light on the wisdom of U.S. actions throughout the period, particularly whether 
other courses of action were at various times possible, some of that information can be 
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discovered indirectly in existing secondary works utilizing such documentation. More 
importantly, such sources are not directly relevant to answering my research question, 
which focuses on the U.S. image of China, rather than its reality. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, it matters less what the Chinese did, said, and desired than what Americans 
both inside and outside of government thought was the case at the time. Threat 
perception, rather than its reality, is the issue at hand. 
 Finally, I should offer a few comments on my chapter titles. As those of you of a 
certain age and musical taste might have noticed, they are all the names of songs by 
independent acts from the 1980s who were part of what was then known as the musical 
genre of college rock.
19
 In addition to matching the content and themes of each chapter, 
they serve another, more symbolic purpose. When alternative rock went mainstream in 
the fall of 1991 with the commercial success of Nirvana’s “Smells Like Teen Spirit,” it 
appeared to the general public as if this new sound had come out of nowhere. 
Subsequent histories, such as noted music critic Robert Palmer’s otherwise authoritative 
1995 Public Broadcasting Service documentary “Rock & Roll: An Unruly History” 
followed this narrative. Its episode on the history of punk rock jumped from the Clash’s 
“London Calling” album to Nirvana as if nothing happened in the interim. In reality, 
Nirvana emerged out of an infrastructure of clubs, publications, radio stations, and 
record labels created and nurtured during the decade between the implosion of the initial 
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punk rock wave and the emergence of commercial alternative rock. It was a scene that 
produced Kurt Cobain’s foremost musical role models, such as the Fins, the Wipers, and 
the Vaselines. Just as they – and the artists whose songs I use for my chapter titles – 
paved the way for the success of Nirvana and the bands who thrived in its wake, Nixon 
built upon the efforts of a network of individuals inside and outside of government who 
had labored largely in obscurity for nearly a decade. And just as those college rock 
bands built an audience for a new style of music, these historical actors built an audience 
for a new China policy. This is the overlooked story of how that audience was built. 
 
 22 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
RECIPE FOR HATE: EISENHOWER’S INTRANSIGENCE AND THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF A HOSTILITY SPIRAL 
 
“The President added that he was not afraid of Communist China – not in this decade, at 
least.”20 
 
 In late May of 1971, as some in the media began to anticipate a diplomatic 
breakthrough by President Richard Nixon involving communist China, leading journalist 
Roscoe Drummond claimed that, nearly twenty years earlier, incoming President Dwight 
Eisenhower argued for early diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic. However, 
according to Drummond, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles prevailed upon the 
president that “the time was not ripe” for such a bold step, while Eisenhower worried 
about strident opposition from the U.S. public to any outreach to the Chinese 
communists, who less than a year earlier had been killing Americans on the Korean 
Peninsula. Nonetheless, Drummond recalled conversations with President Eisenhower in 
which he would “periodically burst out with his own animate feelings on the subject,” 
and surmised that he must have done the same with Vice-President Nixon, no doubt 
influencing the future president’s actions.21 
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 While contradicting the scholarly consensus on Eisenhower’s China policy, this 
retrospective assessment did not in fact depart from how journalists evaluated 
Eisenhower’s views on the subject while he was president. The year 1954 began with a 
number of stories predicting the imminence of China policy breakthroughs, claiming the 
administration was taking a “new look” at “the problem of the future relationship of the 
most powerful country in the world with the most populous.”22 Administration officials 
like Undersecretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter Robertson and Vice-
President Nixon quickly denied the validity of these rumors.
23
 Yet leading pundits like 
Drew Pearson remained unconvinced. A year later, Pearson in fact would claim that “the 
President has just made up that when the time is ripe he will recognize Red China” and 
that Dulles had also felt this way “for some time.”24 Eisenhower occasionally fanned the 
flames, musing about future policy flexibility. In August 1954, while answering a 
question on the subject, he noted how much the U.S. relationships with Germany and 
Japan had changed over the past decade, and how no one could have foreseen these two 
former enemies becoming close U.S. allies.
25
 
 Such utterances worried those who opposed any policy shifts. Alfred Kohlberg, a 
leading right-wing hard-liner on the subject who liked to joke that “I am the China 
Lobby,” called the State Department in November 1954 demanding to know if the 
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rumors were in any way accurate, particularly a recent report by Walter Winchell that 
Eisenhower was considering granting the communist Chinese formal diplomatic 
recognition.
26
 Dulles’s office wrote back the next day to assure Kohlberg that such 
reports had “absolutely no basis” in fact.27 In public remarks in April 1954, Dulles 
conceded “a good deal of uncertainty” among officials in the earliest days of the 
administration on the issues of diplomatic recognition and admission  to the United 
Nations, but that this “uncertainty has been dissipated,” and the U.S. government had no 
intention of changing its opposition to such actions.
28
 Yet such assurances usually fell on 
deaf ears. Even after multiple military crises involving the Chinese which nearly caused 
the U.S. to launch nuclear strikes, even after repeated public snubs by Dulles of tentative 
offers of Chinese outreach, and even after China shifted to a more intransigent foreign 
policy in line with increasingly radical and repressive domestic policies, the media still 
expected change. Seemingly nothing could convince the leading observers of the day 
that a breakthrough was just around the corner, or dissipate the fears of those who 
opposed any such policy changes. 
 The policy of the Eisenhower administration toward communist China was based 
on propositions that the regime was weak, or fragile, or both at the same time. A 
communist-led China could only threaten U.S. security and American hegemony in East 
                                                          
26
 Memorandum, Special Assistant to the Secretary Roderic L. O’Connor to Dulles, 15 November1954, 
Folder Kohlberg, Alfred, Box 83 (1954), Series Selected Correspondence, Dulles, JF Papers, Mudd 
Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey. 
27
 O’Connor to Kohlberg, 16 November 1954, Folder Kohlberg, Alfred, Box 83 (1954), Series Selected 
Correspondence, Dulles JF Papers, Mudd. 
28
 Impromptu Remarks of the Honorable John Foster Dulles before the Republican Women’s Centennial 
Conference, Washington, D.C., 7 April 1954, 5. 
 25 
 
 
Asia and the Pacific Rim if the leadership of the United States allowed that to happen. 
Eisenhower hoped to deter the Chinese from any aggressive actions by threatening them 
with weapons they did not yet possess. That approach was tested – and proved to be at 
least temporarily successful – during two military crises in the Strait of Taiwan. At the 
same time, Eisenhower endorsed low-level negotiations with Chinese diplomats for the 
release of U.S. citizens being held in China, but was unwilling to make any concessions 
which would have secured their release and resulted in higher-level meetings. Reifying 
his chosen course of intransigence was persistent fear of public opinion, which the 
president believed to be unalterably hostile to any outreach towards China. Belying this 
assumption was evidence that congress was far from unified in its support for these 
policies. Eisenhower ignored chances for an opening due to his belief that the domestic 
political risks were not worth the overseas diplomatic rewards. China in his opinion was 
not too great a threat to be ignored. It could be managed crisis by crisis, conference by 
conference, U.N. vote by U.N. vote. Though Eisenhower understood the strategic weight 
of Asia, he would not let concerns over a China menace he saw as overrated detract from 
his “Total Cold War” with the Soviet Union.29 In a reverse of the Macartney Mission to 
the Emperor Qianlong’s Qing court, China offered nothing of use to him. 
Fragile Colossus 
 Though Eisenhower assumed office in January 1953, and the Korean Armistice 
was signed in July 1953, the year 1954 is the appropriate place to begin assessing U.S. 
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peacetime policy towards communist China due to a combination of factors domestic 
and foreign. That year witnessed the ultimate decline and disgrace of Senator Joseph 
McCarthy. Though the ghost of McCarthyism would haunt all future debates about 
China policy until 1971, particularly among Democrats, his era – much of which focused 
on assessing blame for the “loss” of China – was officially over. It was also the year of 
the Geneva Conference, where the Chinese communists, led by Zhou Enlai, made their 
debut on the international diplomatic stage. The French evacuation of Indochina and the 
division of Vietnam resulting from that conference created a new front for conflict 
between the Americans and the Chinese. In the fall of 1954, the first U.N. vote occurred 
on the subject of seating Mao Zedong’s government in place of Chiang Kai-shek’s. That 
summer, inspired in large part by fears this vote might go against U.S. preferences, Cold 
War hardliners decided to form a lobbying organization which they called the 
Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United 
Nations. It was therefore the beginning of an era where the dominant question was how 
much the U.S. should seek to diplomatically isolate China, or whether or not it should 
isolate China at all. This era would end in 1971 with the official abandonment of 
isolation, exemplified by Kissinger’s meeting with Zhou, Nixon’s announcement of his 
visit to China, the ending of the travel and trade bans, and the admission of the P.R.C. to 
the U.N. 
 That the era lasted so long, in fact that it can be termed an era at all, would have 
shocked observers at the start of 1954. As with Truman at the start of 1950, they 
expected Eisenhower to make an accommodation with Mao once the metaphorical dust 
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had settled. Unlike Truman, Eisenhower’s hand was not forced by events. He had 
options, and made fateful early choices. The strategic groundwork for the choices he 
would make in 1954 was laid by a series of policy papers crafted in 1953 which applied 
his preferred strategic approach to East Asia. Eisenhower viewed Truman’s foreign 
policy, particularly during his second term, as largely an exercise in failure and futility. 
This view was shared by Dulles, who wrote in 1954 that Truman’s reactive approach to 
containment gave the initiative to the Soviets, who felt free to strike where they and their 
clients pleased, bogging down U.S. forces in desultory ground wars which played 
against America’s comparative strengths. The goal of the new administration’s foreign 
policy would be to prevent such conflicts from ever occurring. It would achieve this by 
relying “primarily upon the deterrence of striking power,” particularly the power of 
nuclear weapons, where the U.S. enjoyed a pronounced advantage.
30
 Eisenhower would 
not allow the U.S. military to be bled by its adversaries as Truman had. 
 A 1952 campaign memo attacked “the tragic inadequacy of Foreign Policy of the 
Democratic Administration in the last seven years,” particularly “its lack of serious 
purpose in Asia.” According to this memo, “the only real policy which has been 
consistently followed is watch, wait, and shiver.” Further communist advances in Asia 
would result in a crippling “psychological” blow to the U.S. strategic position.31 Fear of 
the psychological fragility of U.S. allies in the region would guide Eisenhower’s policies 
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toward China, as well as the rhetoric of those who served him. In 1953, Dulles worried 
any sign of U.S. retreat would “set up a chain reaction.” In a speech two years later, the 
Secretary of State discussed the “great danger” which would result if the “non-
Communist peoples” of Asia came to doubt U.S. resolve to halt any and all communist 
expansion on the continent.
32
  This stated goal would ultimately determine Eisenhower’s 
China policy in a manner which foreclosed nearly all options to change the temporary 
polices enacted during the Korean War. Actions the president deemed necessary to 
prevent any speck of additional territory from falling under communist rule made the 
Bamboo Curtain in Asia even less permeable than its Iron counterpart in Europe. 
 The administration laid out its policy approaches over the course of 1953 in three 
policy papers produced by the National Security Council: NSC 148 on East Asia, NSC 
146 on the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan, and NSC 166 on the Chinese communists on 
the mainland. These papers viewed the Chinese communists as the Soviet Union’s de 
facto viceroys in Asia, and stressed the internal fragility of the regime With this in mind, 
NSC 148 proposed “fostering and supporting anti-communist Chinese elements both 
outside and within China,” with the ultimate goal being “to bring about changes in China 
which will eliminate the threat from that country to Free World security.
33
 In terms of 
the scope of U.S. actions to achieve this goal, NSC 146 proposed backing not only 
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Nationalist raids against the Communist mainland and seaborne commerce with 
Communist China,” but ensure they would be able to conduct “large-scale amphibious 
operations,” clearly with an eye towards eventual invasion and reconquest of the 
mainland.
34
 A memo from the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported the “ultimate objective of 
the replacement of that regime,” showing the military and civilian officials were on the 
same side of this question.
35
 
 These arguments reached their culmination in NSC 166, which called for the 
policy goal of “reorientation of the Chinese Communist regime or its ultimate 
replacement.” While so far the communists had proven successful in consolidating 
control and achieving early economic success, they still faced critical long-term 
problems they might well not be able to overcome.
36
 With this in mind, concessions on 
the part of the U.S. would only strengthen the regime, as well as lessen the chance of a 
rivalry developing between it and the Soviets. Furthermore, the U.S. should work 
towards “denying the Chinese Communist regime full status in the international 
community.”37 Achieving legitimacy would only make the enemy stronger, and less 
liable to collapse. Outreach would actually lessen the chance of it losing the support of 
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its vital patron. Thus, before 1954, the administration had mapped out a plan of not only 
containment and isolation, but also of subversion. However, it had not had a chance to 
put it into effect, or test its worth. 
 Events would temper the boldness of early proposals, if at first only around the 
edges. NSC 5429, an update to NSC 148 composed after the Geneva Conference and 
during the early stages of the first Taiwan Straits crisis, still maintained regimes like that 
currently ruling China unavoidably “have elements of rigidity and instability which 
sometimes produce crises” which could in due time be exploited. Thus, the 
administration stuck to its original pan to “utilize all feasible and covert means” in order 
to “create discontent and internal divisions.” However, perhaps with the current external 
crisis in mind, in cautioned against agreeing to “offensive actions against mainland 
Communist China” and warned of “deliberately provoking” a war with China.38 After 
the second Taiwan Straits crisis in 1958 and the resignation of Dulles early in 1959 due 
to terminal illness, assumptions began to change, specifically those concerning the 
regime’s staying power. In January 1959 presidential aide Gordon Gray, while still 
holding out hope for the “possibility” of rebellion in the future, found no evidence for it 
occurring in the near future. He also proposed a new policy paper in light of events since 
1953.
39
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 The resulting paper, NSC 5913, produced that September during the tenure of the 
new Secretary of State Christian Herter, raised the need “to cope with the growing threat 
to Free World security posed by increasing Communist power in Asia.” The regime had 
only become stronger in the intervening years, and future planning must take into 
account the new assumption “that for the predictable future the Peiping regime will 
continue to exercise effective control over mainland China” as well as that “its military 
and economic strength and its resultant power position in Asia will continue to 
increase.”40 One might be tempted to see this as a turning point, indicating the China 
threat was being reassessed even before Kennedy took office. Yet the paper itself, and 
the officials who control policy from Eisenhower and the new Secretary of State 
Christian Herter on down, failed to process the implications of this altered assumption. 
They did not reconsider their approach to the U.N. question, or consider new attempts at 
outreach. More importantly, they did not make their new conclusion public, and thus did 
not contribute to the debate. Therefore, while admitting reality had proven initial 
predictions incorrect, NSC 5913 refused to realize the implications of this realization. 
A Tale of Two Crises 
 Having established by 1954 the hardline grand strategic approach to China which 
would endure long after its central assumption was no longer considered valid, the heart 
of Eisenhower’s China policy moving forward centered around two perilous crises in the 
Taiwan Straits which were in large part a natural outgrowth of that policy, if not 
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necessarily its inevitable result. Both crises had identical endings, yet the president was 
praised for his handling of the first and pilloried for his actions during the second. 
Eisenhower raised the possibility of communist “diversionary attacks” on the offshore 
island groups of Quemoy and Matsu, both located directly opposite Taiwan and less than 
10 miles from the Chinese coast, in an NSC meeting on 5 August 1954. The president 
also mused about a large-scale invasion of Taiwan “by a fleet of junks,” which would in 
his opinion “be a good target for an atomic bomb,” indicating his almost insouciant 
willingness to consider the tactical utilization of nuclear weapons.
41
 Less than a month 
later, on 3 September, the communists began a significant shelling of the largest island 
of the Quemoy group opposite the city of Amoy in Fujian Province. With 450,000 
soldiers in the region, as well as air superiority, there was nothing the Nationalists could 
do to prevent the communist forces from taking Quemoy, as well as the smaller Matsu 
Islands to the north, provided their leaders were willing to take the necessarily steep 
casualties. Making the situation potentially critical was the fact that the offshore islands 
were garrisoned by approximately 100,000 soldiers, fully a third of Chiang’s regular 
army. The loss of this many man would severely jeopardize the regime’s stability, if not 
the defensibility of Taiwan itself.
42
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 Faced with this situation, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Admiral James 
Radford proposed the insertion of U.S. ground forces.
43
  Believing this would both fail to 
render the islands defensible and violate his entire “New Look” strategy, Eisenhower 
stated “he was firmly opposed to any holding back like we did in Korea.” This meant 
withholding ground forces and instead using nuclear weapons on the Chinese forces 
stationed on the mainland. He understood such drastic escalation of the situation meant 
“the rest of the world would condemn us, as well as a substantial part of the U.S. 
people.” But of paramount importance to the president was to demonstrate to the 
communist world that they would not be able to “tie down U.S forces” at will as they 
had for three years in Korea.
44
 China’s timing coincided with the announcement of the 
formation of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) as well as talks for 
establishing a formal U.S. security alliance with the Nationalists on Taiwan. The 
communists wanted to demonstrate to the U.S. the dangers of making security 
guarantees with their civil war opponents.  
 With winter storms coming, the initial artillery bombardments proved but a 
prelude, giving U.S. leaders time to consider their options. Eisenhower remained 
committed to his course of action. In January he argued that threatening nuclear attack 
“would decrease the risk of war” as well as “halt the dangerous drift” East Asian security 
policy had taken since 1949.
45
 In his view, the communists were not after just Quemoy 
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and Matsu. “They were after Formosa.” The initial attacks were but a prelude to larger 
action.
46
 Knowing he needed public support to take such risks, Eisenhower sent a 
message to congress on the situation in late January. Rather than being alarmed by news 
of a possible nuclear war over a couple rocks in the ocean, the press applauded both 
Eisenhower’s firmness as well as what they took to be hints of a newly flexible approach 
to China policy. The New York Times called it a “tour de force” which reclaimed China 
policymaking from the Senate, where the writer believed it had been for the past five 
years, opening the possibility that the U.S. approach might begin to “soften.”47 The 
public appeared less hopeful, with mail to the White House running 3-to-1 against the 
president’s approach.48 
 This example of a threat of what came to be known as “Massive Retaliation” 
was, while disproportionate, still intended to be limited in scope. Low-yield atomic 
weapons would be used solely against local military targets, avoiding large 
concentrations of civilians “except in one or two instances.” Thus, it be tactical, rather 
than strategic, bombing, targeting only front-line units. Conventional ordinance was not 
seen as sufficient to destroy artillery batteries and airfields “in the face of Chinese 
manpower and the capacity to replace and rebuild.”49 Part of the reason Eisenhower had 
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faith in the deterrent value of his threat was that he believed his doubters “are 
underestimating the sanity of the Chinese Communists.”50 An irrational adversary cannot 
be easily deterred. Thus, Eisenhower did not believe Mao to be a madman. Still, 
considering the administration’s goal of regime change, Dulles wondered if it was in 
Chiang’s “long-range interest” to use such extreme methods, since even a limited atomic 
attack on the mainland “might destroy any hope of good will and future favorable 
reception of the Republic of China by the Chinese people.”51 Yet this risk, among many 
others, was seen by the administration as absolutely necessary. 
 This seemed necessary because the administration viewed the fate of Taiwan, 
and in fact the entire U.S. strategic position in the Western Pacific, as being at risk. The 
loss of the Offshore Islands would both embolden the communists and dishearten the 
nationalists.
52
 The islands represented the nationalists’ last existing link to the mainland, 
and according to Eisenhower their army was “held together by a conviction that some 
day they will go back.”53 As he explained to supporter Lew Douglas, “internal 
disillusionment” and “despair” on Taiwan would lead to the fall of the non-communist 
government.
54
 If Quemoy went, so would Taiwan, and with it “the whole U.S. security 
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position” in the region.55 Dulles explained in a February 1955 speech carried on national 
television that regional allies would conclude “that the United has no real intention of 
standing firmly behind them.”56 Eisenhower emphasized the “psychological” effect of 
losing these islands.
57
 In the past six years, the Chinese mainland had been conquered by 
communists, North Korea had survived the Korean War, and the Vietminh had driven 
the French out of Indochina and established a communist regime in North Vietnam. The 
U.S. could not afford another such defeat. On a visit to Bangkok, Dulles wrote 
Eisenhower predicting that the loss of Formosa would even “convince Japan 
communism wave of future.”58 Domino theories were not just applied to South Vietnam. 
 Some in the press accepted this speculative narrative, U.S. News writing that 
“one more advance by the Reds will collapse the morale of anti-Communist forces” 
throughout the region.
59
 While this might have worked adequately with a domestic 
audience, the leaders of important allies were another matter. Eisenhower and Dulles 
used the same arguments with these leaders they used in their own internal debates and 
in communications with the American public. In Ottawa, Dulles emphasized the 
importance of “morale” and “psychology” to the situation, and reiterated the domino 
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theorizing, arguing that if Quemoy and Matsu were lost the U.S. would be driven back to 
New Zealand and the Aleutians.
60
 Eisenhower wrote to Churchill that “we have come to 
the point where every additional backward step must be deemed a defeat for the Western 
world,” while arguing communism’s postwar advance “has been much faster and much 
more relentless than the 1940 sweep of the dictators,” a point upon which Churchill of 
all people could have corrected the president.
61
 
 After the weather cleared and the seas calmed in early April, some in the press 
expected an imminent communist attack before the beginning of the Afro-Asian 
Conference in Bandung.
62
 Whether because Mao took Eisenhower’s threats seriously, or 
because he realized a bloody battle on the eve of Zhou Enlai’s charm offensive would 
create too much cognitive dissonance, the attack never came. During the crisis, 
Eisenhower attempted to convince Chiang to significantly reduce the size of his 
garrisons on the offshore island chains, both because 100,000 men were excessive for 
defensive needs and because, were a large-scale attack to come, the loss of much smaller 
garrisons would not impair Taiwanese morale or overall defensive capabilities. 
Eisenhower complained about the difficulty of U.S. security being placed in “a fellow 
who hasn’t anything to lose,” implying that he believed Chiang – and not Mao – was the 
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irrational Chinese leader.
63
 To make matters worse, Eisenhower recognized the islands’ 
utter irrelevance in the event of an actual invasion of the mainland, writing from 
considerable firsthand experience “you do not conduct an amphibious operation against 
a hostile coast going into some tiny islands and then launching a second amphibious 
attack.”64 The ultimate absurdity was that, due to the underdeveloped infrastructure in 
Fujian Province at that time, if the communist regime was on the verge of collapse, and 
an invasion were to become feasible, the 100,000 troops on Quemoy and Matsu would 
need to be evacuated from within sight of the mainland, transported back to Taipei, and 
then re-embarked to a more promising landing point further north near the Yangtze Delta 
region. Simply put, Chiang’s force dispositions were the height of absurdity. 
 Yet they were also, in part, Eisenhower’s own handiwork. When he took office, 
Quemoy and Matsu were lightly garrisoned, as he wished them to be. Only after 
Eisenhower decided the “Unleash Chiang” by removing the 7th Fleet from the Taiwan 
Strait in order to encourage amphibious raids did the nationalist leader begin increasing 
the garrison sizes to levels Eisenhower found alarming.
65
 The U.S. president never 
reckoned with the dangers of indulging an ally he could not control because of his 
indispensability. Chiang recognized Eisenhower’s lack of  leverage, and refused to 
reduce the sizes of the garrisons in the aftermath of the first crisis, to say nothing of 
abandoning them all together in exchange for an increased U.S. naval commitment, 
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which Eisenhower offered Chiang that May through his envoys Walter Robertson and 
Admiral Radford.
66
 The president already recognized he was “on the horns of a 
dilemma” due to the need to ensure that Chiang “save face.”67 He explained in 1956 to 
British Prime Minister Anthony Eden that “if we tried to press Chiang too hard to give 
up the islands, Formosa might well be lost,” and with it the entire region.68 By late 1957, 
when then-Governor Christian Herter visited Chiang, nothing had changed. The U.S. 
still clung to its domino theory, and “the Chinese leader still dreams of returning to the 
mainland.”69 So long as both propositions held, there was no reason events could not 
repeat themselves. 
 In the meantime, the administration sought to celebrate its success. The foremost 
example of this was Dulles’s January 1956 Life Magazine interview. Its celebratory title, 
“How Dulles Averted War,” only hinted at his level of boasting. Dulles claimed the 
threat to use nuclear weapons not only saved the offshore islands in 1955, but limited 
Vietminh gains at Geneva in 1954 and ended the Korean War in 1953. Though the 
phrase “to the brink of war” was the author’s and not Dulles’s, and no one in the piece 
used the word brinksmanship, it was this article which led Adlai Stevenson to coin the 
term to describe what he – and many Democrats – viewed as the reckless foreign policy 
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of Eisenhower and Dulles.
70
 In addition, the article reinforced the notion that Dulles was 
in charge. This was understandable, since the article concluded that “all of the major 
decisions since Dulles took office have either been handled personally by him or decided 
on the basis of knowledge he had acquired on his worldwide trips.”71 More than two 
years later, a New York Times article stated “Dulles enjoys the respect and confidence of 
a President who defers to his judgment with something akin to devoutness.”72 Historians 
have offered a severe corrective to this assumption. Records of Eisenhower’s numerous 
National Security Council meetings, among other evidence, consistently show a 
president firmly in control of a foreign policy Dulles only appeared to lead because his 
actions so closely followed the president’s directives and desires. But at the time, 
Dulles’s public prominence reinforced the then-prevailing narrative of a hands-off 
executive. 
 The Second Straits Crisis began about a month before the four year anniversary 
of the first. Like all sequels that recycle the original plot, it left the public deeply 
unsatisfied. In addition, unlike during the later stages of the first crisis, U.S. observers 
did not think the communists were serious about launching an attack this time. 
Nonetheless, everyone had to show up and try to convincingly mouth their lines one 
more time. Dulles pointed out the importance of “morale” and the dangers of a 
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“cumulating rollback effect.”73 Eisenhower reiterated his belief that “there is no military 
reason for the Chinese Nationalists to hold the offshore islands,” again pointing to the 
pointlessness of the crisis from the U.S. point of view.
74
 But this time Dulles doubted 
communist intentions to assault the islands, noting how they “exercised considerable 
caution” in attempting to avoid encounters with nationalist patrols.75 For his part, 
Eisenhower once again sent envoys to attempt to convince Chiang to abandon the islands 
entirely to ensure there would be no Third Straits Crisis.
76
 In exchange, the U.S. would 
offer him additional amphibious landing craft in the case of a breakdown of communist 
control on the mainland. 
 Eisenhower recognized the U.S. was “at a great disadvantage in terms of world 
opinion.”77 Regardless, as Dulles pointed out, more was at stake than global image. The 
New Look was on the line. Once again, the communists would back down if threatened 
with ten kiloton atomic bombs.
78
 If they did not, there would be the potential for all-out 
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nuclear war. But if the U.S. did not make the threat, Eisenhower’s entire foreign policy – 
for which Dulles was the public face – would be discredited. The Chinese were not the 
only ones obsessed with “face.” Dulles explained to Eisenhower, who surely already 
understood this fact, that “we have geared our defense to use of these (atomic weapons) 
in case of hostilities of any size,” and that “if we will not use them when the chips are 
down because of adverse world opinion, we must revise our defense setup.”79 Dulles 
made the same point to British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan the same day, albeit in 
a less self-serving manner, arguing that if nuclear weapons were taken off the table in all 
but the most serious security situations “then we face a very grave situation indeed in the 
face of the massive manpower of the Sino-Soviet bloc.”80 The test was not so much of 
U.S. resolve as of the viability of the administration’s strategy of containment. 
 The crisis was over by early October, approximately two months after the 
communists began shelling. But the danger had ebbed weeks before, Eisenhower noting 
on 25 September that “we have had our first evidence that the Chinese Communists have 
some realization of the dangers inherent in a nuclear conflict with the United States.”81 
Evidently he had forgotten making the exact same observation during the first crisis. But 
the media – and the general public – had not forgotten. This made the victory decidedly 
Pyrrhic. The public reaction demonstrated the non-replicability of brinksmanship as a 
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tactic in a democracy. Eisenhower succeeded not only in saving Quemoy and Matsu – 
which he no longer desired Chiang keep. He also succeeded in discrediting the New 
Look. Editorial opinion ran heavily against Eisenhower in the first month of the second 
crisis, the Minneapolis Morning Tribune expressing the thoughts of many when its 
editors wrote “if there ever was a war that would be fought at the wrong place, at the 
wrong time and for the wrong reason, it would be a war with Communist China over the 
islands off the coast of the mainland of China.”82 
 Eisenhower felt compelled to give a televised address defending his conduct. 
While the press lauded his January 1955 remarks, his September 1958 address was 
greeted derisively, and the Democrats sensed weakness in an election year. The 
Washington Post claimed the speech “provoked the sharpest split to date in bipartisan 
support of the President’s foreign policy.”83 The normally sympathetic Wall Street 
Journal noted the irony that the New Look had fallen directly into the trap it was 
intended to bypass, stating that the crisis proved that “every place the Communists 
choose to create a provocation the United States must stand ready to fight – and fight in 
fact if it comes to that. And if that is what Mr. Eisenhower means, it is a policy without 
much hope.”84 Eisenhower saved American lives only by dramatically raising the stakes 
of failure. In addition, the intervening period of peace and quiet been wasted. The next 
week, the same newspaper asked “were there no acceptable alternatives, especially in the 
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more than three years since we specifically reaffirmed our determination to defend 
Formosa?”85 The president noticed the criticism, remarking to Dulles his belief that “as 
much as two-thirds of the world, and 50% of U.S. opinion opposes the course we have 
been following.”86 Dulles in turn told Walter Robertson that “we have a public relations 
problem of our own” and that the administration “can’t put us into war without public 
opinion supporting it.”87 As the crisis neared its conclusion in early October, pollster 
George Gallup wrote that it was hurting Republican congressional candidates among a 
crisis-weary and war-fearing public.
88
 
 Once again, after the guns fell silent, U.S. officials tried to convince Chiang to 
remove most if not all troops from the islands. Once again, he refused. From Taipei, 
Dulles cabled the president “I trust your talks with the voters are more surely persuasive 
than my talk with the Generalissimo.”89 The president raged to Herter against Chiang’s 
“illogical position,” adding that “he was just about ready to tell Chiang Kai-shek where 
he got off.”90 In June 1960, the nationalists still stationed 100,000 fighting men stationed 
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on the offshore islands.
91
 Chiang had learned nothing, the American public had forgotten 
nothing, and Eisenhower felt alienated from both. 
 Utilizing Chinese sources nearly four decades after the events, political scientist 
Thomas Christianson concluded “recovery of the islands was not a primary goal at the 
onset of China’s military operations.” Instead, Mao exploited the crisis for mass 
mobilization at the start of the Great Leap Forward’s attempts at rapid rural 
industrialization.
92
 Observers at the time intuited this to be the case, a British diplomat in 
Beijing hypothesizing that Mao’s “domestic policy of perpetual ‘campaigns’ and ‘leaps 
forward’ thrives on the stimulus of external crises.” The crucial term in his mind was 
crises “rather than wars.”93 The New York Times, without having a single correspondent 
in the country, realized Mao was using the crisis “to induce the Chinese people to make 
record exertions and to accept the most radical change in their way of life yet 
attempted.”94 This knowledge no doubt added to the absurdity of the entire episode, 
which each side making threats the other knew they did not intend to follow through on. 
But while Eisenhower failed to rally his domestic audience, Mao failed by succeeding in 
doing so with his, as would become apparent to the world within a few years. 
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Negotiations and Debates 
 During the First Straits Crisis, Eisenhower wrote to Dulles that “I devoutly hope 
that history’s inflexible yardstick will show that we have done everything in our power, 
and everything that is right, to prevent the awful catastrophe of another major war.”95 
Some historians have seen events the way Eisenhower wished they would. But in 1958, 
his contemporaries did not. He had failed to improve relations with the Chinese 
communists or bring the Chinese nationalists to heel when he had the chance, and the 
world was now paying the price with an unnecessary war scare, and a nuclear one at 
that. But once again, reporters hoped that now, at last, changed would have to come. 
Perhaps what one reporter referred to as “the strange vest-pocket war over Quemoy 
Island” would breathe new life into “Uncle Sam’s drift toward diplomatic recognition of 
Communist China.”96 At the height of the crisis, the Washington Post expressed the hope 
that it would serve as the catalyst for change.
97
 Near its conclusion, the New York Times 
claimed to notice a “somewhat belated flexibility” in Eisenhower’s China policy which 
could lead to its “realignment,” although the editors pointedly added “the pity is that this 
more flexible policy was not adopted long before the Chinese Communist attack put us 
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in our present dilemma.”98 In other words, Eisenhower had missed an opportunity to 
wage peace. 
 This is not to say Eisenhower made no attempts to alter the status quo between 
the two crises. He did make efforts, but they were halting and limited, largely due to the 
president’s unwillingness to make concessions for fear of displaying weakness towards 
an adversary. Contrary to press speculation, the administration never considered offering 
diplomatic recognition. Dulles explained in 1953 to conservative California Senator 
William Knowland that “unfortunately” Woodrow Wilson had set the precedent of 
diplomatic recognition implying “approval of a government,” and under that standard he 
was against recognizing the communists as the legitimate governing force in China.
99
 On 
the other hand, the administration was always willing to interact with that regime “on a 
de facto basis when circumstances make this useful.”100 Any consideration of formal 
recognition at a future time was contingent upon changes in Chinese behavior.
101
 In the 
meantime, Eisenhower was willing to consider “dual recognition” – the “Two Chinas” 
policy conservatives who supported Eisenhower’s approach feared his Democratic 
successors would adopt – but he knew that would not prove acceptable to either side.102 
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Thus, while Eisenhower had his doubts about nonrecognition, and did not see such an 
approach as a virtue in itself, he did not believe it useful to alter to existing situation. 
 In contrast to Dulles’s alleged shunning of Zhou at Geneva in 1954, the 
immediate aftermath of the First Straits Crisis in 1955 witnessed the first sustained 
negotiations between the two parties and rampant speculation on what these activities 
might lead to. China’s performance at the Bandung conference was largely considered a 
success, even though the final declaration was more to the U.S.’s liking than to 
China’s.103 It was during this “Bandung Moment,” less than a month after the two 
nations were nearly at war, that ambassadorial talks began in Geneva which were later 
relocated to Warsaw. The primary issue discussed was the release of several dozen U.S. 
military and civilian personnel currently being held in China. Eisenhower claimed to 
favor expanding the talks to additional subjects, over the objections of Knowland and the 
editors of Time magazine, based in their case on their distrust of communists in general 
and Chinese communists in particular.
104
 Within a month, four U.S. airmen had been 
released.
105
 Yet the talks soon bogged down over the unwillingness of the U.S. to 
reciprocate China’s good faith gestures. Admiral Radford had already leaked that he 
desired a blockade of the Chinese coast until all prisoners were released, further 
complicating the situation both abroad and at home, while shortly after the start of the 
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negotiations Eisenhower refused to allow China to be represented at the upcoming Big 
Four Conference in Geneva, a clear insult to Chinese prestige.
106
 
 Despite such self-imposed stumbling blocks, speculation built up that additional 
meetings might soon occur at a higher level, specifically between Dulles and Zhou. First 
to publicize the idea was Democratic Senator Walter George of Georgia, Chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A conservative on most issues, George was 
perhaps the earliest China dove in Congress, and before Mike Mansfield the most 
influential.
107
 Eisenhower hinted that he supported such higher-level talks, and Dulles 
appeared to welcome them as well.
108
 Yet by September their position had hardened, 
with the administration now stating a foreign ministers’ meeting would only occur after 
the release of all 41 Americans currently being held in China.
109
 Either out of sincerity 
or a desire to score diplomatic points from U.S. intransigence, Zhou formally offered to 
meet with Dulles in 1956, an invitation the administration rejected. According to the 
press, this “put Washington in a very bad light indeed.”110 Officials in the next 
administration highlighted actions such as this as cardinal errors they would not repeat. 
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Instead, in the 1960s, emphasis would repeatedly be placed on “putting the onus” for bad 
relations back upon the Chinese by making offers similar to Zhou’s in 1956. 
 Over time, Zhou’s rejected 1956 invitation came to be seen as Eisenhower’s lost 
chance to change the situation for the better. In early 1971, Kissinger described the 
renewed potential for an opening of high-level contacts with the Chinese as a return to 
1955, reflecting this sentiment. Whether Dulles and Zhou could have accomplished 
much had they met is doubtful. Even if such a meeting led to the release of all U.S. 
prisoners, there was still the travel and trade bans. Even if the U.S. unilaterally lifted 
these restrictions, the Chinese would likely not reciprocate by allowing travel and trade 
unless the U.S. relented and allowed the P.R.C. to join the U.N. This step would have 
been even less acceptable to Eisenhower than recognition. While he toyed with the latter, 
he never expressed interest in considering the former. Though later erstwhile policy 
reformers proposed incremental steps, China policy was a seamless garment, a fabric 
whose strings could not be tugged at without risking wholesale unravelling. Unlike their 
Democratic successors, Eisenhower and his officials understood this, as would Nixon 
later on. Still, such a high-level meeting might had prevented the Second Straits Crisis, 
which would have proven politically useful to Eisenhower, given its negative effect on 
domestic opinion of his leadership. 
 But even such a symbolic step was too much, given the administration’s 
commitment to denying the Chinese communists international legitimacy and its fears of 
showing weakness. Dulles defended this intransigence in 1956 by claiming the Chinese 
were using their American captives as “political hostages.” He refused to exchange a 
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meeting with Zhou for the release of many, if not most, of them. To Dulles, such an 
agreement would imply the Chinese could “impose their will upon the United States.”111 
Eisenhower blamed his opposition on the fact that “the feeling of the American people 
against Red China was so strong that it would be almost impossible to have such a 
meeting.”112 But as Dulles’s remarks indicated, the true issue was not domestic opinion, 
or even the prisoners, but face. The administration would not lessen tensions at the risk 
of humiliation. 
 While worrying about psychological factors among Asian allies, they also had 
their own concerns with image and morale. Foreign policy adviser and Time-Life editor 
C.D. Jackson acknowledged that nonrecognition “is slowly being undermined by the de 
facto land, population and administrative mass of the Mainland regime.” However, 
formal recognition would be seen by the world not as “real-politik” but as “an act of 
appeasement.”113 Domestically, the effect of U.N. admission would, according to 
Eisenhower, “be catastrophic in this country” due to fresh memories of American losses 
in Korea.
114
 Even superpowers could feel fragile. 
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 Eisenhower used this alleged fragility based on fears of negative domestic 
opinion to justify his intransigence to frustrated allies. He told British representatives 
that “our public opinion” would not support Dulles meeting with Zhou, and the 
Canadians that the American public would not countenance communist China’s 
admission to the U.N.
115
 He claimed to favor trading with China, but again blamed 
public opinion for his inability to act.
116
 He told Nehru that “he would like to get our 
people over their currently very averse attitude toward Red China,” adding that he “does 
not understand” why the American people appeared to fear the Chinese more than the 
Russians.
117
 Eisenhower did not believe he could change the minds of most Americans, 
and certainly would not risk trying on an issue such as China which was a low priority 
for him. 
 In addition, the strongest opposition to any change was centered in his own 
political party. Conservative Republicans scored political points after 1949 by arguing 
the Truman administration failed to adequately support Chiang’s government during the 
Chinese Civil War. McCarthy was hardly alone in this endeavor. Some of these voices 
came by 1952 to be termed the “China Lobby,” a phrase they rejected since it implied 
both dual loyalty and that they were a minority pressure group. In addition, there was at 
that time no formal organization advocating for supporting the Chinese nationalists and 
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isolating the Chinese communists. This changed in 1954 with the decision by certain 
early conservative activists to form the Committee of One Million Against the 
Admission of Communist China to the United Nations. These activists worried about the 
upcoming U.N. vote on admission, fearing abandonment by key U.S. allies. As 
Christopher Emmet explained to Minnesota Representative Walter Judd, in his recent 
visit to Britain Emmet had been struck by the widespread belief in that nation that 
opposition in the U.S. to including communist China in the community of nations 
existed only among an extreme faction, and was not a widely held belief among the 
general public. A mass organization supported by members of both political parties 
could dispel that notion.
118
 Liberal Democratic Senator Paul Douglas was an early and 
prominent member of the new organization, and the sole Democrat to appear at the April 
1955 press conference announcing the formation of the organization. He seconded 
Emmet’s reasoning, explaining that “if our allies know this is not just the position of 
small minority on the ultra-conservative side, they may reckon with the view more 
fully.”119 The group could only succeed if it remained bipartisan in membership, giving 
the appearance of a public consensus on the issue. 
 Marvin Liebman, who in 1955 worked as Emmet’s assistant, became Secretary 
of the Committee of One Million, handling its daily business, including fundraising and 
publicity. But Walter Judd remained the face of the organization. As a congressman, he 
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enjoyed access to the president, and was on very good terms with many of his foreign 
policy officials. The Committee grew out of an effort begun in 1953 to collect one 
million signatures opposing the admission of communist China to the United Nations. 
After the announcement of this goal, Judd met at the White House with Eisenhower, 
providing the effort with publicity and legitimacy.
120
 He was also in communication with 
Dulles, and called “Mr. China Policy” by Walter Robertson.121 Robertson was seen at 
the time as the China Lobby’s conduit to Eisenhower, and he told Judd in 1959 that “this 
administration has been trying to implement the policies which you long have 
advocated.”122 The administration’s relationship with members and allies of the 
Committee varied based on Eisenhower’s level of personal respect for the individual. He 
appeared indifferent to Judd, but fond of New Jersey Republican Senator Alexander 
Smith, who was a member of the lobby’s Steering Committee. Dulles was a close friend 
of Smith’s, and after Smith retired from the Senate in 1958 he became one of 
Eisenhower’s foreign policy advisers.123 
 On the other hand, Eisenhower was downright contemptuous of Republican 
Senate Majority Leader William Knowland, calling the conservative standard-bearer 
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“the biggest disappointment I have found since I have been in politics.”124 He appeared 
to not respect the senator’s intellect, and no doubt was annoyed after Knowland leaked 
the news that Radford supported blockading China, an action Eisenhower adamantly 
opposed.
125
 Overall, Eisenhower’s relationship with the Committee of One Million was 
best summed up by his administration’s handling of communications with Liebman in 
1957 concerning his worries about Eisenhower possibly relaxing the trade ban. While 
deciding a letter from the president himself was not necessary, Eisenhower’s aides 
concluded that “in view of the prominence of the Committee of One Million” it would 
be advisable for White House Chief of Staff Sherman Adams to write the response.
126
 
Eisenhower respected the lobby’s influence, particularly on Capitol Hill. But his fear of 
public opinion extended beyond the Committee’s supporters, or its limited ability to 
inflame mass sentiment. 
 While denying it was itself a “China Lobby,” the Committee believed there 
existed a “Red China Lobby” consisting of ideologically suspect professors, greedy 
businessmen, and naïve religious leaders, identified by Liebman as “professional do-
gooders, misguided liberals, and fearful Americans who believe appeasement to be the 
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best policy.”127 Eventually, the academics would prove to be their most articulate and 
influential adversaries. But for most of the Eisenhower years, the academics kept a low 
profile, many of them no doubt still recovering from the attacks they sustained during 
the McCarthy Era. By 1957, a few began to speak out, particularly John King Fairbank 
of Harvard and Arthur Doak Barnett of the Council on Foreign Relations. Fairbank 
called for policy reform in the April 1957 issue of the Atlantic, while Barnett advocated 
open debate of the issue in a Foreign Policy Association pamphlet.
128
 For the time being, 
these tentative forays had no effect on public opinion. But later events would prove 
Liebman was correct to view men like Fairbank and Barnett as potential threats. 
 Eisenhower claimed Congress posed an insuperable obstacle to any policy 
reforms during his time in office. Historians have taken him at his word. Yet at the time 
reporters noticed pronounced fissures on Capitol Hill regarding China policy which 
prefigured those of the late-1960s, when Democrats and liberal Republicans joined 
forces to call for policy change, isolating support for the status quo among a right-wing 
rump. As early as February 1955, veteran pundit Arthur Krock predicted support at the 
1956 Democratic Convention for high-level negotiations with China, and a split on that 
issue at the Republican Convention. At the start of 1956, the New York Times claimed 
moderate “Eisenhower Republicans” now supported “a practical not a formal” 
recognition of Communist China, which the editors expected Eisenhower to pursue in 
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his second term. After the election, a Times story claimed “a powerful Senate group” 
was seeking to lift the trade ban. This group, supposedly led by Walter George and 
Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, was expected to attract “considerable liberal 
Republican support.”129 Though George no doubt supported such moves, he was part of 
no group of this sort. Yet there were some who like him expressed at least an openness 
to policy change. Senator J. William Fulbright, who would soon succeed George as 
Foreign Relations chair, predicted in 1957 that in the future it would be necessary to 
recognize communist China. He would soon lead efforts to unite academics and what 
Republican Senator Hugh Scott termed the “non-braying jackasses” on his Foreign 
Relations Committee to call for policy change.
130
 
 While keeping quiet for the time being, Mike Mansfield had long supported a 
“flexible” foreign policy on China and other issues. After the 1960 elections, his aide 
Frank Valeo noted how “China policy in the past eight years has stood still while the 
situation has changed,” though he recognized bringing this situation into balance was 
“likely to be controversial.”131 A rationale for undertaking such controversial policy 
reform was offered in 1958 during the Second Straits Crisis by the Kansas City Star. 
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Noting “we cannot overthrow” the Chinese communists, the editors proposed that 
recognition and U.N. admission be “dispassionately and hard-headedly” examined to 
pave the way for their future implementation.
132
 This would remain an isolated sentiment 
for the next half-decade, but in the mid-1960s swiftly became the media consensus on 
China policy, paving the way for acceptance of Nixon’s moves in the early 1970s. 
Threat and Menace 
 The main difference between these later eras and Eisenhower’s time was how the 
Chinese threat was perceived. In the 1950s, China was either seen as not dangerous or as 
dangerous but fragile. Expressing the former view, Eisenhower remarked in a 1955 
meeting of the National Security Council that he “was not afraid of Communist China – 
not in this decade at least.”133 Many, including his Secretary of State, doubted it would 
make it into the next decade. Only months into the regime’s existence, Dulles claimed 
the communists in China “will find it very difficult to establish its uncontested rule 
unless we help that by seeming, ourselves, to accept that result.” Provided that did not 
occur, “the Communist offensive in the East will be checked on the rocks of internal 
difficulties within China.”134 In 1954, he wrote Clare Boothe Luce that “despotisms 
always look formidable and impregnable from the outside,” but “they are usually rotten 
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on the inside.”135 Such assumptions argued for the virtues of nonrecognition. Adding a 
certain moral element, and alluding to Dean Rusk’s characterization of the regime as a 
“Slavic Manchukuo,” leading U.S. historian of China Stanley Hornbeck reminded a 
1955 audience that “the United States did not recognize Manchukuo. Also – Manchukuo 
did not stay.”136 In a 1954 article in the Saturday Evening Post, the journalist Joseph 
Alsop situated the regime’s strengths and weaknesses within the context of distant 
Chinese history, comparing Mao’s rule to the short-lived Qin and Sui dynasties which 
collapsed after trying to change too much too quickly.
137
 
  Belief in the notion of China as a fragile threat did not preclude some from 
emphasizing the threat over the fragility. General James Van Fleet, the former 
Commander of United Nations Forces in Korea, travelled for over three months in 1954 
across the Pacific Rim on behalf of Eisenhower. His report to the president labeled 
China “a greater menace to the Free World than the Soviet Union itself.”138 In an article 
published in U.S. News upon returning, Van Fleet cautioned Americans that “I don’t 
think that time is on our side.”139 Yet a few months later, that same magazine argued that 
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while “acting tough,” the Chinese “are leading from appalling weakness.”140 A 
continued policy of isolation was the best way to keep them in that state of weakness. 
The New York Times, which a decade later – upon reconsidering the regime’s stability – 
would lead the calls for policy change, in 1954 labelled the proposed benefits of 
outreach to China a “dangerous delusion.” Zhou Enlai’s virtuoso performance at the 
recent Geneva Conference, establishing him as “a formidable adversary,” only 
confirmed this assessment.
141
 Leading China scholar Richard Walker called China “a 
major power on the world scene” in 1958, but that only strengthened his support for a 
policy designed to “exploit the weaknesses of the country, to make him (Mao) fail.”142 
 Walter Robertson summed up all these views in a 1959 speech which began by 
noting the “growing fear of the growing power and threat of Red China” among the non-
communist nations of Asia. Yet ending China’s isolation would only compound the 
problem. With this is mind, the administration would “take no action which would create 
international prestige for this regime.” He concluded by telling his audience that “the 
cure for muddy water” is “time,” a reference to a Chinese saying implying time was not 
on Mao’s side, and all the U.S. had to do was wait his regime out.143 But in the interim, 
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the Chinese communists remained a great menace to their southern periphery, and had to 
be contained. 
 Dulles claimed in 1955 that the Chinese were both “more belligerent” than the 
Soviets and enjoyed “a cultural prestige in Asia not enjoyed by Russia in Europe.”144 
Dulles had recently returned from the region, where he noticed that “everywhere there 
were people who were frightened and worried” about “aggressive Chinese Communist 
intentions.” The Secretary of State did not anticipate conventional military action on the 
part of the Chinese, arguing instead that they would encourage aggression and 
subversion “by all means short of open invasion.”145 Allen Dulles argued that China was 
setting its sights on Southeast Asia, where it faced the least resistance. Walt Rostow 
claimed the greatest point of weakness was South Vietnam, but also argued that so long 
as that nation held, China would not seek to expand its influence anywhere else.
146
 
Given the disparity between Chinese goals and capabilities, containment could be 
achieved at a low cost, while failure to contain China would exact an extremely high 
price. 
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 Though none disputed the containment aspect of the policy, some questioned 
isolation on the assumption that the regime was not going away. An early voice to this 
effect was Marquis Childs of the Washington Post, who in 1954 claimed the 
administration “has not yet come to grips with the most massive and formidable 
alteration in the world that we have witnessed this century,” the creation of a united, 
powerful, and hostile China.
147
 As the decade advanced, this conviction slowly spread, 
with Newsweek in 1958 noting “an astonishing nine-year record of achievement” by the 
Chinese communists.
148
 Even those who hewed to existing policy such as State 
Department official J. Graham Parsons realized by 1959 that “uprisings on a national 
scale or even large-scale regional uprisings are most unlikely to occur within the 
foreseeable future.”149 But while some assumptions were being questioned or 
overturned, few if any followed the obvious policy implications. That would have to 
wait for officials in the next administration. 
 Underlying much of the fear of China during this period were considerations of 
race – the merging of the Red Menace with the Yellow Peril. The fact that communist 
China was powerful, antagonistic, and non-white made it threatening in a way the Soviet 
Union could never be, no matter how many armored divisions or intercontinental 
ballistic missiles it deployed. Racial considerations also might have, for lack of a better 
term, colored the administration’s reactions to attempts by the Chinese communists at 
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outreach or tentative rapprochement. Gordon Chang claimed “prejudice against Asians 
permeated the entire top levels of the administration.” While recognizing it was 
“difficult to judge” if this influenced policy, Chang hypothesized that it led Eisenhower 
and Dulles to view Chinese acts of kindness as “Asian trickery” and declarations of 
hostility as proof of “Asian fanaticism.”150 
 However, the extant record does not bear this contention out. The isolated 
examples of Dulles and Eisenhower making prejudiced remarks were far outweighed – 
in terms of policymaking implications – by their anticolonial sensitivity to Asians’ own 
views on race, particularly hostility throughout the region to continued white 
domination. Regarding decolonization, Walter Judd remarked to Eisenhower in 1954 
that Asians “are afraid the United States will stay with the White people,” to which 
Eisenhower replied “maybe Judd had got something there.”151 Eisenhower was reminded 
in a 1952 memo that while China’s neighbors opposed communism, “they are equally or 
even more interested in ridding themselves of ‘white man’s’ rule,” creating a delicate 
tightrope for the incoming president to walk in his Asian containment policies.
152
 After a 
violent encounter in 1957 between a U.S. soldier and members of the local population 
led to small-scale riots in Taipei, Eisenhower wondered if the U.S. should have any 
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military bases in the region “if they hate us so much.”153 For his part, Dulles – whom 
Chang cast as even more prejudiced than the president – cautioned at the height of the 
First Straits Crisis that it was “of the utmost importance that the issue should not take on 
the appearance of a struggle between races.”154 Even if these two leaders were 
prejudiced in personal beliefs, they were sensitive to the racial feelings of non-whites, 
and their policies reflected the latter over the former. 
Passing and Perpetual Rhetoric 
 The administration’s refusal in 1956 to have Dulles meet with Zhou did not 
dampen the expectations of significant and imminent policy alteration. That nothing had 
changed so far was chalked up to the upcoming election as well as bureaucratic inertia, 
Joseph Harsch of the Christian Science Monitor writing in a front-page story that “the 
process by which the machinery of a great and powerful government adjusts itself to 
changed circumstances is of necessity a slow and ponderous one – more like the 
movement of an ocean liner than of a bicycle or a motor car.”155 Events abroad appeared 
to be working against existing policy. At the end of 1956, noted psychic Jeane Dixon 
predicted communist China’s admission to the U.N. in the upcoming year. With perhaps 
more credible sourcing, the Washington Post reported that “a highly-placed United 
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States official” expected the same result.156 In addition, it was still widely believed 
Eisenhower would welcome an end to the policy of isolating China. Journalist Robert 
Donovan, a reporter with the New York Herald Tribune who had enjoyed extensive 
access to President Eisenhower during his first term in office, wrote in the Saturday 
Evening Post in January 1957 that the president “has long been troubled by doubts about 
the wisdom of endless nonrecognition of Red China.” Donovan viewed Eisenhower’s 
purported desire to change China policy as part of an overall mission to marginalize the 
conservative wing of the Republican Party.
157
 This report, combined with speculation 
about an end to the trade ban and a concerted push by major U.S. newsgathering 
organizations for a partial lifting of the travel ban, had conservatives fretting that 
Eisenhower was really going to set them adrift. 
 In part to quell this speculation, Secretary of State Dulles gave an address in late 
June at a Lions Club gathering in San Francisco. It would be the most comprehensive 
and publicized remarks on China policy by a high-ranking Eisenhower official to date, 
and come to define the administration’s approach for posterity. It is largely because of 
this speech that contemporaries and historians alike forgot about the near-constant 
expectations for policy change among the press while Eisenhower was in office. China 
Lobby ally Robertson helped his boss craft the speech. Robertson reminded Dulles “this 
is a very important speech” which should not be allowed to be subject to multiple 
interpretations. He noted the speculation of imminent policy change, as well as recent 
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remarks by Democratic senators Green, Fulbright, Hubert Humphrey, and Warren 
Magnuson supporting such a course of action.
158
 In his address on 28 June 1957, Dulles 
reiterated opposition to recognition and U.N. membership, as well as travel to and trade 
with China. He attacked those who claimed such steps were inevitable, calling this “the 
least cogent” argument for policy change. The speech’s enduring passage came near its 
conclusion, when Dulles declared that “we can confidently assume that international 
communism’s rule of strict conformity is, in China as elsewhere, a passing and not a 
perpetual phase. We owe it to ourselves, our allies, and the Chinese people to do all we 
can to contribute to that passing.”159 Though he did not use these exact words, Dulles 
would be forever connected with the idea that communist rule in China was “a passing 
phase.” A sympathetic observer might claim in his defense that Dulles was not merely 
predicting the regime’s collapse, but perhaps its evolution. Technically it was 
“communism’s rule of strict conformity” which was the passing phase. The market-
based reforms begun under Deng Xiaoping could be seen as having turned Maoism into 
“a passing phase.” But that interpretation does not conform to Dulles’s repeated prior 
expressions of his belief in regime collapse. 
 The press noted Dulles’s speech as an attempt to reassure supporters of the 
existing policy at home and abroad as well as to squelch any and all speculation of 
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policy change.
160
 While Dulles emphatically succeeded in that first mission, he failed in 
the second, such was the continuing strength of expectations that Eisenhower desired 
change on China policy. Taiwanese diplomat George Yeh congratulated Dulles on the 
address, noting how when Chiang read a translation of the text he “was particularly 
impressed by your reference to the rule of international Communism in China as a 
‘passing and not a perpetual phase.’”161 C.D Jackson termed the speech “interesting, 
exciting, virile, and anticipated the counterarguments so skillfully and straightforward 
that that dragon will have very few teeth left.”162 Judd effusively praised the address on 
the floor of the House of Representatives, an action for which Dulles sent a warm thank 
you note.
163
 Still, within two months, the New York Times termed the speech “a kind of 
fireman operation” which only delayed the inevitable alteration of existing policy.164 The 
media simply refused to not believe a change was going to come. 
 The issue which aroused the most rampant speculation in the months leading up 
to Dulles’s address was a possible lifting of the trade ban, established by an executive 
order given by Truman during the Korean War applying the 1949 Export Control Act.
165
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Before the onset of that conflict, Dulles himself had privately wondered “is recognition 
of the Chinese communist government necessary for the conduct of trade between the 
United States and China?”166 China hard-liners had always worried trade would become 
the thin edge of the rapprochement wedge due to its appeal among their natural political 
allies in the business world. Washington University Professor George Taylor wrote 
Stanley Hornbeck in 1954 about a meeting he had with a group of Seattle bankers, 
finding that “every last one of them was a Republican and in favor of trading with 
Communist China as quickly as possible, and if this meant recognition then why not 
recognize.” In 1956, Liebman noted with concern the support of the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce’s president for lifting the trade ban.167 Internally, the administration 
concluded such an action “would constitute a concession without an adequate quid pro 
quo,” hurt U.S. “prestige” in the region, and “might adversely affect U.S. public 
opinion.”168 The State Department noted how between mid-1955 and mid-1956 support 
of trade with China in public opinion polls had dropped dramatically.
169
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 In the weeks leading up to Dulles’s speech, Eisenhower considerably muddied 
the waters at a press conference by refusing to rule out a reevaluation of the trade ban.
170
 
The speech ended speculation for the next few months, though largely because of 
concrete evidence of a reconsideration of the travel ban. On 6 August 1956, the Chinese 
communists announced they would admit U.S. journalists. The next day, the State 
Department reaffirmed the travel ban, and Eisenhower followed suit two weeks later.
171
 
The print media now transitioned from observers to participants. In February 1957, the 
American Newspaper Publishers Association launched a formal protest.
172
 The 
administration responded first with an argument that the Chinese unfairly tied ending the 
travel ban to the release of U.S. prisoners, turning them into hostages to be exchanged 
for concessions, which only succeeded in casting itself in a worse media light by 
implying Eisenhower’s obstinacy not only kept out reporters who wanted to go to China, 
but Americans held in China against their will in. Second, it argued that lack of 
diplomatic representation prevented the U.S. government from protecting American 
journalists in China. When this was scoffed at, the administration finally raised the 
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possibility that the reporters would be hoodwinked by their Chinese hosts and turned 
into instruments of propaganda.
173
 
 Rather than dig this hole any deeper and subject itself to further public ridicule, 
on 22 August 1957 the State Department decided to approve visas for a limited number 
of journalists to visit China. However, it refused to allow Chinese journalists to visit the 
United States, and this lack of reciprocity led to a Chinese refusal to allow the U.S. 
newsmen to visit.
174
 The caveat, coupled with Dulles’s address two months earlier, 
would indicate a certain lack of seriousness behind the administration’s offer. Such a 
conclusion is further supported by a July memo worrying that any relaxation of the 
travel ban “would be interpreted as a weakening of our China policy in some Asian 
nations,” as well as an August letter from Dulles to Jackson explaining why he disagreed 
with Jackson’s support for allowing reporters to travel to China. Dulles wrote that “I 
believe the sense of ostracism – being treated as different, and not morally the equal of 
other countries – is the greatest pressure we can bring to bear” to lead to the release of 
all the U.S. prisoners.
175
 This rejection of outreach, and its conflation with appeasement, 
typified the administration’s approach to the Chinese communists. 
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With Apathy and Hostility 
 Thus, the contemporaneous assessment of Eisenhower’s China policy was the 
reverse of that during Nixon’s early years. While the latter president’s July 1971 
announcement of his upcoming visit to the Chinese mainland came as a complete and 
utter shock to nearly all informed observers, despite multiple signals he desired to take 
such a journey, Eisenhower’s peacetime confirmation of President Harry Truman’s 
wartime isolation of the People’s Republic never ceased to be a surprise. As president, 
Eisenhower established what for 17 years would be the U.S. China policy status quo of 
no diplomatic recognition, opposition to U.N. admission, and bans on trade and travel. 
He set precedents which required immense efforts to overturn. Yet few believed he 
supported these actions, and many expected them to constitute a passing phase in U.S. 
foreign policy. Barely anyone realized Eisenhower was laying the cornerstone of U.S. 
Asia policy for a generation. What was more, provocative U.S. actions and utterances 
sparked an escalating hostility spiral with the Chinese which it would take nearly a 
decade after Eisenhower left office to undo. Henry Kissinger noted that in his first 
meetings with Zhou Enlai in July 1971 that “the only time” the Chinese Premier 
displayed anger “was when he was talking about Dulles” and his behavior at the 1954 
Geneva Conference.
176
 Zhou repeatedly claimed in the ensuing decades that Dulles 
ostentatiously refused to shake his hand at that meeting. While extensive historical 
investigations have nearly definitively debunked this claim, the legend proved more 
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important than mere facts. The alleged snub became the symbol of Eisenhower’s – and 
America’s – intransigent and at times insulting treatment of Chinese communists. When 
Richard Nixon finally set foot on Chinese soil, the first thing he made sure to do was 
shake Zhou Enlai’s hand in full view of the cameras, to definitely indicate that a new era 
had dawned. 
 In April 1971, Max Frankel recalled how on the eve of leaving office Eisenhower 
warned incoming President Kennedy that any relaxation of China policy by the new 
president would “force him out of retirement to lead the opposition.”177 Nancy Bernkopf 
Tucker debunked this claim, arguing instead that all evidence points to Eisenhower using 
this conversation to emphasize the need for Kennedy to take a tough stand on communist 
infiltration of Laos. This assessment accords with the archival evidence of their 
conversation.
178
 Tucker concluded that Eisenhower and Dulles “misled contemporaries 
and historians” with their harsh rhetoric due to an unwillingness to confront domestic 
opposition to the policy changes they preferred.
179
 Tucker was clearly incorrect about 
Eisenhower misleading contemporaries. If anything, the media believed he was more 
flexible on China than was actually the case. She also underrated the importance of his 
and Dulles’s public rhetoric on long-term relations with the Chinese. Whether or not 
they believed fully in the policies they followed, these two statesmen initiated a 
peacetime hostility spiral with the Chinese which foreclosed the option of policy change 
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for close to a decade after their departure. They allowed the U.S. to remain for Mao, in 
the phrase of Thomas Christenson, useful adversaries. Given the willingness of many 
prominent senators to support or at least acquiesce to most policy changes then under 
consideration, one must also conclude that Eisenhower’s obstinacy was based less on a 
need to mollify public opinion than on a fear of appearing weak to internal political and 
external diplomatic allies. More than Mao, or even Chiang, it was Eisenhower who was 
obsessed with saving face. 
 Near the end of Eisenhower’s second term, two events commenced which would 
dramatically alter perceptions of the Chinese communists in the next decade – the Great 
Leap Forward and the beginning of the Sino-Soviet conflict. The C.I.A. failed to see 
China’s impending disaster, going so far as to worry in October 1959 about “the threat 
of millions of tons of exportable rice hanging over Southeast Asia” due to China’s 
booming food production.
180
 Even without access to the mainland, the U.S. press sensed 
impending disaster, warning China was “close to economic chaos” and soon would have 
to severely shift course to avoid further calamity.
181
 As for China’s deteriorating 
relationship with their Soviet allies and patrons, which exacerbated China’s economic 
difficulties, historians have recognized for three decades that, while officially pushing 
the notion of a communist monolith, the Eisenhower administration worked to cause 
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fissures in the alliance.
182
 Dulles’s preferred approach was “to keep pressure on 
Communist China” in order to punish that regime for its Soviet alliance. This policy of 
tough hate was also backed by Walter Judd, who expressed the hope that one day the 
Chinese would realize that “Moscow cannot supply its needs.”183 The 1954 Quantico 
Vulnerabilities Panel convened to advise the administration on how to win the Cold War 
concluded “Sino-Soviet relations cannot be broken at this time, but they can be strained 
by continuing to isolate the Chinese communists.
184
 
 By the end of the decade, it was clear to all that the alliance was at the very least 
troubled. The NSC policy paper on the Far East written during Herter’s brief tenure as 
Secretary of State predicted that “despite likely frictions the Sino-Soviet alliance will 
hold firm,” and the State Department maintained as late as August 1960 that “frictions 
do exist, but that interest in continuing relationship overrides frictions.”185 This only 
added to the notion that the present policy still suited events. Soon, that would no longer 
prove to be the case. 
 In January 1960, William F. Buckley quipped that “Mr. Eisenhower has been 
pretty good where China is concerned (indeed, he tends to be pretty good on everything 
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to which his does not turn his attention.)”186 This punchline summed up the situation 
quite well. Conservatives had much to complain about regarding Eisenhower’s 
presidency, but China policy was not one of their complaints. This was in part because 
the president had other priorities, and devoted his attention to communist China only 
when compelled to. That turned out to be quite frequently, but his involvement rarely 
extended beyond crisis management. While he was applauded for his approach during 
his first term, after the Second Straits Crisis Eisenhower began to attract critics. Even 
Reader’s Digest came by 1959 to support a lifting of the travel ban. Noting that 
“communist China is a nation organized to work and to hate,” it claimed person-to-
person contacts was the only way to counteract this dangerous trend.
187
 Senator 
Mansfield came to a similar conclusion in 1960, at least with regard to the need for an 
exchange of journalists.
188
 The beginning of change appeared around the corner. Yet a 
1957 article in the Christian Science Monitor regarding the debate that year over 
exchanging reporters offered a prescient warning. Noting how the domestic needs of 
each nation were rarely in sync, and how many of the proposals for outreach were mere 
gamesmanship, it observed that “one side unbolts its door only when it is sure the other 
side’s door is going to be locked.”189 This would prove both a fitting epilogue for 
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Eisenhower’s two terms, and well as an apt prologue for the two presidents who would 
succeed him for the next eight years. 
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CHAPTER III 
DON’T LET’S START:  QUESTIONING CONSENSUS IN THE KENNEDY YEARS 
 
“I cannot believe that a policy of immobility can serve us well in a world where change 
is the rule.” - Averell Harriman1 
 
 On 17 December 1962, the Kennedy White House hosted a Nobel Laureate. She 
had not come to receive an award, attend a banquet, or discuss the arts. She was there to 
plead her case. Pearl Buck's cause, as usual, was China. She believed the people of 
Taiwan lived under grave danger from Mao Zedong's communists. But rather than 
support Chiang Kai-shek, much less “unleash” him on the mainland, Buck was willing to 
offer him – and the island he ruled - as a sacrifice for peace among the Chinese, and 
between communist China and the western world. According to Michael Forrestal, “Miss 
Buck expounded at length on her fear that unless something was done in the very near 
future, the people of mainland China would become the permanent enemies of the 
Western World. She felt it was essential for the United States to make an attempt to reach 
a modus vivendi with Red China before the death of Chiang Kai-shek.” Buck predicted 
Chiang's death would bring about “a collapse of the Taiwanese political and economic 
structure, leading to war.” To prevent this catastrophe for the sake of all involved, “Miss 
Buck proposed that we make a discreet but very strong effort to convince the 
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Generalissimo that his place in history can only be assured by a reunion under the 
auspices of the Formosa Chinese with their Mainland brothers.” The method of this 
reunion would involve the preservation of the “de facto independence of Formosa for a 
10 to 25-year period with an agreement at the end of the period for a negotiated 
settlement based upon a plebiscite or some other device.”2 
 Buck maintained the United States would not be acting alone on this matter, 
insisting “throughout the conversation” that there was “communication and a basis for 
accommodation between Mao and Chou En-lai on the one hand and the Gimo (Chiang) 
and his followers on the other.” What was needed to reach an agreement and preserve 
peace in East Asia was American involvement. At that moment, Kennedy was the man to 
provide it. According to Forrestal, Miss Buck said that she had been “convinced by the 
President's handling of the Cuban crisis that it might be possible in his Administration 
for this problem to be tackled, and that was why she had come to Washington with her 
proposal.”3 
 Buck's books, particularly The Good Earth, played a major role during the 1930s 
and 1940s in creating an American affection for and paternalistic identification with the 
Chinese people, sentiments which made the communist takeover in 1949 and the 
following year's attacks across the Yalu River particularly traumatic and inexplicable, 
fueling support for the China Lobby’s preferred policies of isolating a regime so 
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obviously anathema to the main currents of Chinese culture.
4
 However, Buck herself 
blamed Chinese militancy on these policies of isolation and hostility, writing in 1954 
that “had we kept the doors open, I believe that China would not have been compelled to 
follow Russia as her sole friend. But we closed the doors as fast as we could, not 
knowing what we did.” She even maintained her affiliation with the Institute for Pacific 
Relations, founded in the 1940s by Owen Lattimore and John Fairbank and accused by 
Senator Joseph McCarthy and his supporters at the heart of the China Lobby of being a 
communist-front organization.
5
 She was thus self-consciously a woman of the Left when 
it came to China policy. Unlike “the Lattimores and the Fairbanks,” whom 
Representative Kennedy had memorably blamed by name in 1949 for the communist 
conquest of mainland China, her celebrity gave her entrée to the halls of power in the 
early 1960s.
6
  
 Like most prognosticators during this period of what the future held for China, 
no matter their ideological leanings, Buck was partially correct but mostly wrong. 
Taiwan was in no danger of collapse, and those in positions of power who agreed with 
Buck’s desire for change at this time actually leaned towards a “Two Chinas” policy, 
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believing in the inevitability of Taiwanese independence, not reabsorption by the 
mainland. Yet her fundamental supposition – that the United States must reach out to the 
Chinese communists precisely because they were menacing and dangerous, proved 
prescient, and would soon become increasingly prevalent, both within the administration 
and in many prominent organs of the mainstream print media. Ultimately, U.S. leaders 
would feel compelled to take these actions before Chiang’s passing, in large part to 
prevent the P.R.C. from settling into permanent pariah status. The notion that the 
inevitability of China’s rise to great power status necessitated the end of U.S. attempts to 
isolate the Chinese communists remained a minority opinion, but for the first time it 
would be expressed by those with influence over opinion and access to power. 
 It was during Kennedy years that it dawned on most Americans – and many 
within the administration – that the Chinese communist regime was here to stay, and in 
the long term was only going to get stronger and become more threatening to U.S. 
interests. This sentiment manifested itself both in the popular culture, where Chinese 
villains began supplanting Russian ones, and in debates within the State Department and 
the National Security Council. The beginnings of the Sino-Soviet split both presented 
potential opportunities to exploit intra-bloc dissension and indicated that even China’s 
closest allies were growing wary of its assertiveness. At the same time, the ease with 
which Mao’s regime survived the disastrous famines caused by the Great Leap Forward, 
its accelerating nuclear weapons program, and its 1962 battlefield defeat of Indian forces 
in the Himalayas further confirmed its durability. All these factors led officials like 
Chester Bowles, Robert Komer, and Roger Hilsman to argue for outreach to the Chinese 
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precisely because of the threat they would present in the future. Their arguments fell on 
deaf ears among senior Kennedy officials, in part because of fears of right-wing political 
backlash. To confront this domestic opposition, Roger Hilsman went public in December 
1963, attacking the major presumptions of those who supported the China policy status 
quo. The positive press reaction to his speech made debating China policy respectable, 
laying the groundwork for the eventual acceptance of rapprochement. 
Yellow Peril Yes, Fifth Column No 
 The fundamental grand strategic question Kennedy’s East Asian advisers 
grappled with, which Eisenhower’s had not, but all future administrations would, was 
how to deal with the long-term threat of a rising China. This specter had long haunted 
the American cultural imagination. Jack London parodied such fears in his short story 
“The Unparalleled Invasion” (written in 1907, published in Collier’s in 1909), in which 
the U.S. in 1976 leads a coalition of the white nations in a campaign of airborne 
biological warfare to exterminate the Chinese people lest their productive, industrializing 
nation become the world’s leading economic power.7 A decade earlier, in the aftermath 
of China's humiliating military defeat at the hands of the neighboring Japanese, the 
editors of Harper's Weekly, in an essay which assessed the potential Japanese threat and 
found it wanting, made reference to widespread speculation about China's potential. 
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They noted how “a great many thoughtful people have believed that if we should 
succeed in teaching our methods to the Chinese we might pay dearly for it.” They 
warned, with measured understatement, that “if we could teach China to use her 
resources in war as Germany has used hers, the result might be unpleasant.” Swiftly 
shifting tone, the authors speculated that “a Mongolian domination of the human race 
would be a calamity worse than the Deluge.” Still, they concluded “this danger, if it ever 
existed, was always remote.”8 After all, at that time, the western powers were waxing, 
and the backward, corrupt, and seemingly incurious Qing Dynasty was in terminal 
decline. 
 The global picture in 1961 was very different. Germany and Japan had 
spectacularly risen and fallen. The British and the French were ingloriously unwinding 
their once globe-spanning empires. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. stood supreme, at least for 
the time being. The Chinese – united, modernizing, and aggressive – seemed to be on the 
precipice of outgrowing and challenging their Soviet patron. On its immediate periphery, 
China had been irritating, confounding, and at times humiliating their American 
adversaries for more than a decade. As the superpower conflict seemed to be entering a 
new, more stable epoch, the Chinese threat loomed ever larger in the American psyche. 
Longstanding racial fears combined with more recent geopolitical realities to revive the 
old Yellow Peril with a new reddish tinge. 
 Robert Heinlein anticipated this changing mood with his bestselling science 
fiction novel Starship Troopers, published in 1959. That story depicted a future global 
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society very different from that of his own time. The differences were as much political 
as technological, and the former were brought about in large part by the rise of 
communist China. In Heinlein's imagined future, by the 1980s the Cold War had become 
a thing of the past, and a world war was fought “between the Russo-Anglo-American 
Alliance and the Chinese Hegemony.” The war ended inconclusively with “the 
negotiated treaty of New Delhi,” which notably failed to mandate the return of 60,000 
Alliance prisoners-of-war from Chinese custody. This would seem to indicate the 
Chinese, though fighting alone, got the better of their combined adversaries, as would 
the fact that shortly after the war the societies and governments of their opponents 
quickly collapsed. Jobless, bitter, but trained to fight, the veterans from what had been 
Britain, Russia, and the United States stepped in to “fill the vacuum” and end the 
anarchy. They may have “lost a war” abroad, but they would win the peace at home.9 
 The veterans established a praetorian democracy in which only the few who had 
served in the armed forces possessed the franchise, albeit only after they had completed 
their service, thus preventing complete praetorianism. Armies would be numerically 
small but extremely well-armed, the mass conscription forces of the past having been 
discredited as untrained mobs from the first stalemated war with China in Korea until the 
last failed effort against that nation in the 1980s. China's position at the pinnacle of 
power would itself prove fleeting, as evidenced by the soldiers having read “Tsing's 
classic Collapse of the Golden Hegemony.”10 Government by military veterans would 
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thereafter become a global phenomenon, enabling a unified planet to successfully defeat 
giant communistic alien insects in the distant future. Left unsaid, but heavily implied, 
was that such a post-democratic polity might have been the only way to defeat the 
Chinese. Either way, the rise of China meant the death not only of western supremacy, 
but of western liberal democracy. 
 In his biography of Heinlein, Leon Stover claimed Heinlein modeled the 
communistic alien bugs after “Soviet expansionism.”11 But the novel's text made clear 
the model was Red China, the Filipino hero Johnnie Rico observing – in a transparent 
allusion by Heinlein to Chinese human wave attacks during the Korean War – that “the 
Bug commissars didn't care anymore about expending soldiers than we cared about 
expending ammo. Perhaps we could have figured this out about the Bugs by noting the 
grief the Chinese Hegemony gave the Russo-Anglo-American Alliance.”12 The global 
alliance thus triumphed over Chinese stand-ins, a new society successfully re-fighting an 
old war. 
 Heinlein was not the first American author of fiction to envision a war between 
the united white nations of the world and an expansionist China, nor was he the first to 
predict a Chinese victory. But he was the first to have done so in over a generation, one 
of the few to place the war within his – and his readers' – own potential lifetime, and the 
first to forecast a Chinese victory unaided by allies or Fifth Columns. Coming only six 
years after the end of the Korean War, when Chinese armies compelled U.S. soldiers and 
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marines to embark on the longest retreat in their nation's military history, and at a time 
when communist China appeared to be on a path of unprecedented and inexorable 
demographic and economic growth, Heinlein's vision of the near future had a certain 
surface plausibility, one that would be echoed four years later by the historian Arnold 
Toynbee.
13
 
 In contrast to Heinlein’s faceless hordes, Chinese villainy assumed individual 
form in the movies “The Manchurian Candidate” and “Dr. No,” released in 1962 and 
1963 respectively. Both were based on bestselling books written in the late 1950s, 
Richard Condon’s The Manchurian Candidate having been published in 1959 and Ian 
Fleming’s Dr. No a year earlier. Both drew upon the original lone Chinese villain, the 
Englishman Sax Rohmer’s 1913 creation Fu Manchu, described in that year’s The 
Insidious Fu Manchu as “the yellow peril incarnate in one man,” possessed of “all the 
cruel cunning of an entire Eastern race, accumulated in one giant intellect.”14 In the 
movie “The Manchurian Candidate,” Frank Sinatra, playing the hero, Army Captain 
Bennett Marco, helpfully described the villain Yen Lo as “that Chinese cat standing there 
smiling like Fu Manchu.”15 Stanley Kauffmann of The New Republic, in his lukewarm 
review of the inaugural James Bond film, described the title character as “a kind of 
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space-age Fu Manchu.”16 
 In the original 1958 Ian Fleming novel, No was very tall, thin, and bald, just as 
Rohmer described his classic Yellow Peril personification.
17
 In both the book and the 
film, No defended his private island of Crab Key with an armored flame-throwing 
tractor costumed to look like a dragon. In the film, Chinese soldiers in vaguely Maoist 
uniforms captured Bond and defended their leader's lair, while Chinese technicians kept 
his nuclear reactor running.
18
 Bond’s nemesis sought to sabotage the U.S. space 
program, had his services refused by both that nation and the U.S.S.R., and said of the 
Cold War “east, west, just points of the compass, each as stupid as the other.”19 The 
movie set a trend for the rest of the decade for espionage thrillers on both the big and the 
small screen by seeking to move beyond the Cold War while vaguely acknowledging its 
continued existence. Critics viewed the film as mildly entertaining escapist fun having 
no geopolitical import whatsoever, despite its setting near Cuba in the immediate 
aftermath of the Missile Crisis, or No's obsession with missiles and nuclear power. 
 The same could not be said for “The Manchurian Candidate.” Its geopolitical 
content was unmistakable. However, given that the plot featured American communists 
using a staunchly anticommunist Republican senator and Chinese operatives to facilitate 
a Soviet takeover of the United States, the exact nature of its political message was 
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somewhat up for grabs. Life identified the villains as “Chinese Reds,” while Brendan 
Gill of the New Yorker claimed the “Russians” were the bad guys.20 Arthur Knight of the 
Saturday Review wrote that he quickly came to the realization that “this was not Yen Lo, 
the Red superman, but our old childhood friend, the insidious Dr. Fu Manchu,” which 
made the film “a good deal more enjoyable” for Knight.21 The creators themselves added 
to the debate, albeit retrospectively. In a 1988 conversation with director John 
Frankenheimer and star Frank Sinatra, which was included as part of the original VHS 
release of the film, screenwriter George Axelrod defended the film against charges of 
prejudice, though interestingly not anti-Chinese or anti-Asian prejudice. Axelrod recalled 
people saying the film was “so anti-Russian, which it wasn't.” Axelrod remembered that 
as he was crafting the script in 1961, he expressed to Sinatra his worry that “when the 
picture is released, if Kennedy is just about to have some sort of rapport with the 
Russians, it's going to embarrass him.” Sinatra recalled reassuring the writer by 
recounting that he had just visited Hyannisport, where President Kennedy asked him 
what his next film project would be. Sinatra recalled replying it would be an adaptation 
of The Manchurian Candidate, to which Kennedy replied “great – who's going to play 
the mother?”22 
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 Yet a close reading of the film – as well as the book – reveals the Asiatic, and 
particularly Chinese, nature of the villainy. Like Fu Manchu, Yen had a special talent for 
brainwashing. This particular stereotype was reinforced by Chinese attempts to turn 
American prisoners-of-war against their nation during the Korean War. In his landmark 
1958 book Scratches on our Minds, the first major scholarly work on American images 
of the Chinese, the political scientist and former journalist Harold Isaacs noted – based 
on interviews of American national and regional elites – the prevalence of “the image of 
the Chinese as brainwashers.”23 Condon's novel referred to Marco's desire to “unlock all 
of the great jade doors” and liberate Raymond's mind from its Chinese captors.24 The 
book and movie both featured an early scene in which Yen brainwashes his American 
prisoners of war, taken from the front in Korea. Presciently anticipating the Sino-Soviet 
split, as well as pinpointing one of its causes, Condon noted how the audience for the 
brainwashing, a mix in both the book and the film of Chinese and Russian communists, 
was “divided, physically and by prejudice.”25 In the film, Yen told the Russians, who 
were impatient to witness the brainwashed U.S. solder Raymond murder a member of 
his squad, “I apologize to my dear Dmitri. I keep forgetting that you're a young country, 
and your attention span is limited.”26 The film was symptomatic of a transitional period 
in Cold War cinematic enemy imagery. The Chinese still worked for their Russians 
                                                          
23 
Harold R. Isaacs, Images of Asia: American Views of China and India, originally titled Scratches On 
Our Minds (New York: Harper, 1958, reprinted 1972), 218. 
24 
Condon, The Manchurian Candidate, 298. 
25
 Ibid. 35. 
26 
The Manchurian Candidate [DVD], MGM Home Entertainment, 1998. 
 89 
 
 
masters, but were increasingly coming to the fore, and the nature of the villainy in 
question took on characteristic elements of the Yellow Peril. 
 Yet as the cultural chasm between Chinese and Americans grew, that between 
Chinese-Americans and white Americans curiously narrowed. The 1961 film musical 
“Flower Drum Song,” based on the 1958 musical by Richard Rodgers and Oscar 
Hammerstein, itself based on a successful novel of the previous year written by the Yale-
educated Chinese-American C.Y. Lee, was the first Hollywood film production with an 
predominantly Asian cast, and the only one until 1993’s “Joy Luck Club.”27 The film 
presented a vision of a self-contained, yet very American, Chinatown featuring Chinese 
cops, Chinese hoods, Chinese businessmen, Chinese entertainers, and even Chinese 
beatniks. “Flower Drum Song” thus engaged in a sort of Reverse Yellowface, with Asian 
actors playing parts that would normally be reserved for white actors, and were in fact 
were “played” by white characters in Lee's novel, which aimed for a semblance of 
realism. What in Lee’s hands had been a complex tale of the specific difficulties faced by 
young educated Chinese immigrants was transformed for the stage and screen into an 
update of early 20
th
 century “melting pot” immigrant stage dramas, with Chinese 
standing in for Irish, Italians, and Jews, and the setting suitably upgraded with the latest 
in consumer goods and luxurious postwar living. 
 Juanita Hall’s Madame Liang, before performing the song-and-dance number 
“Chop Suey” at a party celebrating her completion of citizenship classes, declared “I am 
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happy to be both Chinese and American,” to which her brother – the family patriarch 
Wang Chi-Yang – replied “you are like the Chinese dish the Americans invented. 
Everything is in it – all mixed up.”28 The notion that Liang can become fully American 
without sacrificing her Chinese heritage reflected the lyricist Hammerstein's left-leaning 
tolerant liberalism.
29
 Yet critics found its depiction of Asian-American life patronizing 
and inauthentic. Newsweek joked the movie “makes plain that all Chinese are cute as 
little dolls and most of them are rich as Mme. Chiang.”30 The New Yorker declared that 
“the settings are every bit as authentic as Fu Manchu.”31 Even the unprecedented use of 
a nearly all-Asian cast came in for criticism because almost none of the actors were 
Chinese. “Honestly fellows, they don't all look alike,” scolded Time magazine, no 
paragon of ethnic sensitivity when it came to reporting news from China during this 
period.
32
 Regardless, all agreed that America’s Chinese had finally entered the 
mainstream. While the foreign image of Chinese was returning to the negative, menacing 
stereotypes of earlier periods, discrimination and antipathy towards the Chinese in 
America so characteristic of that group’s experience during the past century was fast 
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receding. 
A Torch Passed 
 Such cultural manifestations of a revived Yellow Peril appeared to bode ill for the 
popularity of even the most incremental China policy alterations during the early 1960s. 
Yet as the members of the Kennedy administration settled into their offices, the first 
glimmers of a new public openness for change appeared. The reasoning behind these 
glimmers appeared to reinforce, rather than counter, the heightened threat perception. A 
March 1961 Gallup poll for the first time showed significant increases in support for 
taking incremental steps to improve relations with communist China, including majority 
support for a partial lifting of the trade ban. The State Department summarized the poll 
at the time as indicating that “the American public would like to see the U.S. take steps 
to improve our relations with Communist China.”33 Anticipating precisely the arguments 
which would begin to be made within the corridors of power during the Kennedy years, 
gain increasing and influential adherents outside government during the Johnson 
administration, and become policy under Nixon, a Long Island housewife called China 
“a tremendous force that we can't and don't wish to annihilate,” adding “we are going to 
have to work out some way of getting along.”34 While only 20 percent supported seating 
the P.R.C. in the United Nations, 59 percent claimed a willingness to “go along with a 
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decision to seat Red China” if the U.S. was outvoted. Both numbers were nearly double 
what they had been in 1955.
35
 
 Kennedy officials heard similar arguments from academic experts on mainland 
China. Anathematized and threatened by conservatives during the early 1950s, and 
ignored by those in power during the second half of the decade, they gained the ears of 
many in the new administration. University of Rochester Economics professor 
Alexander Eckstein, one of the leading American experts on China, wrote James 
Thomson shortly after the election to tell him the incoming administration's policy 
should be based on two premises: “the Chinese Communist regime is here to stay” and 
“the admission of Communist China in the United Nations is only a matter of time.”36 
Pressure also came from abroad. British Foreign Secretary Lord Home told the House of 
Lords in February 1961 that “the facts of international life require that Communist China 
get a seat in the United Nations even though it has few of the credentials of a peace-
loving nation.”37 
 Working against this gathering current for change was the undertow of domestic 
political considerations. The State Department had noted in March 1961 that support for 
“taking steps” to approve relations with Communist China enjoyed majority backing 
among Democrats and independents while Republicans were “much more evenly 
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divided on the issue.”38 Yet this by no means made changing China policy a political 
winner. Among those who cared passionately about the matter, sentiment seemed to run 
staunchly against any change whatsoever. The Nation might have labelled the 
Committee of One Million the “Lobby of a Million Ghosts” in 1961, but in 1960, their 
lone vocal enemy in Congress, Democratic Representative Charles Porter of Oregon lost 
his bid for reelection, and in 1962 more than two-thirds of Porter's former colleagues – 
296 Representatives, along with 55 Senators, 180 of them Republicans and 171 
Democrats - consented to have their names appear on Committee mailings.
39
 Once out of 
office, Porter devoted himself as obsessively to, as he wrote Kennedy in August 1961, 
“showing up the Committee of One Million for the fraud it is,” as his arch-nemesis 
Marvin Liebman did to proving he group was no paper tiger.
40
 For the time being, 
Liebman clearly had the better of it. Eisenhower administration State Department 
holdover J. Graham Parsons wrote the new Secretary of State Dean Rusk to remind him 
of “the force of public opinion in the United States and the effectiveness of groups like 
the Committee of One Million to stir it up.”41 The Chinese communists seconded this 
assessment, Foreign Minister Chen Yi telling Britiain’s Malcolm MacDonald in 1962 
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that “there are extremely hostile interests and ‘lobbies’ in Congress and elsewhere the 
Administration cannot ignore” when it came to crafting policies concerning his regime.42 
 John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency at a time of renewed American interest 
in China's internal situation and external intentions, as evidenced by “the considerable 
increase in the number of books about the Red colossus” with such titles as The Anthill, 
The Endless Hours, Ten Years of Storm, and Diary From Red China.
43
 In March of 1961, 
Gallup asked a sample of Americans “Looking ahead to 1970, which country do you 
think will be the greater threat to world peace – Russia or Communist China?” Thirty-
two percent answered China, compared with 49 percent who responded Russia. 
According to George Gallup, most of those who chose China cited its “huge population” 
and “war-like policy.” He concluded that China remained the “lesser evil” in the eyes of 
most Americans, but led with the statement that China “has yet to displace Russia as our 
chief opponent in the cold war struggle.”44 That day was coming. In March 1963, when 
Gallup asked another sample the same question, 46 percent chose China, and 33 percent 
Russia, a reversal from two years earlier.
45
 Perhaps in response, at a 1 August 1963 press 
conference, John F. Kennedy called China “menacing” and “Stalinist,” while defining 
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the Soviet Union as a status quo power.
46
 
 Communist China had never seemed more threatening - or more vulnerable. It 
sought to develop nuclear weapons, massed troops across from Taiwan, worked to bring 
all of Indochina under communist rule, sent several divisions across the Himalayan 
Mountains, and grew increasingly estranged from its Soviet ally and one-time leading 
patron and protector. At the same time, it suffered the monumental domestic calamity of 
mass famine due to the economic policies of the Great Leap Forward. If ever there was a 
time to test whether Chinese communism was indeed a “passing phase,” that had been it. 
Yet the regime had survived, with nary a trace of unrest. With past assumptions about the 
regime's fragility in tatters, future policy appeared to be in need of a substantial revision. 
An unprecedented number of voices, for the time being concentrated exclusively on the 
center-left, advocated outreach instead of hostility as the best means of containing the 
Chinese threat. If China could not be stopped, it must be changed, and change within 
China could only be achieved through outreach from abroad. 
 Amidst this maelstrom of dimly understood events occurring behind and just 
beyond the Bamboo Curtain, a small coterie of Kennedy officials within the State 
Department and the National Security Council – with the tacit support of some in the 
White House – men who had the ears of the those in power but did not control the levers 
– began promulgating the theories which Kennedy could not dare propose, but in a 
decade’s time would become accepted – and even celebrated – policies under the man 
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Kennedy had defeated. By the end of 1963, when these new policy notions were final 
made public, a turning point had been reached in how American elites both inside and 
outside of government discussed relations between the United States and communist 
China. Government officials and leading newspapers advocated previously 
unmentionable notions such as the permanence of Mao's regime and the futility of 
continuing to isolate the nation he led. China was still feared, by the American public 
more than ever before. But the new goal was to contain, not overthrow, this menacing 
power, and perhaps make it less menacing. 
 It would take years for advocates of this new approach to convince the majority 
of the American public that it was the correct one. And, at least during the Kennedy 
years, few wanted to try, particularly those such as Secretary of State Dean Rusk who 
withstood the slings and arrows of Truman's troubled second term. But something had 
changed. For future administrations, that which had been a question of “what” became a 
question of “when.” Those in positions of power who defended the status quo of 
isolation no longer argued that these policies were correct, as had been the case 
throughout the Eisenhower years. Instead they argued that the time had not yet arrived 
for the inevitable changes in policy. 
 Nearly all the steps first proposed by Kennedy officials were ultimately enacted 
by the man Kennedy defeated with a swiftness that astounded these same officials. Yet 
when Richard Nixon shook Zhou En-lai's hand in February 1972, he was standing on the 
shoulders of these men who worked for the man who defeated him for the presidency 
more than a decade before. These men largely failed to prevail in the bureaucratic 
 97 
 
 
skirmishes in the State Department and the National Security Council between 1961 and 
1963. But they were the first individuals with any modicum of official power both to 
admit that U.S. policy towards communist China was unsustainable and to concoct 
pragmatic proposals intended to remedy this policy's fundamental deficiencies. Given 
China's increasing aggression and unpredictability during these years, the shift in 
American sentiment away from isolation was by no means foreordained. Had Richard 
Nixon become president in 1960, a very different consensus would most likely have 
emerged among his very different foreign policy staff. Only Kennedy – or more 
accurately those who worked for Kennedy – could lay the ground work for Nixon to go 
to China. 
A Policy Questioned, but Maintained 
 The only way to fight back would be to embark upon measures to alter public 
opinion. In November 1961, Abram Chayes – who worked for Undersecretary of State 
Bowles – attempted to get just such a process started by writing a “Proposed Presidential 
Speech on a Two Chinas Policy.” Revealingly, the words “Two” and “Chinas” appeared 
in that order nowhere in the text. Chester Bowles noted after reading the speech that “the 
key point is the establishment of the two China concept, although, of course, we must 
not call it that.”47 This speech contained nothing in the way of concrete policy proposals. 
Yet the words President Kennedy never uttered bore an unmistakable similarity to those 
spoken by President Nixon eight to ten years in the future, as well as to what one of 
Kennedy’s own officials would publically utter slightly more than two years hence. As 
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with that actual speech, this proposed speech baited the Committee of One Million, first 
subtly by referring to the Chinese capital as communist-preferred Peking instead of the 
nationalist-approved Peiping, and then blatantly by declaring the United States can no 
longer afford to “allow our national policies to be shaped by shrill charges and sterile 
slogans.”48 
 It was intended both as a signal to the Chinese that the U.S. was capable of 
change and as an attempt to convince the American people such change would be in their 
interest. Like virtually all attempts at starting the process of policy change during this 
period, it subscribed to the notion of an expansionist China endangering U.S. interests, 
both because of the traditional behavior of new Chinese dynasties and the established 
actions of young communist regimes. Yellow and red proved a potentially catastrophic 
combination, one compared to that posed by Nazi Germany or 1930s Japan.
49
 However, 
unlike those two regimes, the Chinese could be altered rather than destroyed, since “the 
lessons of history clearly show that no conflict between nations is permanent. People 
change, governments change, and nations change. It is the rigid, the inflexible, and the 
arrogant who fall by the wayside.” Therefore, the U.S. government and its people “must 
welcome every opportunity to encourage more moderate attitudes on the part of the 
Peking government,” and “the door remains open; we for our part will never close it.”50 
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 Breaking taboos, but offering no concrete path forward, this speech was both too 
bold to be uttered and not bold enough to be worth uttering. Bowles recognized this, 
commenting that “this needs more work. It is right and awkward in several areas, and I 
don't want it to go unless it is good.”51 He told his subordinate Tom Hughes that while 
“this is no time to send the President a controversial memorandum and proposal,” that 
day was fast approaching as “I believe we may soon be prepared to move.” Bowles 
speculated such a speech would have the support of Averell Harriman, Adlai Stevenson, 
and Senator Mike Mansfield. Most hopefully of all, “the general line appears to me 
reasonable and in line with the President's instincts.”52 No mention was made as to what 
Dean Rusk, who effectively exercised veto power over all change in China policy during 
his lengthy tenure under both Kennedy and Johnson, would think of the speech. 
 The two men who did the most to commence the process of policy evaluation 
could not have been more different. Chester Bowles was a politician, an incurable 
optimist, and a dove. Robert Komer a bureaucrat, an innate pessimist, and a hawk. 
Bowles objected to the Bay of Pigs, and was termed a “gutless wonder” by Attorney 
General Robert Kennedy, while Komer viewed the bargain which ended the Cuban 
Missile Crisis as an unacceptable loss for the U.S. and was nicknamed “Blowtorch Bob” 
by Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge.
53
 The cautious, deferential 
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Bowles foundered in Kennedy’s State Department, while the headstrong, impudent 
Komer excelled in McGeorge Bundy’s National Security Council. Yet both assumed the 
current policy existed on borrowed time, that the clock was ticking down to zero, and 
that change, while sure to be agonizing, must come sooner rather than later. 
 As befitted his nature, Komer moved first, telling Bundy barely a month after the 
new president’s inauguration that “we should prod State to get started pronto on a broad-
scale rethinking exercise” and “disengage, as skillfully as we can, from unproductive 
aspects of our China policy,” specifically opposition to UN membership for the PRC and 
defending Taiwan’s possession of the Offshore Islands. Komer recognized opposition 
from congress and elements of the American public would be “a real problem,” but he 
also feared delay would lead to the U.S. “being dragged into such changes” by world 
opinion.
54
 
 One month later, Komer elaborated on this memo in his report “Strategic 
Framework for Rethinking China Policy.” Stating that “time is not working in our favor 
in the Far East,” Komer observed “ the secular trend is toward increasing acceptance of a 
powerful Red China as a fact of political life.”55 To respond to this seemingly inevitable 
eventuality, Komer proposed a then-novel – but eventually commonplace – mixture of 
containment and outreach in the hopes of making the regime less threatening to 
American interests. Komer recognized this would face headwinds from both Taiwan and 
their supporters in the U.S., against which the administration “must fight a two-front 
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war” because “any revision of China policy unfortunately requires, perhaps more than 
any other facet of US foreign affairs, consideration of the impact at home.” The primary 
arguments which should be made to domestic critics were that treatment of the P.R.C. 
was simply being made equivalent to that of the U.S.S.R., and that engagement was 
necessary “precisely because it is an enemy, not despite this fact.”56 For their part, the 
Chinese communists were in no way expected to be receptive to any initial overtures. 
This intransigence, however, would work against them, since it would “shift the onus for 
continued tensions as much as possible to Peiping.”57 Neutralist nations would recognize 
that the Chinese were solely to blame for poor relations. 
 This tactical gambit was previously utilized by Eisenhower on multiple occasions 
to curry favor overseas vis-à-vis the Soviets, but was only applied to China policy 
beginning with the Kennedy administration.
58
 Even those who believed proposing 
concrete policy changes were substantially premature favored such steps. In an early 
memo to Rusk, Parsons argued “we might well put the onus for the fact that we do not 
have more contact squarely on the Chinese Communists.”59 Chester Bowles, in a lengthy 
April 1962 memorandum, echoed Komer and Parsons almost verbatim, writing “it is to 
our clear advantage to place the onus for the present communication impasse squarely on 
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the Peiping regime.”60 Bowles blasted the previous administration’s “sterile, inept, and 
unrealistic” polices in Asia, which had burdened Kennedy with “a complex of 
contradictory policies many of which had their root in domestic partisan conflicts.”61 
The existing U.S. approach of “non-recognition and U.N. exclusion” was “a national 
posture rather than a national policy.”62 
 While Komer retrospectively defended Eisenhower’s approach to communist 
China as useful during the time it existed, Bowles had savaged the previous president’s 
entire foreign policy as it was being made. In a 1957 speech at the Naval war College, 
Bowles labelled the existing approach to containment “left-over American 
isolationism.”63 Entirely lacking in his opinion was positive outreach to non-communist 
nations, specifically in the form of generous foreign aid. In their fervent support for 
foreign aid and profound antipathy to Eisenhower, Bowles and then-Senator Kennedy 
were in complete agreement. In addition, both saw democratic India as Asia’s great 
prize, a potentially potent example of the blessings of freedom. Bowles had been 
Truman’s ambassador to that nation, and would later serve in that position for Johnson. 
In a 1959 speech, Kennedy labelled “the struggle between India and China” as a contest 
between democracy and dictatorship “for leadership of the East, for the respect of all 
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Asia, for the opportunity to demonstrate whose way of life is the better.”64 Only later 
would Kennedy’s innate hawkishness contrast irreconcilably with Bowles’s deeply 
dovish nature. 
 Despite, or perhaps because of, this dovishness, Bowles feared Chinese 
aggression as much as an ultra-hawk like Douglas MacArthur. In a series of 1961 
speeches, the general warned audiences that China’s communist leaders had created “a 
mighty colossus which threatens all of continental Asia and bids fair to emerge as the 
balance of military power in the world.”65 In an unpublished essay written for the New 
York Times Magazine in 1959, Bowles was more specific but hardly less alarmist, 
predicting that “the principle military threat in Asia during the next decade may take the 
form of a major Chinese push into Southeast Asia.”66 To neutralize this looming threat, 
three years later Bowles called for the U.S. to use its “leverage” to “weaken China’s 
expansionist tendencies and military capacity, encourage the opening of its society to 
non-Communist influences, enlarge its economic ties to the West, and gradually modify 
its hard-shell Communism.” China’s “re-entry into the family of nations,” entailing U.S. 
diplomatic recognition and the P.R.C. occupying China’s seat in the U.N. Security 
Council, should be the “desirable long-term goal of U.S. foreign policy.”67 This, of 
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course, was exactly what eventually occurred, beginning under the administration of 
Eisenhower’s Vice-President. 
 Bowles believed the process of change must begin sooner rather than later. This 
was because “by 1964 China will almost certainly detonate a nuclear device,” and any 
policy alterations after this event would be viewed overseas as “a defensive U.S. 
response to increased mainland power.”68 Like all others considering change within the 
administration, he recognized the powerful impediment of inflamed public opinion. 
Whereas Komer the bureaucrat believed in confronting such negative sentiments, 
Bowles the politician recommended that “every effort should be made to keep the 
operation in lo [sic] key. All talk of a ‘new Asia policy’ should be discouraged.”69 For 
whatever reason, the public was beginning to sense something might be afoot. The State 
Department noted in 1962 that “one of the more notable developments in the public 
discussion of U.S. China policy” during that calendar year “has been the upsurge in 
speculation that the U.S. is considering a change in that policy.”70 Whether hopeful or 
fearful, such speculation had to be discouraged. This also anticipated Nixon’s eventual 
approach. 
 Bowles loathed the Committee of One Million. As Chairman of the 1960 
Democratic Platform Committee, after receiving multiple letters from the organization 
warning of the political repercussions of any softening of the China plank, he wrote “in 
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all frankness, I must admit that this campaign irritates me a great deal.”71 The Committee 
of One Million had valid reasons for its concern. In an April 1960 article on Foreign 
Affairs, Bowles extolled the strategic value of an independent Taiwan, and explicitly 
argued for the abandonment of Quemoy and Matsu to the mainland communists.
72
 The 
Foreign Affairs piece was nearly identical to his unpublished New York Times Magazine 
piece written the previous year, with the revealing absence of the phrase “Two Chinas.” 
Yet this implication was clear. Bowles’s potential influence was revealed during the 
general election campaign, when Kennedy pointed out the strategic uselessness of the 
Offshore Islands during a televised debate with Richard Nixon. During Bowles’s Senate 
confirmation hearings for the position of Undersecretary of State, Republican Senator 
Norris Cotton of New Hampshire wondered whether Bowles believed opposition to 
American recognition of “Red China” or that regime’s admission to the United Nations 
“are bedrock foundations of our policy.”73 
 Bowles’s lone proposal for immediate policy change in 1962 was a partial lifting 
of the trade ban to allow the selling of wheat to mainland China as an inducement to 
better behavior. Bowles believed the ongoing severe scarcity of food in China was not a 
passing phase. He asserted it was “endemic” in a society with unproductive collective 
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agriculture and a rapidly expanding population.
74
 His hope was that the promise of 
massive wheat sales could be employed to encourage Chinese cooperation in Northeast 
and Southeast Asia.
75
 In this hope, Bowles was not alone. That very month, Averell 
Harriman – who the previous November replaced Bowles as Undersecretary of State – 
pleaded with his immediate superior “we should not have our historical record be one of 
having refused to sell food to a people in a period where food was greatly needed. That 
would be a record which might one day haunt us.” Harriman argued for no mere isolated 
humanitarian gesture. Echoing Komer and Bowles, he couched this proposal as part of a 
long-term process “moving our relationship away from one of implacable mutual 
hostility.” Like Bowles, Harriman worried such a friendly gesture in the aftermath of an 
inevitably imminent Chinese nuclear test “might be interpreted as motivated by 
apprehension.” He considered policy change to be both inevitable and beneficial, telling 
Rusk rather bluntly “I cannot believe that a policy of immobility can serve us well in a 
world where change is the rule.”76 As the leading Democratic defender of China policy 
immobility, Rusk surely did not take kindly to such sentiments. 
Crucible of Famine 
 The obvious reason for all this discussion of selling food to China was the 
massive three-year famine in China occasioned by the spectacularly catastrophic man-
made disaster of the Great Leap Forward. Next to the Sino-Soviet split, no aspect of 
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China policy received more attention from the American media during the Kennedy 
years. Journalists and government officials differed on two questions. They argued over 
the severity of the famine, and over whether it threatened the future of the mainland 
regime. Those who correctly gauged the severity earliest also paradoxically proved most 
incorrect in predicting its effects, anticipating the regime might not survive or at the very 
least would become defanged. Officials in the Defense Department recognized the true 
extent of the famine relatively early.
77
 An April 1961 memorandum from then-Deputy 
Assistant for Special Operations Edward Lansdale to Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara crowed “’The Great Leap Forward’ in China has landed in the soup.” He 
reminded the Secretary of “the old Chinese political saying ‘Three bad harvests and the 
mandate from heaven changes,’” and noted mentions of “growing discontent” from CIA 
staffers and “Chinese friends.” While not making an outright prediction of communist 
China’s collapse, Lansdale observed that while “the threat of China has hung heavy over 
our heads in Asia,” he hoped that “it might well be that we can start changing this is 
1961.”78 In the media, Chiang Kai-shek’s old boosters at Time led the way, becoming the 
first major U.S. periodical to write “Communist China faces mass starvation,” noting “a 
crisis in public morale and labeling the regime’s predicament “damn serious.”79 For 
those who believed Mao’s regime might be “a passing and not a perpetual phase,” surely 
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this was the moment for it to pass from the scene by collapsing under the weight of its 
own misguided delusions. 
 Yet those who believed the U.S. hard-liners were the ones deluding themselves 
with such speculations deluded themselves into underestimating China’s domestic plight. 
As late as 1962, Business Week wrote “although China is hungry, it is not starving,” and 
esteemed foreign policy journalist Richard Hughes wrote in the New York Times 
Magazine that “the tough Chinese peasants, despite their hardships, are not yet 
confronted with the terrible famines which were once their normal lot.”80 Even the arch-
conservative U.S. News & World Report, shortly before Time used the phrase “mass 
starvation,” both underrated China’s difficulties and incorrectly placed most of the blame 
on natural and not human causes. Yet, unlike Time, that magazine correctly discounted 
the danger of domestic discontent.
81
 Whatever one’s view of the viability of the 
mainland government, no one seemed to believe that it could survive causing the death 
of 30-40 million of its countrymen. 
 Less than a decade before, Joseph Alsop predicted that, like the short-lived Qin 
and Sui Dynasties, Mao’s dynasty would try to do too much too quickly and meet its 
inevitable demise within less than a generation.
82
 Now, it appeared to him that 
vindication was imminent. He expressed his confidence in a series of articles in 1961 
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and 1962 which went far beyond Lansdale’s cautious predictions.83 The liberal Atlantic 
Monthly, which was one of the first magazines in the mid-1950s to argue against 
Dulles’s “Passing Phase” line, reversed course, announcing that “unrest and 
dissatisfaction have penetrated every corner of China.”84 
 Even if the regime persevered, it would no longer be capable of disruptive 
radicalism at home or abroad. A May 1963 National Intelligence Estimate predicted Mao 
“will no longer be able to count on a high degree of revolutionary, almost frenetic 
enthusiasm.”85 U.S. News quoted an unnamed expert that “never again will the 
Communist be able to manipulate the Chinese people the way they once did.”86 The New 
Republic took note of a new “realism” among the Chinese leadership, and Newsweek 
speculated that this new cautiousness would extend to foreign affairs, included a possible 
if belated acquiescence to Soviet demands.
87
 It appeared Chinese behavior for the rest of 
the decade would be boring and predictable for a change. After such a serious and self-
inflicted wound, surely its leaders had no choice. 
                                                          
83
 Joseph Alsop, “Can China Explode?” Hartford Courant, 17 May 1961, 14; Joseph Alsop, “China Is In 
Grave Trouble, and ‘One Good Harvest’ Won’t Help.” Lost Angeles Times, 10 April 1962, B6; Joseph 
Alsop, “The Coming Explosion in Red China,” Saturday Evening Post, 11 August 1962, 79-82. 
84
 “The Atlantic Report: Red China,” Atlantic Monthly, February 1962, 16. 
85
 NIE 13-4-62: “Prospects for Communist China.” 2 May 1962, 6, from Tracking The Dragon: National 
Intelligence Estimates on China During the Era of Mao, 1948-1976 (Washington, D.C.: National 
Intelligence Council, 2004). 
86
 “From An Expert: ‘Communists Have Lost The Chinese’,” U.S. News & World Report, 6 August 1962, 
50. 
87
 “’Realism’ in Peking,” The New Republic, 30 April 1962, 6; “Hungry Admission,” Newsweek, 30 April 
1962, 45. 
 110 
 
 
 Yet some doubted the seriousness of the wound. Traveling in mainland China in 
the aftermath of the famine, Sir Fitzroy Hew MacLean found conditions “harsh, but 
slowly improving” and warned that, despite recent setbacks, “China’s strength is 
growing.” Given this assumption, “it is unrealistic for the United States government to 
maintain no relations with it.”88 Roger Hilsman predicted “sufficient agricultural 
recovery to renew significant development efforts,” though growth rates for the rest of 
the decade would be “well below” those of the previous decade, when China’s economy 
posted some of the world’s fastest growth rates.89 Mao’s China would soon demonstrate 
its resilience, though not where expected. Chiang had made no secret of his desire to 
exploit the calamity of the Great Leap Forward by launching massive raids on the 
mainland in the hopes of inciting a general rebellion. In a meeting with Roger Hilsman 
in early March 1962, his son and heir apparent declared it would be “the year of 
action.”90 Less than a week later, Harriman visit Chiang Kai-shek in Taipei to inform 
him that Kennedy “would not repeat the Cuban experience” and risk a Bay of Pigs with 
the world’s most populous nation.91 Rusk was less diplomatic, telling Kennedy “the plan 
was nonsense,” and proposed the president reject it outright. Hilsman, as was becoming 
the case in his relationship with Rusk, begged to differ, claiming a frank rejection 
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“would immediate start a public campaign to arouse the China lobby.”92 Then, and later, 
he argued the best course of action would be “temporizing,” lest Chiang suspect the 
administration was considering adopting a Two-China policy.
93
 Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor agreed with Rusk that “not being more frank with 
Chiang” risked miscalculations down the road, and he was supported by others who had 
the same fears.
94
 
 However, the miscalculations in 1962 would be made by Nehru in the 
Himalayas, not Chiang in the Taiwan Straits. Lashing out at the weakest link in its an 
chain of encirclement, China demonstrated that even at is lowest, it was still by far the 
strongest military power on the continent, and capable of projecting that power across 
the most formidable of natural barriers. Paradoxically, the manner in which the Chinese 
executed this attack would lessen, rather than accentuate, U.S. fears of an irrationally 
belligerent Chinese leadership. American elites inside and outside of government were 
shocked not by China’s aggression, but by its restraint. 
 Virtually every aspect of the Sino-Indian War caught officials within the 
Kennedy administration flat-footed. As late as within one month of the start of major 
fighting, they did not expect the border dispute to escalate into outright war. Once 
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fighting began, they underestimated Chinese tactical capabilities and goals. After these 
became clear, they overestimated Chinese strategic objectives to varying degrees. A 
Special National Intelligence Estimate less than a year before the war occurred stated 
“we do not believe that Peiping will launch a major military effort against India during 
the next two years or so.”95 After China’s initial limited yet devastating attacks on India’s 
front line positions in the Northeast Frontier Area (NEFA), a C.I.A. official wrote “we 
believe Chinese objectives are limited.”96 From his perch in Hong Kong, analyst John 
Holdridge agreed, telling Washington on November 5, that “we believe Peiping will 
content itself with securing a favorable military position and then hope that Afro-Asian 
(or Soviet or internal) pressures or blandishments will force Nehru to acquiesce to its 
demands.”97 
 By this point, C.I.A. analysts were having second thoughts, writing that “we are 
less confident that the Chinese objectives will remain similar limited” to their current 
front-line positions.
98
 U.S. Ambassador to India John Kenneth Galbraith voiced similar 
doubts in a telegram to Rusk.
99
  On November 18, Chinese forces annihilated their 
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poorly equipped Indian adversaries along India’s far northeastern and northwestern 
frontiers. In the northeast, the Chinese passed to the edge of the mountain barrier and 
advanced to the precipice of the Assam province frontier, a rich land containing the bulk 
of India’s petroleum wells and tea plantations. Nehru declared a state of “total war” and 
asked Kennedy for 12 U.S.-piloted fighter squadrons to halt the advance.
100
 Before he 
could respond, China announced its unilateral withdrawal from NEFA on November 20, 
established occupation of Aksai China (Ladakh) in the far northwest, and declared a 
unilateral cease-fire. In the words of Galbraith, “like a thief in the night, peace 
arrived.”101 
 China’s restraint shocked both the U.S. press and the administrations. Time 
opened its cover story on the war with the line “Red China behaved in so inscrutably 
Oriental a manner last week that even Asians were baffled.” In its cover story that week, 
U.S. News told its readers that “Mao Tse-tung caught the whole world by surprise when 
he pulled back from what looked like total victory.”102 Paul Nitze, the Pentagon’s point 
man on the war, admitted in his memoirs that “the Chinese Communists surprised us all” 
while Galbraith relayed Indian laments that “at the moment CHICOMS look reasonable 
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and this advantage had to be taken away from them.”103 U.S. officials quickly reached a 
consensus that the threat of a vigorous U.S response deterred the Chinese. Komer wrote 
Kennedy that “a case can be made that Peiping realized it might be overreaching itself 
and risking an expanded war in which US and UK would rapidly step up the scale of 
their supports.” Thomas Hughes at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research concluded “concern over the growing prospect of direct U.S. intervention” 
played a primary role. Galbraith added that “a large and growing number of Indians” felt 
the same way.
104
  
 The implication was clear: China could be deterred by mere threats of U.S. 
conventional force. Hilsman made the connection to “future courses of Chinese 
Communist action, not only in India but in Burma, Laos, and elsewhere in Asia.”105 
“Elsewhere,” unmistakably, meant South Vietnam. U.S. officials readily recognized that 
“the type of pressure which we are most likely to face from Communist China in the 
foreseeable future consists of political subversion and subversive insurgency” as 
opposed to “all-out” conventional attacks on neighboring nations.106 In late 1961, an 
SNIE argued that “domestic difficulties thus far do not see to have had a direct effect on 
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Peiping’s foreign policy.”107 At the same time, the authors stated “we do not believe 
Peiping would consider assignment of SEATO forces to South Vietnam as an immediate 
and direct threat to their own internal security. Without ardent Chinese backing, “the 
DRV would probably see to avoid having its regular units enter into a direct military 
engagement with SEATO, and in particular US, forces.”108 At this early point, increased 
American involvement in Southeast Asia was based less on Chinese strength that on 
China’s supposed lack of resolve when faced with American might. 
The Atomic Divorcee 
 Behind this strategy of containment through deterrence was the ultimate 
possibility of a U.S. nuclear attack on the communist Chinese, who lacked such 
weapons. Yet this situation was known to be a temporary condition. Underlying nearly 
all arguments for outreach to communist China was the ominous and imminent 
inevitability of its acquisition of atomic weaponry. State Department Director of Policy 
Planning George McGhee wrote to McGeorge Bundy in 1962 that “there can be little 
doubt but that over the long run a Chicom nuclear program could have a degrading effect 
on the U.S. political and military positions in Asia.
109
 Curtis LeMay claimed “the 
attainment by the Chinese Communists of even a limited nuclear capability would 
present serious military and political problems to the United States and the Free 
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World.”110 But in the near-term, a Chinese atom bomb was seen as largely a weapon of 
public opinion. McGeorge Bundy wrote Rusk that when the Chinese communist became 
the first Asian nation to acquire nuclear weapons, “the impact might even be like Sputnik 
I.”111 The greatest fear was how the publics in China’s neighborhood would receive the 
news. LeMay worried it might induce them “to yield to the ‘wave of the future.’”112 
Komer’s subordinate Joseph Hanson, adopting some of his superior’s instinctive 
alarmism, pushed for swift “advance action” to prevent “unnecessarily large 
psychological gains for the Chinese.”113 But it was assumed the leaders of these 
countries would be more sophisticated and understand China’s extremely limited arsenal 
and almost nonexistent delivery capability. With that in mind, Hilsman assured Rusk 
“the neutralist countries are unlikely to change their basic policies.”114 
 Preventing the communist Chinese from developing nuclear weapons through the 
use of force, while fleetingly considered by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. at various times, 
was never a serious option. More peaceful means of suasion also appeared fruitless, 
Edward Rice informing Harriman in June 1963 that “it appears very unlikely that 
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Communist China will be deterred from exploding a nuclear device merely because of a 
US-USSR test-ban agreement.”115 Moves towards this first superpower arms control 
agreement had many causes, but one catalytic factor was the accelerating Sino-Soviet 
split, which made the Soviets more amenable to U.S. outreach, since they no longer had 
to worry about alienating their more obstinate junior partner. 
 This most important relationship in the communist sphere rapidly unraveled 
during the Kennedy years, and was closely and often breathlessly covered by U.S. 
media. The Boston Globe speculated at the time of Harriman’s appointment as head of 
the State Department’s Far Eastern Affairs Division that “it may be possible to exploit 
tension between Moscow and Communist China.”116 Yet the administration both doubted 
the severity of this tension more than the media and was at a loss as to how to exploit it. 
Walt Rostow in January 1962 called it a “historic and unprecedented development” 
about which “no one knows what to do.”117 While McGhee told McGeorge Bundy in 
September 1962 that “the Sino-Soviet dispute will not be resolved in the near future,” in 
a December 1962 speech on the matter Harriman claimed he “did not foresee a complete 
break.”118 
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 One can infer just how troubled a writer or speaker believed Sino-Soviet 
relations were at a given time based on the word or words utilized to describe the 
problems in the relationship. What started as a “dispute” or “conflict” in 1960 became a 
“split” or “break” by 1963, with various other terms being employed in the intervening 
years depending on one's assessment of the relationship. The significance of terminology 
was alluded to in the introduction to the first State Department assessment of the 
deteriorating relationship in February 1962, written by McGee: 
“The words break, breach, rupture, rift, and split have all been used more or less 
accurately to describe a marked change for the worse in the special complex of 
relationships between Communist states. Whichever word one uses, it is obvious that 
there are meaningful degrees of change, just as there are meaningful degrees of 
deterioration in quarreling, sleeping in separate rooms, going home to mother, getting a 
legal separation, and being divorced, not to speak of arranging or undertaking the murder 
of the other party.”119 
 After outlining the significance of the terms one employs, McGee, perhaps 
reflecting the imperfect state of information he and other American officials possessed at 
the time, concluded with equal glibness that “by some definitions, the USSR and 
Communist China have already broken, breached, ruptured, rived, split, or whatever.”120 
 The fundamental debate among those who looked at the matter with open eyes 
was whether they took evidence of deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations at face value or 
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extrapolated based on how these close and necessary allies should behave. Journalists 
tended to fall into the first group, and academic experts into the second. The informed 
public would have also been cognizant of expert opinion and analysis which invariably 
poured cold water on the breathless reportage of the journalists. One of the first major 
print pieces on the issue talked of a “momentous power struggle” which had “suddenly 
flared into flames,” but concluded with the qualifier that experts believed “each needs 
the other too much to risk an outright rupture in relations.
121
 In October 1960, U.S. News 
asked five academic experts to prognosticate the future course of events. None predicted 
rupture, agreeing that, in the words of Hugh Seton-Watson, “the Chinese will gracefully 
surrender.”  
 Leading officials within the administration oscillated between the academics and 
the journalists, migrating over time from the skepticism of the former to the credulity of 
the latter. For instance, in June 1961 Robert Komer wrote Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. that 
“the Sino-Soviet dispute may well prove to be one of the key determinants of the shape 
of the 1960s.”122 That same summer, in a National Security Estimate, analysts predicted 
while “it seems to us unlikely” the two sides “will soon find a way to resolve their 
differences,” each side is aware of the immense danger that would result from an open 
rupture.” Therefore, Sino-Soviet relations would in the future be “erratic, cooperative at 
some times and places, competitive at others.”123 The marriage might be rocky and 
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loveless, but there would be no divorce if the parties understood what was best for them. 
 On the other side entirely were those who denied the reality of the split. Outside 
the administration, this included the Committee of One Million, though their 
conservative media allies in venues like the National Review largely ignored the frictions 
within the communist world. In the administration, the leading expounder of this denial 
was Dean Rusk, who both feared and catered to the China Lobby, which reciprocated 
with a mixture of bullying and praise. At the first Policy Planning Staff meeting on the 
matter, Rusk expressed skepticism when staff member Mose Harvey boldly declared 
“the monolith no longer exists.” He asked Harvey if, even assuming the Soviets and the 
Chinese were no longer on good terms, their “objectives were not still “the same.” 
Harvey bluntly replied to his boss “their objectives are no longer the same.”124  
 But even among those on Harvey’s side, there were reasons do eschew boldness 
both domestic and foreign. Two months after the first meeting concerning the Sino-
Soviet dispute, the State Department issued public relations guidelines which stressed 
that “constant care” must be taken “to avoid exaggerating either the nature or implication 
of the dispute.” In addition, any suggestion that the US is taking sides in the dispute is to 
be avoided.”125 Since neither communist power was particularly popular in the U.S., 
Kennedy should not be seen as cozying up to either. On the foreign side of the equation, 
a May 1962 State Department report concluded “too blatant a propaganda exploitation of 
the Sino-Soviet dispute, or conciliatory gestures to either party to woo them further 
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apart, might well have the counterproductive effects of strengthening the forces tending 
to drive them together.”126 This anticipated Nixon’s much more famous triangular 
diplomacy, since he was also acutely aware of the need not to publicly flaunt the fact he 
was playing one communist power against the other. 
 As with Nixon, Kennedy officials recognized the need to exploit these intra-bloc 
tensions, particularly when it came to advancing U.S. interests in Southeast Asia. Larger 
goals were tantalizing but not realistic. Hong Kong Consul John Lacey noted that “one is 
accordingly tempted to look for lines of action which the US might take to accelerate the 
collapse of Communist and the weakening of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.”127 Around the same 
time, the State Department concluded that even a complete break would neither “end the 
cold war” nor “result in a decisive shift in the balance of forces that could be brought to 
bear” in either a global war or limited regional conflicts. Still, “a break would 
nevertheless, profoundly affect the nature and course of the cold war” by reducing the 
risk of regional conflicts escalating into world war.
128
 In other words, the split reaffirmed 
the Kennedy administration’s belief the United States could safely fight and win limited 
“Brush-Fire Wars.” In a strikingly similar vein, Columbia University Professor Donald 
Zagoria argued in an October 1962 Foreign Affairs article that tensions within the 
communist camp enabled the United States to “take firmer positions in Southeast Asia 
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“without increasing the risks.”129 Thus, the only safe way to exploit the rift was for the 
U.S. to increase its commitment to South Vietnam. 
 None of this meant the administration was taking Rusk’s side over McGhee and 
his fellow like-minded staffers. In fact, the same memo which cautioned about publicly 
seeking to exploit acrimony between the Chinese and the Soviets admonished against 
underplaying it either. One of the goals of future public relations activities was “to 
counter Communist efforts . . . to gloss over the seriousness of their differences and to 
maintain the fiction of a monolithic unity that no longer in fact exists.”130 The notion of a 
communist monolith had by then officially devolved from gospel to heresy, a Big Lie 
promulgated by the enemy. This represented both a revolution in official perceptions and 
in how those perceptions were communicated to the American people. Hilsman walked 
this line in a November 1962 speech in Dallas, the first on the topic by an administration 
official. Though acknowledging that Sino-Soviet differences were “very serious,” he 
maintained that shared enmity towards the United States would lead the two sides to 
“patch over their differences.”131 By this late stage in 1962, those around Hilsman no 
longer believed this, and no doubt neither did he. But it was important to keep up the 
façade. 
                                                          
129
 Ibid. 18. 
130
 Guidelines for Co-ordinated Information Policy in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 4. 
131
 Roger Hilsman, “How Real Is The Break Between Russia and Red China?” U.S. News& World Report, 
26 November 1962, 74. 
 123 
 
 
Going Public 
 A little over one year later, Hilsman would give a far more consequential speech 
which was just as strategic, but more reflective of his true beliefs and intentions. The 
speech made no policy proposals, concealing internal discussions over the travel and 
trade bans, which were the two aspects of China policy a president could change with 
the stroke of a pen. Such steps were seen by both their opponents and supporters as the 
thin edge of the wedge to rapprochement and all that this entailed. Broaching the subject 
of slight changes in the travel ban, Joseph Yager wrote to Harriman in February 1962 
that “there is a real need for first-hand scholarly reporting on mainland China.”132 In 
November 1963, Chayes told Hilsman that Harriman “authorized him to go ahead with a 
less restrictive policy covering validation of passports to Communist China.”133 While 
this did not take effect, it reflected a concurrent State Department proposal that the 
Kennedy administration soon “permit travel to China by American citizens in the larger 
context of general liberalization of present passport restrictions.”134 
 This document also proposed that “at the appropriate time” the administration 
should permit “sales to China insofar as it includes food grains.”135 In May 1963, six 
months before the writing of this internal report, Marvin Liebman wrote to John Tower, 
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the new Republican Senator from Texas, that he had been made aware of McGeorge 
Bundy “saying that United States policy on trade with Red China ‘Is now being 
reviewed at the Department of State.’” Believing such a change could only succeed in 
secret, Liebman instructed Tower that “if this is so, the public should know about it.”136 
Tower wrote the White House with an enquiry, and was soon assured that “the 
Administration does not contemplate the change of that trade policy in the existing 
circumstances.”137 
 Liebman’s letter to Tower was a response to a public comment made by Porter, 
who had been in touch with the administration in his capacity as leader of the newly-
formed Committee For a Review of Our China Policy, which he created as a 
counterweight to the Committee of One Million. Porter advocated beginning the process 
of eliminating the trade embargo. He told Hilsman that the purpose of his group was “to 
‘take over the Department’s worries by drawing critics’ fire.” The former congressman 
believed “American policy to be changing,” but recognized how controversial this would 
be. He proposed quite prophetically that the process of altering public opinion could best 
be furthered by Senator Fulbright’s Foreign Relations Committee holding “public 
hearings on our China policy.”138 Like Bowles, Porter felt the executive branch trying to 
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move public opinion was a fool’s errand and would do more harm than good. 
Unbeknownst to him, his interlocutor begged to differ. 
 Hilsman spoke in San Francisco on 13 December 1963, three weeks after 
Kennedy’s assassination. He intended his remarks as an open rebuke to the late John 
Foster Dulles, who in San Francisco in 1957 had declared the communist Chinese 
regime to be “a passing and not a perpetual phase.” That speech had been applauded by 
the Committee of One Million and their supporters. Now Hilsman, supported by 
subordinates like James Thomson, Allen Whiting, and Robert Barnett, who helped 
Hilsman write the speech, was going to confront these forces publicly for the first 
time.
139
 By doing so, he began that faction’s marginalization within the foreign policy 
elite and among leading opinion makers. 
 At its heart, Hilsman’s speech was a less evocative and minimally provocative 
rewriting of Chayes’s speech from two years before. As with that speech, Hilsman 
proposed only outreach. He declared that “we pursue today toward Communist China a 
policy of the open door,” a phrase with an obvious pedigree concerning Sino-American 
relations.
140
 Hilsman noted how, in recent years, the Chinese communists had proven to 
be “pragmatic when their existence is threatened,” belying their reputation for 
belligerent irrationality. Like Chayes, Hilsman recognized that the past harsh rhetoric 
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used by Dulles (or, for that matter, Rusk), led to rhetorical hate spirals, and declared “we 
will not sow the dragon’s seed of hate.”141 Hilsman went on to imply those who had 
done so on the American side were acting out of irrational emotion. It was now “time to 
take stock – dispassionately,” of U.S. policy towards East Asia. Unfortunately, “there has 
been perhaps more emotion about our China policy than about our policy toward any 
single country since World War II.”142 Hilsman was openly proclaiming himself and 
like-minded reformers not to be soft and sentimental doves, but actually more 
dispassionate, reasonable, and hard-headed than the China hawks. 
 Hilsman’s opponents did not fail to recognize the threat.  The Committee of One 
Million had declared in 1962 that “the only force that has so far blocked a U.N. seat for 
Red China has been American public opinion.”143 To his supporters, Liebman castigated 
“the demoralizing softness of Mr. Hilsman’s major theme of conciliation and tolerance,” 
the first time the Committee had felt compelled to condemn the action of a member of 
any administration.
144
 Publicly, he charged Hilsman with “promoting a ‘two Chinas 
solution,’” a notion backed to varying degrees by those who supported Hilman’s 
statements within the administration.
145
 Liebman was no doubt reacting less to 
Hilsman’s words than to the widespread favorable reception they received in the media. 
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The Christian Science Monitor called the speech “the most articulate and complete 
statement of American policy on mainland China to have been made in years.” 
Numerous stories in major newspapers alluded to the “open door” phrase in their 
headlines, proving that had in fact been a successful sound-bite.
146
 The primary criticism 
was that Hilsman had not gone farther, and made any policy proposals, the Washington 
Post lamenting “after six years, has the United States nothing more to say than if China 
changes, the situation might improve?”147 
 Yet Max Frankel of the New York Times expressed the emerging consensus that 
“the most remarkable fact” concerning the speech was that it was made at all.” During 
the Kennedy years, China had been the foreign policy issue which must not be named, as 
the president let his administration “slide into timidity” in the face of pressure from the 
China Lobby and its supporters.
148
 Louis Fleming wrote in the Los Angeles Times, 
previously a China Lobby bastion, that “reluctantly, the United States is speaking about 
the unspeakable.” Fleming declared Chinese behavior “the most predatory” of all nations 
during the postwar period, but that the only way to contain China was to accept “the 
realities of China” and adopt a policy of outreach rather than isolation.149 
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The Journey of a Thousand Miles  
 All recognized this would be a long process. Some even knew it was already 
several years in the making. Frankel termed the speech an expression of “long held but 
rarely articulated views on Communist China.”150 This was precisely Hilsman’s 
intention, as he made clear in a post-speech talking points memo to Adlai Stevenson 
which recognized his words as “significant primarily as the first attempt in some time to 
articulate the policies we have been pursuing toward Communist China for several 
years.”151 The Christian Science Monitor summed up Stevenson’s ensuing remarks by 
claiming the new Johnson administration was now pursuing a “two-pronged policy” 
coupling no change in the existing policy of nonrecognition with “a new disposition to 
keep the subject under open discussion and in the public eye.” This summed up 
Hilsman’s intent to begin the process of policy change by moving the debate beyond the 
corridors of Foggy Bottom. As the Guardian in Britain had aptly predicted the morning 
after Hilsman’s speech, “time will be allowed to erode the old policy.”152 
 Stevenson’s remarks came in the immediate wake of Rusk’s assurance to China 
hard-liners at home and Taiwanese leaders abroad that the speech “simply referred to the 
longest possible range future.” The press saw this as “seeming to cancel the conditional 
policy toward Communist China that Hilsman had proffered in his speech.” For the first, 
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but by no means the last time, Rusk undercut a junior administration official who hinted 
at a softening of China policy. According to veteran pundit Arthur Krock, the Secretary 
of State had merely “thickened the fog” which already “suffuses American Far Eastern 
diplomacy.”153 The New York Times quipped that Rusk had “made American policy seem 
even more of a Chinese puzzle than before.” If any side was inscrutable, it was the 
Americans, not the Chinese. In that same editorial, the Times became the first major 
newspaper to call for “normalization of contacts with the Chinese.”154 Hilsman’s words 
were having an effect. 
 Assessing the impact of Hilsman's speech two days after it had been given, 
Frankel concluded that “it did not change policy, but it changed Washington's 
posture.”155 There was an irony in the truth of this observation. In an April 1962 
memorandum outlining many of the ideas Hilsman would later publicly express, Chester 
Bowles called the isolation of China “a national posture rather than a national policy.”156 
Yet Bowles objected to the posturing of Eisenhower and Dulles not because it was empty 
posturing, but because it was the wrong kind of empty posturing. From that time and 
place, Kennedy’s successors would let the word go forth that the torch had been passed 
to a new generation of officials, tempered by the flames of McCarthyism, but not afraid, 
and occasionally eager, to poke its dying embers. When Kennedy took office, change 
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was in the air. Shortly after he was struck down, it was on the lips. The question now 
became, when would words become actions? 
 131 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
BEGIN THE BEGIN: POLICY MAINTENANCE AMIDST A TRANSFORMED 
DEBATE DURING THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION 
 
 In February 1964, two months after Roger Hilsman’s San Francisco speech and a 
matter of weeks after France offered diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of 
China, Doak Barnett wrote a memo for his seminar students seeking to explain the lack 
of change in U.S. China policy, particularly under Democratic administrations. 
According to him, the Republicans controlled policy remotely by using “China policy 
issues as a political weapon” to intimidate Democrats, turning them into “captives of the 
opposition.” They were able to do so because of the perception that the public was on 
their side when it came to isolating the Chinese communists as much as possible. 
However, in Barnett’s estimation, “public opinion” was conflated with “Congressional 
opinion,” which was dominated by “certain small lobby groups” known colloquially as 
the “China lobby.” Barnett hypothesized that the public favored a much more flexible 
approach to China policy than members of congress.
1
 
 Barnett went on to advance the argument that the executive branch had since 
1949 “been unwilling to use, in the formulation and implementation of policy toward 
China, most of those officials who had accumulated experience and expertese (sic) on 
Chinese problems prior to 1949, because such persons were considered tainted by the 
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failures of past policy.” In addition, younger experts who did serve in government felt 
“inhibited’ by the “persecution” of an earlier generation of scholars.2 Barnett himself 
was part of the latter group, as was his brother Robert, who had served in the Kennedy 
and was currently serving in the Johnson administration. Doak Barnett himself had 
covered the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War as a journalist in the late 1940s, 
and a decade later participated, along with Dean Rusk, in a series of study sessions 
convened by the Council on Foreign Relations to better understand events behind the 
“Bamboo Curtain,” a term he had coined in 1948 while in northern China. 
 In other course material produced for his students that semester, Barnett 
predicted the situation of stasis and inertia might quickly change, claiming “the U.S. 
Government will probably have to start acting vigorously – and soon – to lay the 
groundwork for some acceptable alternative.” Standing in the way was fear of a public 
“outcry” and the consequent negative political repercussions. To neutralize this threat to 
policy change, Barnett declared “there is an urgent need, therefore, to inform the 
American people about the realities of the situation, and to clarify the practical 
alternatives from among which American policy makers must choose.”3 The professor 
was talking about the Johnson administration. The executive branch would be the 
potential agent of change, overcoming a congress which on this matter was recalcitrant 
at best and outright hostile at worst. 
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 Unbeknownst to Barnett, the reverse would soon prove to be the case, and he 
would go from observer to leading actor. In late November of that year, Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee Chief of Staff Carl Marcy forwarded an article written by George 
Kennan from the most recent New York Times Magazine to his boss, Senator and 
committee Chairman Fulbright. “I think you will find this article quite worth reading,” 
Marcy wrote in an attached memo.
4
 In this lengthy and often meandering essay, Kennan 
argued that China’s communist regime would not collapse, but could be moderated 
though diplomatic engagement.
5
 Politicians are constantly forwarded articles by 
members of their staff, and usually it is nearly impossible to figure out if they even 
bothered to read the material, let alone if the arguments made any impact. In this 
instance, that is not the case. Within a year, Fulbright began giving speeches calling for 
significant changes in U.S. China policy privileging outreach over isolation. In every one 
of these speeches, he quoted – at length and with accreditation – Kennan’s words from 
that article. Those quotes concerned Kennan’s belief that, though currently menacing 
and dangerous, China’s communist regime was bound to evolve in a manner more 
congenial to U.S. interests, provided the U.S. ceased its policy of total isolation and 
official hostility. 
 Not wanting to be the only voice calling for change, in March 1966 Fulbright 
convened Senate hearings on communist China. The two star witnesses were Doak 
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Barnett and John Fairbank. Their remarks were televised live, and received extensive 
and prominent print media coverage. If Barnett represented the later, untainted, 
generation of scholars, Fairbank was a leading member the earlier cohort. His 
appearance signified both a personal vindication and a sign that old fears and taboos 
were fast receding. Barnett’s call for a new policy of “containment without isolation” 
became an oft-repeated sound bite and slogan for those proposing significant changes in 
China policy. While not leading to this result during the administration of Lyndon 
Baines Johnson, it did occasion new, and more conciliatory, rhetoric from the president. 
 That the executive branch is missing from this sketch of developments on China 
policy during the first half of the Johnson administration is no oversight. During this 
period, and continuing through the second half of Johnson’s tenure, congress and public 
opinion provided the motive forces on this issue, while the administration largely stood 
still. Hilsman’s speech changed nothing internally, but externally it began a chain 
reaction which led to greater media advocacy – as represented by Kennan’s article – that 
influenced and emboldened a few members of congress, Fulbright most importantly 
during this period. The chain reaction reached critical mass in the spring of 1966, after 
academics came out of the shadows to grant decisive legitimacy to those calling for 
policy change. Throughout these years, the administration was, in terms of the public 
and elite debate, on the outside looking in. It would soon join, albeit more to co-opt and 
control the forces of reform rather than to harness them. 
 During the first half of his administration, Lyndon Johnson accepted the new 
premises put forth in Roger Hilsman’s speech, but steadfastly followed the old policies 
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these premises logically undermined. French diplomatic recognition for the P.R.C., the 
gathering momentum for seating communist China in the United Nations, and its 
successful test of a nuclear weapon – all occurring in 1964 – seemed for brief moments 
to necessitate at least some policy alterations, but quickly proved inconsequential. 
Meanwhile, increasing U.S. military commitments in South Vietnam set the U.S and the 
P.R.C. on a dangerous collision course. While inside the administration some privately 
argued this was yet another reason for outreach, publicly these same officials backed 
away from Hilsman’s posture and returned to modified versions of the rhetoric of 
Dulles-era intransigence. They – and their superiors – ignored evidence that for the first 
time the general public, largely out of fear of the Chinese threat, was softening in its 
opposition to changes in China policy. Ultimately, it would take outside actors to 
capitalize on and catalyze this new mood. Fulbright’s hearings gave prominent China 
scholars a national forum in which to question existing policy, and the press and the 
public proved receptive. This in turn spurred the administration to change its rhetoric, if 
not yet its policies. 
First Year Jitters 
 Some Democrats at the time and many scholars since have faulted the 
Eisenhower administration for taking an approach to long-term China policy centered 
around instances of short-term crisis management. By comparison, one may call 
Johnson’s approach to the issue an attempt at crisis-free crisis management. There were 
potential crises early in his tenure, specifically French recognition and China’s first test 
of a nuclear weapon. One might argue that on China matters much of his presidency was 
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overtaken by a continuing regional crisis in the form of the Vietnam War. Yet fears of 
direct Chinese military intervention – fears which occasioned the timing of Fulbright’s 
hearings – quickly dissipated and the situation proved easily manageable, even with the 
extremely limited level of direct communication between the two nations. Furthermore, 
in between these events, the administration did little if nothing to formulate a long-term 
strategy which matched the new assumptions that took hold in the foreign policy 
bureaucracy during the Kennedy years. Internal documents reveal that, having jettisoned 
the theoretical bases for Eisenhower’s approach, practical actions – and much of the 
public rhetoric – was little different than under Dulles. Some of this changed after the 
Fulbright hearings. But in the first half of his time as president, Johnson’s approach to 
China was a dead policy walking, devoid of life and initiative. One cannot blame this on 
escalation in South Vietnam, for there was no visible flame of policy initiative for the 
Indochinese jungles to extinguish. 
 Before Vietnam became all-consuming, there were a series of events which had 
the potential to undermine existing U.S. China policy. The first was France’s informing 
the U.S. on 15 January 1964 of its decision to accord the People’s Republic of China 
diplomatic recognition.
6
 France thus became the first U.S. ally to recognize the P.R.C. in 
14 years.
7
 While certainly a blow to U.S.-led Western solidarity on this matter, by itself 
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the initiative taken by an increasingly maverick Charles De Gaulle was little more than a 
briefly damaging news story. What worried U.S. officials was that this could be the first 
of many similar defections. Canada, for instance, was seen as “most inclined toward 
recognition.”8 The Canadians had much to gain from increased agricultural trade with 
China, and the longstanding siren call of the Chinese market proved “a formidable 
attraction for many nations.” This no doubt had played a major role in France’s decision, 
along with its desire to reassert its influence in Indochina.
9
 
 On a less self-serving and more strategic level, De Gaulle argued that isolating 
China only made it more of a threat by increasing its potential for belligerence. 
Diplomatic contact could encourage moderation.
10
 This combination of arguments 
would be used by U.S. allies – and the U.S. itself – to justify diplomatic outreach to 
China, but not until the very end of the decade. De Gaulle probably believed events in 
1964 were working on a more accelerated timeline.
11
 In this he would not have been 
alone among U.S. allies, and American policy makers were well aware of it at the time.
12
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The Hilsman speech, and the favorable media coverage it occasioned, was one indication 
this might be the case. Some reacted the same way to France’s actions. On 1 February, 
The New Republic opined “the action of France will no doubt hasten the entry of China 
in the UN, and why not?”13 Ultimately, the hopes of those supporting change and the 
fears of those backing the status quo turned out to be unfounded. France achieved little 
economically or diplomatically from its bold move, discouraging others from taking a 
similar step into the unknown. By late summer the administration could breathe a sigh of 
relief, assured there would be no more “problems with free world countries.”14 This 
proved to be the first of multiple problems whose repercussions could be deferred until 
later. 
 By 1964, it was clear that a successful Chinese test of an atomic weapon was 
imminent. Even Marvel produced two Ironman comic books with plots revolving around 
Chinese scientists trying to procure atomic secrets in the service of Mao’s efforts to 
acquire a nuclear bomb.
15
 Prior consideration on both the U.S. and to a lesser extent the 
Soviet side to destroy or delay China’s nuclear program with a military strike had been 
jettisoned as impractical or counterproductive.
16
 The primary issue now became the 
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inevitable event’s effects, specifically if China’s neighbors would be intimidated and 
Chinese policy emboldened. In April Robert Johnson of the State Department’s Policy 
Planning Council emphasized the test’s impact would be more “political” than military, 
bolstering the regime’s domestic prestige. Abroad, the test’s effect would be neutral and 
“confirm” the present assumptions of U.S. allies, communist nations, and the non-
aligned states. As for the U.S. posture in the region, “a Communist Chinese nuclear 
capability need impose no new military restriction on the U.S. response to aggression in 
Asia,” and thus should not affect ongoing efforts in South Vietnam.17 While Johnson at 
the State Department saw this event as changing nothing, the military strongly disagreed, 
the Pacific Command arguing in July that “the effect on Asia at large will be very great.” 
In their view, the test alone would grant China far greater regional stature.
18
 
 What China would or could do with this stature was another matter. Rostow at 
the National Security Council tilted towards the State Department and disagreed with the 
military’s viewpoint, claiming in September that “with nuclear weapons comes 
caution.”19 Rostow’s report the next week to McGeorge Bundy reiterated past 
assumptions of Chinese rationality, arguing that China would only use these weapons 
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defensively if under direct threat of invasion.
20
 Thus, there was no need for “major 
policy changes” in light of changing circumstances.21 Less than a week before the 
detonation, in an NSC meeting, Rusk flatly stated “now is no time for a new policy 
toward Communist China.”22 
 The one aspect open for dispute was how other nations would react. United 
States Information Agency head Carl Rowan predicted based on recent opinion surveys 
that the reception would be “unwelcome, particularly in Africa.23 On 22 October, six 
days after the test of the 20 kiloton warhead, Thomas Hughes offered a contrasting 
view.
24
 In a memorandum entitled “Africa Stops Worrying and Loves the Bomb,” 
Hughes predicted the test “adds one more argument in favor of diplomatic recognition 
for those African fence-sitters.”25 The director of INR at State ultimately concluded the 
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Chinese “encountered no unpleasant surprises” in the international reception of their 
action.
26
 
 The primary concern at the time for those who opposed any change in U.S. China 
policy was that what Look referred to as “the nuclear thunder out of China” would lead 
some to conclude a more dangerous P.R.C. must now be dealt with.
27
 The historian 
Stanley Hornbeck expressed this concern in a letter to Committee of One Million 
Chairman Walter Judd.
28
 In fact, in early November, former China Lobby stalwart Henry 
L
29uce’s Time magazine came to just this conclusion, leading Robert Komer to feel 
vindicated in his belief that the “China issue no longer has to the same domestic impact 
that it used to.” 30  Along with a post-election article in the usually right-leaning 
Saturday Evening Post entitled “Needed: A China Policy that makes sense,” this seemed 
to confirm to Komer that the issue “isn’t domestic dynamite any longer.”31 However, he 
worried that the situation in Vietnam made matters more complicated than before.
32
 
There was also fear inside the administration that any lessening of U.S. support to South 
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Vietnam in the near future would be seen as a negative reaction to the test.
33
 All told, the 
test itself appeared to by and large confirm previously held beliefs on all sides in both 
the U.S. and abroad. Unlike French diplomatic recognition, this event had long been 
foreseen. Like that earlier event, its effects would not be felt for several years to come. 
For the time being, they could be filed under potential problems successfully avoided. 
A Policy Running to Stand Still 
 Avoiding China policy change was something in which this administration would 
soon become past masters. Hilsman’s speech purposefully offered nothing in the way of 
concrete proposals, merely announcing a shift away from a hostile posture towards the 
Chinese communists. This left Johnson plenty of room to maneuver, which in reality 
made it very easy to remain stationary. In fact, it made it even easier than before. 
Paradoxically, by achieving a change in the official tone, proponents of substantive 
policy alterations during the Kennedy years lessened the pressure for and need of such 
changes. Those who remained under Johnson, foremost among them James Thomson, 
had failed by succeeding. Eisenhower-era hostility, typified by the remarks of John 
Foster Dulles, built up pressure for change, much like shaking a bottle of soda makes it 
likely for the liquid to burst out if the bottle is ever opened. But an unshaken bottle, with 
lesser pressure, can safely be opened and let out only gas. This was essentially what 
Hilsman had accomplished. While appearing to stir things up in the new administration, 
his remarks actually calmed the situation. 
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 Militating against any change in 1964 was the fact that Johnson was running for 
election. Thus, throughout that year, the question was what the administration would 
seek to accomplish in 1965, giving the matter a pronounced lack of urgency. 
Nonetheless, the State Department went about the business of producing a pre-election 
policy paper and preparing public statements. White House official William Y. Smith 
identified the “dilemma” the administration faced at that time. Policy papers would 
inevitably be “leaked” to the press, producing “campaign fodder” for the opposition and 
damaging the president with voters. However, a perceived lack of activity would 
indicate a lack of concern and serious thinking about a vital matter.
34
 To preempt the 
leaks, the State Department made a series of public statements as it conducted its 
preliminary review which reaffirmed the substance of existing policy while attempting 
not to appear stuck in the past. 
 From his perch in Hong Kong, C.I.A. Acting Principal Officer John Lacey 
helped set the tone and shape the rhetoric. He focused on China’s threats to U.S. allies 
along its borders, viewing China purely through the prism of containment. He became 
the first to use the term “firmness and flexibility” to describe the administration’s 
approach. Beginning in July 1966, when Johnson avidly and publicly adopted the phrase, 
it implied a continued containment policy heavily leavened with tentative attempts at 
outreach. But this was not what Lacey had in mind in 1964, defining it purely in terms of 
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a containment strategy which would be “flexible in tactics and firm in principle.”35 The 
U.S. would be prepared to meet any attempts at Chinese aggression with a variety of 
measures. At no point did Lacey consider any lessening of the U.S.-led program of 
isolating China. In Lacey’s telling, this was entirely consistent with Hilsman’s remarks 
since, like the outgoing State Department official, he sought to put the “onus” for this 
isolation on the Chinese by highlighting their bad behavior. This would counteract the 
signal sent by France’s recognition that it was the U.S. which was becoming isolated on 
this matter.
36
 The goal was to apply the Eisenhower methods in a manner clever enough 
to curry favor with world opinion. Hilsman thus had given the policies he opposed a new 
lease on life. 
 Lacey’s approach was seconded by Lindsey Grant, head of the Office of Asian 
Communist Affairs at the State Department. Hilsman created the ACA in 1963 to 
provide a greater bureaucratic focus on China.
37
 In James Thomson’s words, this 
resulted in an “upgrading of the mainland China desk” to independent status.38 As ACA 
head, Grant would assume the leading role in China policy formulation for the next two 
years at State, and set the tone for debate within the entire administration. This was 
because in early 1964 Hilsman was replaced by William Bundy, who initially opposed 
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policy change, Harriman by George Ball, who was indifferent to the matter, and 
Thomson transferred to the NSC. Though personally more flexible on China policy than 
his predecessor, Johnson’s purging of Kennedy loyalists removed voices more in line 
with his instincts than Kennedy’s, contributing to stasis on the matter. 
 In March of that year, Grant produced his “Guidelines of United States Policy 
Toward China.” Like Lacey the previous month, Grant stressed containment and mere 
tactical shifts to place “the onus for our continuing mutual hostility” onto the Chinese. 
Like Hilsman, he took for granted the stability and staying power of the P.R.C., and held 
out hope for future moderation. However, since “our leverage within Communist China 
is almost nil,” there was nothing the U.S. could do to encourage this development.39 
Grant explained his assessment to his superior, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far 
Eastern Affairs Marshall Green. He categorized the Chinese communists as “a serious 
annoyance” rather than “a major threat.” The way to prevent them from becoming one 
was to demonstrate that aggression was “dangerous and unprofitable.” The greatest 
danger was if they sensed any “softening” of U.S. policy.40 Grant emphasized the 
importance of “firmness” even more bluntly to John De Haan, declaring that “the 
fundamental point of this policy is precisely that we are not willing to go to Munich.”41 
In both communications, Grant made clear he did not fear the Chinese threat, and 
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believed it could be easily contained through a tough and uncompromising approach. In 
a telephone conversation with McGeorge Bundy, George Ball reiterated the line that “if 
the US ever does change its policy toward Red China, that will certainly never occur 
unless and until Red China changes its policy towards the civilized world.”42 This “You 
First” approach was directly out of the Dulles playbook. 
 A more searching and long-term approach to policy appeared around election 
time, when it was clear Johnson was going to have at least four more years in office. 
Yet, while the proposals produced strayed somewhat from the first limited policy 
review, and appeared to promise change, they were always couched in a vague and 
purely theoretical style, envisioning a future situation on a distant horizon in which 
change would be both feasible and desirable. Those most forcefully pushing for change 
were a trio of advocates left over from Kennedy – Robert Komer, James Thomson, and 
Thomas Hughes. None of them had gained access to the levers of power on this issue 
since their earlier attempts at advocacy. Komer at NSC opened the campaign in late 
October, reiterating in a typically lengthy and urgent-sounding memorandum how 
changing circumstances had rendered the existing policy obsolete. Instead, he called for 
initiating “the slow, frustrating, and uneven process of grappling to find some areas of 
accommodation” with the ultimate goal of “integrating China into the world community 
as a law-abiding and constructive member.”43 Komer and others had by this time been 
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using such language for close to three years. However, two things had changed. First, 
allied support for U.S. policy was “eroding.” Second, and more pressing, was the 
situation in South Vietnam. Lack of communication with China seriously inhibited 
reaching an accommodation with the communists, which was vital because, according to 
Komer, “the prospects for United States military pacification of Southeast Asia are 
poor.”44 Only a “political settlement” could preserve South Vietnam. The key to 
achieving this aim was to exploit the “natural antagonisms between China and 
Indochina.”45 This was an inversion of Rostow’s formula under Kennedy, whereby 
China and North Vietnam moved in lockstep, and thus Chinese moderation could dictate 
the same in Hanoi, which also would become the basis for Nixon’s “linkage.” It was a 
more astute reading of the situation, but also ironic given Komer’s later position as head 
of pacification programs in South Vietnam. 
 Chinese intransigence could be broken, and negotiations over Vietnam begun, by 
unilateral lifting of the travel and trade bans in order to demonstrate good faith. These 
steps would presumably have a moderating influence on the Chinese, just as previous 
U.S. hostility had encouraged a matching response from Mao.
46
 In a memo sent to 
McGeorge Bundy a month later, Komer explained his position in greater depth, and dealt 
with some of the countervailing arguments. Change was inevitable. The goal would be to 
bring it about as gracefully and swiftly as possible, though these two characteristics were 
                                                          
44
 Ibid. 6, 7. 
45
 Ibid. 8. 
46
 Ibid. 9, 10. 
 148 
 
 
in tension due to “domestic politics” and U.S. credibility overseas. As Komer pithily put 
it, “it is simply unrealistic to expect us to say boldly we were wrong about our China 
policy,” adding that “great nations don’t win kudos abroad by admitting mistakes.” But 
this was a purely tactical matter requiring diplomatic finesse. Domestic opinion was 
shifting in his favor, catching up with views overseas. The trick was to exploit the 
situation in Vietnam. A display of U.S. strength towards Hanoi would open doors to 
Beijing. As Komer put it, the U.S. was “escalating to negotiate.” At the same time, the 
bitter pill of restraining its North Vietnamese ally could be sweetened by intimating an 
end to overt U.S. opposition to a U.N. seat for the P.R.C., something Komer believed 
would happen sooner rather than later regardless.
47
 
 Whereas Komer saw the situation in South Vietnam as essential to China policy, 
Thomson – though reaching the same conclusions – claimed the recent focus on Hanoi 
and Saigon was “concentrating on the tail for the dog, rather than the dog itself.” Instead, 
Thomson attempted to redirect attention back to the eroding of China’s international 
isolation, particularly in the realm of trade.
48
 The U.S. would thus face the worst of both 
worlds – a hostile China isolated only from the U.S. To prevent this, Thomson urged a 
series of policy shifts beginning early the next year as part of a new policy of 
“containment – plus subversion.” By subversion, Thomson meant outreach aimed at “the 
domestication of Communist China.” Like Komer, Thomson called for lifting the travel 
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and trade bans, as well as a shift to a two-Chinas position in the U.N. Mirroring some of 
Komer’s language about the uncertain effects of this potential shift, Thomson ended by 
calling for “a groping toward coexistence on the basis of mutual self-interest.”49 He 
believed such policies would face little concerted domestic opposition, citing as 
evidence the positive press reception of Hilsman’s speech and the lack of congressional 
opposition to his remarks. As with Komer, these were the same proposals he had put 
forth under Kennedy, only this time hopefully made more relevant by the passage of 
time. 
 From Hong Kong, embassy Consul General Edward Rice backed Komer’s and 
Thomson’s policy prescriptions. He focused on the recent nuclear explosion as a spur to 
greater acceptance abroad “of China as a permanent and major factor on the world 
scene.” However, Hughes differed on both the effects of such a changed policy on 
preserving South Vietnam as well as the importance of that goal. He predicted the 
communist Chinese and North Vietnamese “would be tough and uncompromising in any 
negotiations.” But a negative turn of events in Indochina need not have larger effects. 
Questioning the Domino Theory, he doubted if Thailand would go communist “because 
one of its neighbors goes.”50 But while these three disagreed over the importance of 
South Vietnam, they were in lockstep over how to approach the colossus to its north. 
 Whether such opinions were held by those with actual influence over China 
policy is somewhat debatable. What is not up for debate is that these officials, whatever 
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their personal beliefs, did nothing to affect change. Grant wrote remarks to William 
Bundy in February 1965 which indicated an openness to change, at the rhetorical level in 
the short-term and potentially also in terms of long-term policy. Grant believed bellicose 
rhetoric could inflame both Americans and Chinese, making future accommodation 
problematic. Emphasizing where he differed from Dulles’s example, he wrote that “if we 
proclaim ourselves too emphatically anti-Communist or anti-Chinese-Communist, public 
opinion at home will make it even harder than now to pursue policies subtle enough for 
the situation.” He couched China’s position in a racialized or at the very least 
Orientalized manner. Claiming Chinese people “are preternaturally sensitive to slights, 
real or imagined,” Grant worried that showing “hostility for its own sake” could lead to a 
situation where the U.S. would “some day face a China both strong and deeply 
hostile.”51 To prevent this, “we must be prepared to accord her a degree of dignity,” to 
be conveyed by a softening of U.S. opposition to U.N. admission.
52
 This was a clue that 
Grant was at least unofficially out of step with Rusk, and open to Adlai Stevenson’s 
hope that year for “an accommodation with Communist China” to bring about “peaceful 
coexistence” between the U.S. and the P.R.C.53 
 Stevenson based his own proposal on foreign opinion, particularly in non-aligned 
nations where the U.S. was seeking to curry favor. Domestic opinion was a different 
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matter, over which there was disagreement. On of Grant’s goals was to “bring domestic 
opinions and our demands upon it closer together,” which was more a normative than a 
factual statement since he was himself making no such demands by seeking to push the 
policy envelope.
54
 Grant’s remarks implied the administration feared getting ahead of 
what the electorate would tolerate. In reality, throughout the Johnson administration, the 
public led in tolerating policy change, and the president lagged. Evidence contrary to the 
assumptions of Grant and others in power, while noted, appeared to change no minds. 
Reading the Tea Leaves 
 That evidence, while by no means overwhelming, was accumulating during this 
period. Robert Blum, then head of the Council on Foreign Relations, informed Marshall 
Green at the State Department in February 1964 that his organization was planning to 
commission an extensive and detailed survey on Americans’ views of China policy, to 
be conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. A 
preliminary survey, essentially a series of focus groups convened by Samuel Lubell 
Associates, questioned 169 Americans the previous fall. This unscientific investigation 
seemed to confirm recent polling that a sizable majority of Americans viewed China “as 
a bigger threat to the United States than Soviet Russia.” More tellingly, support for 
gestures of outreach towards China, such as allowing China to join the U.N., strongly 
correlated with greater fear of China. Those who feared the Soviet Union more were 
almost unanimous in their opposition to changes in China policy, while those who feared 
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China were evenly divided. This despite the fact that participants who feared China 
expressed that fear in racial terms and described its leaders as “irrational” and 
“Oriental.” Still, this group also expressed the belief that “China is here to stay and can’t 
be ignored.”55 Fear, not hope, appeared to be driving support for policy change among 
the general public. 
 The increasing fear of the Chinese as expressed by Gallup polling in 1963 and 
1964 was noted by the White House as well. By November 1964, three times as many 
Americans viewed China as a greater threat to world peace than Russia.
56
 The CFR 
survey of 1,500 respondents conducted in May and June of 1964 also discovered “a 
widespread fear among Americans that Communist China may attack the United States 
or may try to rule the world.” Intended to be released only after the election, the results 
were eventually published as a book in 1966. Yet Blum informed the administration of 
the major results in August 1964. These included soft majority support for outreach to 
China, including a two-China policy at the U.N., albeit with a determined and sizeable 
minority in opposition. Notably, the survey revealed a willingness to support change 
provided the president proposed such measures. Much of the public appeared to want to 
be led on the issue.
57
 At the very least, the issue was no longer politically radioactive. 
 That James Thomson would greet these results with enthusiasm was 
understandable. More curious was Lindsey Grant’s positive response. After receiving the 
                                                          
55
 Robert Blum to Marshall Green, 7 February 1964, 1-6, Folder 1, Box 16, Thomson Papers, JFK. 
56
 Folder Relations with Russia, Box 181, Office Files of Frederick Panzer, Lyndon Johnson Papers, LBJ. 
57
 Thomson to Bundy and Komer, Subject: U.S. Opinion regarding Communist China, 21 August 1964,  1-
2, Folder CPR 64 65 66, Robert Komer Papers, NSF, LBJ. 
 153 
 
 
survey summary from Thomson, Grant replied that he had “cheered myself hoarse.” He 
termed the results “further ammunition in the common cause,” and evidence of “the 
ebbing of public sentiment on the subject.”58 This reflected a private view on Grant’s 
part which his policy papers did not in the least represent. Assessing the public mood on 
the eve of the election, he told William Bundy “the dominant mood had been a confused 
one seeking for a new and more appealing policy.” Thus, there was an opening for 
change. However, standing in the way was “Congressional timidity.” Grant proposed 
leaking some of the results to key members of congress to inspire them to “go out and 
test the water for themselves.”59 Nowhere did Grant mention any direct public actions by 
the administration. Based on the dissonance between these expressed beliefs and his 
policy statements, Grant appeared to be transferring his own timidity onto other actors. 
 Others viewed the latest data with more caution. At the end of 1964, a State 
Department report claimed that while “a substantial segment of articulate opinion” 
supported ending the travel and trade bans as a prelude to normalization, “a ‘hard core’ 
majority, however, remain opposed to changes at this time.” Noting both “increasing 
popular concern about Red China as a threat to world peace” as well as growing support 
for UN admission, the report highlighted continuing majority opposition to seating the 
P.R.C. In addition, and in opposition to the opinions of Thomson, Komer, and to some 
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extent Grant, it concluded this remained “a highly controversial, emotional issue.”60 This 
no doubt better reflected Rusk’s own view, as well as the administration’s actions during 
this period, or lack thereof. 
 Robert Barnett confided to James Thomson in April 1965 that “China policy will 
be made at the margins for some time ahead.”61 This assessment concerned the travel 
and trade bans, as well as diplomatic recognition of Mongolia, which Thomson referred 
to with clear frustration that June as “tired old chestnuts that have been kicked around in 
the Government since at least the first months of the Kennedy Administration.” These 
measures had not been enacted because of repeated conclusions that the time was 
inappropriate, leading Thomson to exclaim with clear resignation that “I am convinced 
that ‘now’ is never going to be the right time.” To counter any further excuse-making, 
Thomson noted how recent U.S. escalation in Vietnam would inoculate the 
administration against any charges of softness towards Asian communism.
62
 It was the 
rare occasion Thomson was not alone, and had the support of those in greater positions 
of power and influence. Undersecretary of State William Bundy wrote to Rusk later that 
month proposing a slight but significant modification of the travel ban in order to allow 
U.S. scholars to travel to China. He noted how this could both “put the Chinese 
Communists on the defensive” as well as “nullify domestic criticism on both the right 
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and the left.” Rusk disapproved the proposal later that month, indicating his lack of 
support for even the most tentative attempts at softening the policy of isolation.
63
 
 This steadfastness was best represented by a series of public addresses by State 
Department officials of escalating rank between early 1964 and early 1966. All reiterated 
in one form or another Dean Rusk’s February 1964 declaration that “when Mainland 
China has a Government which is prepared to renounce force, to make peace, and to 
honor international responsibilities, it will find us responsive.”64 It was basically a 
shotgun marriage of Dulles to Hilsman, accepting the possibility of change but putting 
the onus for starting the process on the other side. Speaking at Harvard in April 1964, 
Robert Barnett began – as Dulles often had – by noting that “we do not ignore the 
Chinese Communist regime.”65 This line was always intended as a rebuttal to those 
arguing for change who claimed formal isolation equaled de facto denial. Barnett 
accepted that conditions were changing, particularly in light of the ongoing Sino-Soviet 
split, and that “Chinese Communist totalitarianism has its Chinese precedents,” 
indicating the assumption that the P.R.C. took its marching orders from Moscow no 
longer held official credence.
66
 Offering the most tentative hints of future outreach, 
Barnett claimed U.S. policies were carried out “more in sorrow than in anger,” while 
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warning “we must not mistake future expectations for present reality.”67 It was Dulles-
ism with a human face. 
 Marshall Green continued this emphasis on the wisdom of continuing 
containment coupled with isolation in the near-term in two speeches, one in late 1964 
and the other early in 1965. He emphasized the regime’s “avowed hostility” and 
“expansionist” tendencies.68 Green classified any lessening of this isolation as 
“premature actions which would weaken free countries.”69 He noted the “more than 180 
diplomatic level talks with Peiping representatives” as Dulles often had in order to 
dismiss the notion the U.S. had no contact with the Chinese communists.
70
 In both 
speeches, Green predicted change was inevitable, though more likely to take the form of 
evolving moderation on the part of the ruling party than any overthrow of the Chinese 
regime.
71
 However, the U.S. could do nothing but wait and maintain “strength with 
patience.”72 Lindsey Grant referred the Green’s addresses as “educative diplomacy,” yet 
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the only lesson it conveyed was the wisdom of continuity.
73
 Public remarks were 
consistent with Grant’s internal policy papers rather than his private hopes. Furthermore, 
the lack of signaling any prospect for change only served to encourage expectations of 
maintaining the status quo, enabling those like Rusk who opposed any changes to argue 
that any new approaches would be jarring and unwelcome. 
 Even those who internally advocated change spoke out publicly against it. 
Newly-installed head of INR Thomas Hughes remarked in a speech in December 1965 
that “China is recognized as important enough to be denied recognition,” as pure and 
pithy a distillation of Dulles’s doctrine as could be enunciated.74 For his part, in 
February 1966 William Bundy cast doubt on the very sort of attempts at increased 
person-to-person contact he had proposed the previous June, noting how “the Chinese 
have kept the door tightly barred,” essentially blaming the enemy for its isolation. He 
also ridiculed the notion that a U.N. seat would moderate the regime as “neurosis” 
theory, using language associated with those who opposed change rather than those who 
supported it.
75
 In terms of what this rhetoric emphasized about the administration’s 
thinking, these speeches were a great leap backwards from Hilsman, justifying current 
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policies rather than hypothesizing about openings for possible alterations. The tone 
would soon change, but only under substantial outside pressure which revealed that the 
restraining nature of public – and particularly congressional – opinion was vastly 
overstated. The executive branch needed to be led into leading. 
Watching, Waiting, and Not Hoping 
Two outside issues also encouraged continuity. The first – China’s failure to 
sufficiently increase its support for U.N. admission – had the negative effect of making 
sudden change unnecessary. The second – the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam – 
had the positive effect of making any changes appear counterproductive to regional 
stability. The possibility of a negative outcome in the U.N. had been an argument for 
policy change since the first days of the Kennedy administration. The question was a 
classic choice of “fight-or-flight.” Harlan Cleveland, in an October 1964 member 
entitled “The Taming of the Shrew,” argued for the former. He cast doubt on whether 
UN membership would “tame” the Chinese communists, and pointed out how that its 
neighbors feared admission. Even though they regarded it as inevitable, they did not 
welcome it, and thus it was in the United States’s interest to do all it could to delay the 
day of reckoning.
76
 Grant presented the contrary argument to Bundy, pointing out its
imminent impracticality by predicting “almost certain defeat” in the fall of 1965. 
Instead, Grant proposed a “two Chinas” compromise.77 David Dean predicted the P.R.C.
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would gain a majority, forcing the U.S. to invoke the “Important Question” motion in 
order to require a two-thirds vote and thus prevail with minority support.
78
 That year 
witnessed the first tie vote on the matter, meaning the Important Question motion 
remained unused, sparing the U.S. that loss of dignity. In response, Thomson and Komer 
lobbied McGeorge Bundy and Lyndon Johnson respectively to focus instead on 
preserving Taiwan’s status in 1966, effectively conceding the matter of P.R.C. 
admission.
79
 Komer swiped aside any worries about objections from the Republic of 
China by claiming “the Chinats are still our prisoners.”80 Ultimately, this too could be 
deferred, largely because of the severe blow to China’s image occasioned that upcoming 
summer by the explosion of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. 
 While the Chinese would be denied trade or a U.N. seat, they could not be denied 
influence along their borders. The need to contain Chinese-sponsored expansion in 
Southeast Asia had been reinforced by Kennedy’s officials, although at that time part of 
their motivation was the perceived ease with which this could be accomplished, given 
the combination of Chinese weakness during the Great Leap Forward and the perceived 
stability of Diem’s rule. After Diem’s assassination and China’s partial recovery, the 
argument stood, even if the goal now required a far greater effort. Rostow wrote to Rusk 
in January 1964 – when U.S. military personnel were still in an advisory role – to 
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emphasize the need to prove the Chinese hope for “Wars of National Liberation is not 
viable” lest they be encouraged to undertake future adventurism in the region.81 The 
press presented similar arguments, U.S. News reminding its readers in 1964 that “Red 
China is the real enemy,” while Adlai Stevenson wrote in Newsweek in 1965 that the 
goal in Vietnam was to contain “Chinese expansionism.”82 
 This led to a balancing act whereby enough force would be applied to preserve 
South Vietnam but not enough to encourage direct Chinese military intervention, so that 
the unhappy Korean experience would not be repeated.
83
 Some thus concluded that a 
successful end to the conflict could only come through a negotiated settlement with the 
North Vietnamese, since with any attempt at military victory “we will almost certainly 
find ourselves at war with Communist China.”84 A September 1965 report noted 
“Peiping’s extensive program to prepare the country politically, militarily, and 
economically for war with the United States growing out of the Viet-Nam conflict.”85 
Opponents of the war such as Walter Lippmann argued the risk was not worth the 
reward. In early 1966 he compared taking a stand against Asian communism in Saigon 
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to trying to defeat European communism by drawing the line at the defense of 
Bucharest.
86
 But internally, the administration believed it was successfully erring on the 
side of caution. 
 A greater challenge than avoiding a shooting war with the Chinese was seeking 
to drive wedges between the Chinese and Soviets on the one hand and the Chinese and 
the North Vietnamese on the other. In April 1965, the C.I.A. believed it could detect the 
beginnings of a Sino-Vietnamese split similar to the recent Sino-Soviet split due to 
Chinese insistence on a more aggressive and conventional North Vietnamese military 
strategy.
87
 This proved incorrect on both counts, since it was the Chinese who objected 
to North Vietnamese aggressiveness, although this disagreement did not lessen Chinese 
support at a level which could have aided the U.S. effort appreciably. The Rand 
Corporation had a better sense of the nature of Chinese strategy and how it affected 
relations with the North Vietnamese. While some in the press disagreed – Newsweek 
calling it “China’s blueprint for the conquest of the world” – they recognized that Lin 
Biao’s “Long Live the Victory of the People’s War!” manifesto was less a radical call to 
arms than a statement of the limits of Chinese power.
 88
 The acknowledgement of these 
limits created “sharp differences between Peking and Hanoi.”89 Regarding the Soviets, 
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Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. Llewelyn Thompson worried a U.S. loss in Vietnam might 
end the Sino-Soviet split.
90
 This added yet another reason to take a stand.  As for 
exacerbating their existing estrangement, Douglas Cater proposed to the president early 
in 1966 that the U.S. feign interest in outreach to China as a means of creating “anxiety” 
in Moscow.
91
 At this point, serious outreach to Beijing in order to preserve South 
Vietnam was not seriously considered. The goal was containment while keeping the war 
limited. 
 The predominant assumption which buttressed the case for containment was that 
China’s military posture was fundamentally defensive. Thus, in the words of John Lacey 
in February 1964, China’s “reluctance” to directly fight the U.S. meant his government 
could “step up the pace of its military effort in the area without risking unacceptable 
levels of retaliation.”92 A C.I.A. report claimed this to be the case so long as the Chinese 
did not have the capability to deliver a nuclear weapon.
93
 Thomson reinforced past 
assumptions of Chinese strategic “caution.”94 While cautious, the Chinese remained 
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opportunistic, hence the need to hold the line in South Vietnam.
95
 As George Ball put it 
to journalist James Reston, China sought to expand its reach “on a limited liability 
basis.”96 How far the Chinese would go if given the opportunity remained an open 
question. Lindsey Grant wrote to his superior Marshall Green to argue for China’s 
“larger and ambitious world view” driven more by ideology than national interest.97 
Green assented and forwarded his sentiments to Rusk, adding for effect that “the 
example of Hitler should forewarn us that it is always dangerous to assume that people 
do not mean what they say they mean.” While seeking to counter the longstanding 
argument that China’s bite did not match Mao’s bark, Green added the caveat that 
“direct and naked aggression against their neighbors does not fit their pattern,” clearly 
differentiating communist China from Nazi Germany.
98
 
 The crucial determinant of Chinese restraint was lack of capability. China was 
decades away from becoming an industrial power. In the short term, the C.I.A. claimed 
the Chinese economy “continued to flounder in 1963” despite the end of the Great Leap 
Forward.
99
 Recognition of Chinese stagnation after economic near-collapse did lead to 
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certain assumptions which, while appearing logical at the time, proved to be quite 
incorrect. The foremost error was the belief that that the Chinese populace, particularly 
Chinese youth, were ideologically spent, increasingly apathetic, and impervious to 
Mao’s motivations. British journalist Felix Greene reported “a considerable lessening in 
1963 of the dynamism” he had observed in previous visits.100 The C.I.A. claimed in late 
1965 that the regime “is unable to arouse the population from its political apathy,” and 
that even Mao admitted “the coming generation lacks the revolutionary zeal that brought 
the present leadership to power.”101 Not only did the C.I.A. fail to foresee the Cultural 
Revolution – which was understandable – it also incorrectly placed Mao’s lieutenants on 
the ideological spectrum, claiming Deng Xiaoping and Lui Shaoqi belonged to “the 
radical grouping,” while Chou Enlai and Chen Yi formed a “moderate” faction.102 Still, 
that same memo did correctly foresee that “the succession may turn out to be 
disorderly.”103 The issue of succession proved crucial to U.S. policy makers, since few 
expected change in the relationship to occur while Mao remained in power. 
 Most did not expect change even then, at least while the generation which came 
to power with Mao remained. A State Department report in early 1964 predicted that the 
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regime’s legitimacy was contingent upon “the necessity to wage unremitting struggle 
against the influence of the United States.”104 In Hong Kong in 1965, John Holdridge 
called Mao’s potential successors “a tough-minded and intractable crew” who would 
prevent any easing of tensions so long as they remained alive.
105
 Holdridge did note a 
western ambassador visiting from the mainland expressed his past hope “that a more 
positive approach could be implemented to follow up the beginning made in the Hilsman 
speech.” But even this ambassador believed such actions would only lay the ground 
work for improving the U.S. image for future generations of Chinese leaders, and thus 
promised no short-term reward.
106
 As best the U.S. could tell, any outreach would be 
more likely to compromise containment by indicating weakness than lessen Chinese 
aggressiveness by showing reasonableness. China remained a problem rather than an 
opportunity. 
 With regards to Chinese capabilities, many in the media begged to differ. 
Newsweek noted in early 1964 how the Chinese were emerging from their diplomatic 
isolation regarding non-communist nations, and a year later observed that for the time 
being they were besting the Soviets in their rivalry for influence in the Communist 
Bloc.
107
 In addition, to some observers the nation appeared well on its way to internal 
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economic recovery from the Great Leap Forward.
108
 Typifying how this fear of rising 
Chinese power could lead some to call for rapprochement was a June 1964 
commencement address at St. John’s University by Claire Boothe Luce, the wife of 
Time-Life publisher Henry Luce and a former ambassador in her own right. In this 
address, Luce worried that a rising China, if isolated, “might turn desperately 
aggressive,” telling the students that if this proved to be the case “your generation will 
know nothing but endless war in the Orient.”109 This showed calls for policy change 
could be bipartisan. When Committee of One Million Secretary Marvin Liebman 
worried the 1964 Democratic landslide would lead to adverse changes in China policy, 
the leading liberal China hard-liner Paul Douglas wrote Liebman that “I do not believe 
that it is fair to continuously imply that the Democrats are soft on communism and want 
to appease Red China. Clare Booth Luce is not a Democrat.”110 Yet such calls for change 
proved to be few and far between at this time, in large part because of a series of 
devastating diplomat setbacks for the Chinese in 1965, particularly the Indonesian coup 
and extermination of that nation’s large – and pro-Chinese – communist party, as well as 
U.S. direct military intervention in Vietnam. The conservative weekly U.S. News, which 
staunchly opposed policy change at this time, trumpeted China’s weakness in late 1965 
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and early 1966.
111
 The pressure appeared to be off, and supporters of the existing policy 
thought they had achieved a respite. 
 Yet the calm proved deceiving, because a new set of actors were about to enter 
the scene. Before 1966, scholars had remained on the sidelines. The administration 
considered outreach, and some of them made tentative preparations for this, but little 
occurred. James Thomson informed McGeorge Bundy late in 1964 of the worrisome 
“communications gap between the working level of China specialists on the one hand 
and the highest levels of government on the other.”112 Others in the administration also 
recognized this as a problem, but for reasons that did not directly involve China policy. 
In June 1965, as the U.S. military presence in South Vietnam rapidly increased in 
numbers and responsibility, Rostow proposed scholarly consultation for the “primary 
stated purpose” of getting advice and knowledge from these experts, but with “a 
secondary (and unstated) objective” of “influencing the views of those who are skeptical 
concerning our policy.”113 Already at this early stage in the war, policy makers sensed a 
rift between the universities many of them came from and the policies they were 
enacting, and wanted to do what they could to heal it. 
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 For their part, the scholars appeared grateful for the official attention. After 
Averell Harriman visited Cornell University in May 1965, historian John Mellor wrote 
that “there is a sense through much of the academic community” that their knowledge 
was “not being exploited sufficiently.”114 A week later, Cornell historian and noted 
China expert Knight Biggerstaff penned a letter, signed by numerous members of his 
department, thanking Harriman for his efforts to “reestablish communication between 
the American university community” and the makers of U.S. foreign policy.115 The State 
Department desired to extend this outreach, Harold Jacobson suggesting William Bundy 
begin “undertaking a more intensive effort to maintain regular contact with the 
Academic community,” especially China experts.116 But such efforts remained 
theoretical. Scholars also refrained from going public with their objections to existing 
Far East policies. However, in the final days of 1965 Jacobson noted the formation of the 
National Committee on U.S. China Policy. While recognizing this group, led by 
Berkeley professor Robert Scalapino, was officially “educational in nature” and did not 
explicitly advocate policy positions, he understood that the academics involved 
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“obviously believe that certain changes in current US policy are necessary.”117 One of 
the creators of the NCUSCR, and its future leader, was Doak Barnett. 
 The Committee of One Million had worried about the influence of professors 
pushing for policy change since Scalapino co-wrote the Conlon Report for Fulbright in 
1959. Yet in 1964 and 1965, they were largely complacent on this front, and preoccupied 
with tacking against unfavorable ideological winds. The fundamental tension within the 
Committee was that its right-wing leadership believed it imperative for it to appear 
bipartisan, and maintain support across partisan and ideological lines at least within the 
halls of congress. Speaking before the Democratic National Convention Platform 
Committee in 1964, Connecticut Senator Thomas Dodd – one of two Democratic 
senators in the Committee of One Million’s inner circle – argued that admitting China to 
the UN was not a partisan issue, being “favored by only a tiny handful of liberals and a 
tiny handful of conservative businessmen.”118 Yet the recent electoral defeats of so many 
Committee supporters in congress had to be made good. Christopher Emmet argued the 
changing political climate called for a more “moderate” Committee in both personnel 
and posture, with even William F. Buckley conceding that at that moment “a large 
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majority of the Country is not Conservative.” Thus, the Committee’s current image as a 
right-wing organization “handicaps” its effectiveness.119 
 Emmet proposed to Douglas that he recruit a moderate Republican to help 
balance the Steering Committee. The senator he had in mind was Hugh Scott, since the 
Pennsylvanian had opposed Goldwater and “is a fighting moderate Republican.” Emmet 
considered Kentucky’s Sherman Cooper, who while being more liberal than Scott “over 
the whole spectrum of his voting record,” was viewed as insufficiently anti-
Communist.
120
 By the end of the month, Scott had come aboard.
121
 None of the feared 
pressure for policy change came to pass during the height of liberal power in congress 
that year, and by late summer Liebman fretted about “the difficulty of maintaining 
public interest,” as reflected in even lower fundraising totals than usual.122 But this 
complacency would soon be shattered. 
Breaking the Silence 
 Senator Fulbright seemed like a logical candidate to do the shattering. In 
previous years, he had attempted more than any member of congress to change China 
policy, which still was not much. He commissioned the Conlon report in 1959 and 
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lobbied Rusk in 1961 to allow scholars to travel to China. However, he had never spoken 
publicly on the matter before reading Kennan’s article. Two weeks later, in a speech at 
Southern Methodist University in Dallas entitled “Bridges East and West,” Fulbright 
quoted extensively and with attribution from Kennan’s text, particularly his assertion 
that no regime was incapable of change. Fulbright proposed nothing concrete in this 
speech, talking vaguely of “building bridges” in the hopes that “perhaps in ten or twenty 
years” the U.S. relationship with Communist China could be similar to current relations 
with the Soviet Union, involving communication, negotiation, and the exchange of 
ideas.
123
 This was the most tentative of policy statements. In fact, it was not really one at 
all. Fulbright explicitly ruled out diplomatic recognition or UN membership “at present,” 
and did not directly address the travel and trade bans.
124
 Thus, Fulbright’s remarks 
received little notice. 
 In a speech exactly one year later in New Zealand, Fulbright’s language, while 
being no more specific, was nonetheless more insistent. Again, he quoted from the 
Kennan piece on the likelihood bordering on inevitability of change and moderation 
within the Chinese regime. With that in mind, it was time for the U.S. “to take a chance 
that China will change.” This “gamble” was worth the risk because “China is too big to 
be isolated.” It was already the leading power in the region, and “its strength is 
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growing.”125 Compared to his Dallas address, this speech placed far more emphasis on 
China’s potential menace. That nation was currently in the midst of “profound and 
uncompromising chauvinism.” Hopefully, the albeit-still-unspecified U.S. attempts at 
outreach would help lessen this condition.
126
 The speech was also notable for the 
appearance of Fulbright’s “arrogance of power” slogan, here referenced as “the 
arrogance of wealth and power” felt not by the U.S. alone, but by “the West” as a whole. 
Still, at this stage Fulbright chose not to break significantly from the Cold War 
consensus, maintaining that as the U.S. attempted to reach out to the Chinese 
communists “it remains necessary to contain” Chinese power.127 
 Perhaps the situation in Vietnam played a role in this shift. However, Fulbright’s 
continued insistence on containment casts doubt upon this assumption, as did his failure 
to even allude to the expanding conflict which he would soon oppose. It was noteworthy 
that Fulbright’s “Bridges East and West” speech occurred months before Operation 
Rolling Thunder, indicating his growing support for outreach to the Chinese might not 
be have been entirely predicated on the Vietnam War. A potential additional outside 
influence to Kennan, and one which Fulbright encountered between his two speeches, 
was a lengthy report sent to him by Michigan State University Anthropologist R.A. 
Drews. This May 1965 essay was a curious mix of backward-looking Social Darwinism 
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and forward-thinking grand strategy. Drews began by asserting the violent upheavals 
and mass deaths experienced by the Chinese between the mid-19
th
 and mid-20
th
 centuries 
had improved the “genetic make-up” of the Chinese population like none other in the 
world, weeding out the weak and making it a superior race. Drews forecast a high 
probability of imminent war between China and the U.S., and predicted this war would 
take on “racial overtones.”128 To prevent such a war between the white and non-white 
races, the latter of which would be led by a China “rapidly emerging as the champion of 
the non-white nations of the world,” the only sensible option was “to learn all that can be 
learned about our potential enemy” and try to deescalate the conflicts between the U.S. 
and the Chinese. The alternative was the “present course” which “leads with almost 
absolute certainty to an escalation of our difficulties with China.”129 Détente with the 
Chinese therefore had an expiration date which was fast approaching. 
 The dangers of a confrontation with China over Vietnam were recognized even 
by those who supported the status quo with the Chinese communists. Senator Douglas, 
who compared abandoning Vietnam to pre-World War II appeasement and warned of 
“the fatal day when the entire nation must sacrifice all to keep the enemy from our 
gates” also worried that bombing Hanoi would risk driving the North Vietnamese “into 
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the dominance of Red China.”130 Even he supported a negotiated solution, expressing his 
hope in February1966 that the measured use of U.S. force would “bring this matter to the 
negotiating table.”131 There was little if any policy difference on South Vietnam between 
those on opposite sides of the China policy issue. Both saw the need to contain but not 
provoke China. 
 “There is no other single question of American foreign policy which enjoys 
widespread public support as does our China policy,” Marvin Liebman boasted to 
Senator Russell Long on 5 March 1966.
132
 Three days later, Fulbright’s Foreign 
Relations Committee would commence hearings which would begin to erode this 
consensus among the public and in the halls of congress, beginning the Committee of 
One Million’s downward spiral. Liebman recognized the danger of hearings, particularly 
those like Fulbright’s where the testimony of academics who supported significant 
policy change predominated. He warned such well-publicized, authoritative, and 
adversarial presentations “would have a morale-shattering effect.”133 Liebman made this 
comment with reference to a House subcommittee hearing earlier that year which 
received little press attention and entertained only the most minor of policy alterations. 
Fulbright’s efforts promised to have a much higher profile. In a Sunday morning 
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television interview on the eve of the hearings, Fulbright expressed his hope that the 
expert testimony would “educate myself, the members of my Committee and the 
American public on China.” He made clear this goal was not entirely neutral in terms of 
policy, decrying the “taboo that has existed” around the issue since the McCarthy Era. 
According the Fulbright, “heretofore it has been considered unpatriotic to even discuss 
it.”134 Like Hilsman before him, Fulbright recognized that silence could only favor the 
status quo, which like Hilsman he had come to oppose, if not quite yet knowing what 
should replace it. 
 Fulbright began the hearings by obliquely referencing Vietnam as an inspiration 
for their timing, discussing his fears of war between China and the U.S. He claimed that 
as a southerner he could sympathize with China’s past military defeats and “Century of 
Humiliation” in a way Americans from other parts of the country could not. But just as 
Dixie’s “hot-headed romanticism” led to the tragedy of the Civil War, China’s 
bellicosity could do the same. The senator hoped his efforts could begin a process by 
which this could be avoided.
135
 Perhaps because such concerns were widespread at the 
time, the television networks provided live coverage of the testimony of Fulbright’s first 
two witnesses, Doak Barnett on 8 March and John Fairbank two days later. This 
provided unprecedented public exposure for their views, as Fulbright had intended. As 
also intended, it meant the agenda would be set by those who like Fulbright wanted to 
upend existing policy. Barnett made the most of this, calling for a shift from seventeen 
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years of “containment and isolation” to a new policy of “containment without 
isolation.”136 In the short term, this would entail lifting the travel and trade bans and 
acquiescing to U.N. admission. Following Barnett two days later, Fairbank focused more 
on history than policy, yet found time to reiterate Barnett’s prescriptions, arguing the 
goal would be “manipulating Peking into an acceptance of the international world.”137 
Isolation, on the other hand, could only foster continued fanaticism. The press proved 
largely supportive, the Christian Science Monitor calling the lack of “new or imaginative 
or more supple thinking” on China policy since the early 1950s “regrettable.”138 Doris 
Fleeson of the Washington Star hoped the hearings would help avert the “collision 
course with China” she believed the Vietnam War had initiated, but worried Johnson 
would try to shut down debate yet again.
139
 
 Both Barnett and Fairbank offered their support for the Vietnam War, the former 
arguing it made rapprochement not look like weakness, and Fairbank – albeit with some 
reservations – viewing the war as a continuation of a necessary grand strategy of 
containment extending from South Korea through Taiwan to South Vietnam. James 
Thomson noticed this fact and trumpeted it within the administration. He told Jack 
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Valenti at the White House that “we are in luck” with Fulbright’s selection of star 
witnesses, and hoped outreach to such sympathetic scholars could “bridge” the 
developing “chasm” between the administration and academia.140 Richard Wilson of the 
Washington Evening Star agreed, declaring that “President Johnson is finally getting his 
intellectual rationale for the war in Viet Nam from highly qualified sources in the 
academic world.”141 
 After the first week of televised testimony had concluded, Valenti wrote the 
president to inform him “I am trying to stay in touch with historians, writers and others 
who communicate their views,” and hoped to meet soon with Barnett. The presidential 
aide even forwarded Johnson the suggestion he “take the offensive away from Fulbright” 
by endorsing his and any other attempts to educate the American people on China.
142
 It 
appeared the administration was finally being roused from its slumber on this issue. 
Thomson wrote Bill Moyers that Barnett’s and Fairbank’s argument for “containment – 
yes, isolation no” provided “a useful and memorable shorthand for describing a rational 
policy.”143 Since Thomson had long argued for such an approach, this was hardly 
surprising. Vice-President Hubert Humphrey’s public endorsement of this approach 
certainly was. On “Meet The Press” that Sunday, Humphrey announced that henceforth 
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the administration would support a policy of “containment without necessarily 
isolation,” clearly borrowing Barnett’s phrase.144 
 Editorial pages across the nation seized on these words as a sure sign of a shift in 
the administration’s China policy largely because, in the wake of the hearings, they 
hoped that would be the case. Reflecting on the phrase “containment without isolation,” 
the Minneapolis Tribune asked “can we hope that those three words sum up a new U.S. 
China policy?”145 The Denver Post and Detroit Free Press claimed Humphrey had 
changed administration policy with his words alone, whether or not that was his 
intention.
146
 Only staunchly conservative outlets such as the Dallas Morning News and 
Fort Worth Star Telegram voiced objections, worrying that change implied weakness 
and uncertainty.
147
 If not the inauguration of a new policy, it was “at least a welcome 
beginning.”148 As with the positive press reactions to Hilsman’s San Francisco speech, 
the press focused – as Fulbright hoped – on the breaking of a code of silence on China 
policy. Editorial writers claimed “the unmentionable has been mentioned,” “a long and 
stultifying taboo seems to have ended,” and China was no longer “like a porcupine” 
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which had resisted “being picked up for examination.”149 That these sentiments had to be 
repeated more than two years later showed how little had changed in the interim. 
Richard Wilson noted that Dulles-era policies were nowhere close to being changed, but 
believed Humphrey’s endorsement of Barnett’s phrase “makes possible a rational 
discussion” of East Asian policy, helping to engender future change.150 
 Within the administration, long-time advocates for such changes were split 
between hope and worry. Thomson, as could be expected, represented hope. Noting the 
lack of negative press reaction, he argued to Komer that Johnson should exploit this 
opportunity to push for change.
151
 But Komer called Humphrey’s remarks “rather 
premature,” and worried any policy shift at that time “would be risky.” Merely urging 
Johnson to be open to greater flexibility, Komer was concerned primarily with whether 
any shifts on China strengthened or weakened the U.S. position in Vietnam.
152
 For the 
time being, as with the Hilsman speech, Rusk had the last, and contradictory, word. 
Testifying before Zablocki’s House Subcommittee two days after Humphrey’s remarks, 
he made clear nothing had changed. The paramount policy goal remained doing “nothing 
which encourages Peiping” to think that aggression would be rewarded. Rusk denied 
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there was any growing scholarly consensus that policy needed to change, asserting that 
“experts do not always agree.”153 Thomson wrote on a press clipping the next day that 
Rusk’s testimony represented the “End of Honeymoon.”154 Senator Fulbright expressed 
his own hope afterwards that “possibly we may make some impression upon the 
Secretary of State before we are through,” and that “the hearings have at least opened up 
the subject for discussion.”155 
 The press suspected the professors’ testimony would bring about a sea change in 
administration policy in order “to meet China’s future power.”156 As U.S. News put it, 
“clearly, Sinologists are having their day.”157 Some worried these academics were in fact 
becoming too powerful. Focusing on Asia scholars in particular, Sociologist Lewis Feuer 
claimed “for the first time, the Government recognizes intellectuals as a special status 
and interest group,” adding that “the Intellectual Elite is trying to assert itself as a self-
conscious force in the making of decisions by the government.”158 Recent scholarship 
has noted a change in administration policy toward Barnett’s “containment without 
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isolation” after the March 1966 hearings.159 Victor S. Kaufman found “little willingness 
to change” policy before the hearings and their positive reception in the forum of public 
opinion.
160
 Thus, the event proved to be a watershed, achieving a breakthrough where 
Hilsman’s speech had only established a beachhead. 
 While the media, the professors, the senators, and administration officials had 
their say, the question remained what if any impact the hearings had on the general 
public. Early evidence indicated that, unlike Hilsman’s speech, the professors’ words 
had begun to focus attention on China and change some minds on policy towards the 
regime. A Mutual Broadcasting System survey found 54 percent of Americans were 
aware of the Fulbright hearings.
161
 A Harris survey at the end of the month discovered 
that, for the first time, “a majority of the American people favor wide-ranging 
rapprochement with Red China,” specifically diplomatic recognition and U.N. admission 
on a Two-China basis. In general, this majority wanted greater contact with communist 
China so long as it was not at the expense of maintaining the existence of an autonomous 
Taiwan.
 162
 How to thread such a needle would bedevil U.S. policy makers for more than 
a decade afterwards, and in some ways well beyond then, but this represented an 
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important shift in public opinion, significantly less nebulous than the prior CFR survey 
results. 
 But the hearings themselves had the greatest effect on the Senate itself by 
emboldening liberals in both parties to speak out without fear of backlash. Self-described 
“progressive” Republican Jacob Javits had a long if intermittent affiliation with the 
Committee of One Million, though this had not prevented him from in 1965 expressing 
heretical support for seeking out “ways to open the door somewhat,” including a 
relaxation of the travel and trade bans.
163
 Now, however, he became much bolder. In a 
speech twelve days after Barnett’s testimony, Javits called for “containment but not 
isolation of the Chinese people.” At this time, he couched the need for a new policy as 
necessary for both avoiding direction Chinese intervention in Vietnam and achieving a 
negotiated solution. Only by “trying to bring Communist China into the community of 
nations” could South Vietnam be preserved. To save Saigon, the U.S. must go to 
Beijing.
164
 
Hurry Up, Then Wait 
 Javits’s defection revealed the possibility that China policy could remain a 
bipartisan issue – except in exactly the opposite manner the Committee of One Million 
wanted it to be. The liberals might become ascendant in congress, and the conservatives 
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isolated. The legislative branch would no longer be a hindrance to policy change, as 
Barnett had previously assumed and the executive branch still believed. It might, in fact, 
lead the way. The China Lobby picked up upon this shift. Liebman focused on the 
increasing boldness of academics, noting their “current intensified and well-publicized 
efforts to change present American policy toward Red China.” While not commenting 
on the Javits speech, or directly addressing the hearings, Liebman did lament Senator 
William Proxmire’s recent resignation from the Steering Committee. 165 It was the first 
of what would prove to be multiple defections in the years to come. 
 In its coverage of the hearings, the National Review ruefully argued with respect 
to Fairbank that “one of the ironies of the situation lies is the fact that that very people 
who in large measure are personally responsible for the political disaster on the Chinese 
mainland are today hailed as experts by the communications media, the universities and 
important members of the Congress.” The magazine called Barnett’s slogan “the now 
fashionable euphemism for appeasement.”166 The handful of scholars sympathetic to the 
China Lobby remained collegial with the new stars of the scholarly majority, however. 
George Taylor, who gave the most eloquent and convincing arguments against Barnett 
and Fairbank at the hearings, nonetheless complimented Barnett on his “pretty 
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impressive show.”167 In his warm response, Barnett concluded that their policy 
disagreements centered around “judgments about the possibility of influencing the 
Chinese Communist leaders and their policies in the future.”168 Stanley Hornbeck wrote 
Barnett that he believed ending isolation would “be erosive to the policy of 
containment.”169 Barnett disagreed, arguing that an effective policy required both a 
“carrot” and a “stick.”170 
 In the end, of course, Barnett would win the policy argument. But that day 
remained more than five years distant. What had changed during the previous two-and-a-
half years was that the forces for change, while nowhere near triumphant, had coalesced 
and made themselves heard. In the past, they had remained isolated and ineffective. But 
Hilsman’s speech begat Kennan’s article which directly convinced Fulbright first to 
speak out himself and then to offer a venue for others to do the same. This in turn would 
in the months ahead inspire Johnson to publicly address the issue, and to do so in a 
manner which gave aid to the forces for change. There remained two complicating 
outside factors. The first was the Vietnam War. While its successful resolution could – 
and would – be used to justify changing U.S. China policy, the fact that hundreds of 
thousands of U.S. troops were fighting China’s neighbor and ally and that U.S. bombs 
were dropping near China’s southern border could not help make the Chinese eager 
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negotiating partners. Working against rapprochement even more strongly were events 
inside China. Just as the Fulbright hearings created opportunities for outreach inside the 
U.S., the Cultural Revolution was squelching them. Over time, those within the Johnson 
administration sympathetic to policy change would realize the chance had passed them 
by before they even seriously considered taking it. However, the debate within the U.S. 
had decisively changed. For the first time, those supporting existing policies were on the 
defensive. The events of these years thus helped ensure that when the Chinese saw the 
need for change, those in power in the U.S. would not only notice, but welcome this 
reality. 
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CHAPTER V 
WAITING FOR THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD: THE CHANGING POLITICAL 
CLIMATE ON CHINA POLICY BETWEEN FULBRIGHT’S HEARINGS AND 
NIXON’S ELECTION 
 
“We are willing to foster peaceful relations, if Communist China is.”1 
“The Red Guards are getting into more trouble than Stokely Carmichael and SNICK.”2 
 
 Chiang Kai-shek’s regime in Taiwan could never be described as a contented 
ally. Even during the supposedly halcyon days of the Eisenhower administration, when 
its most ardent supporters held senior positions, there was considerable friction and 
occasional mistrust. But by the spring of 1966, the worries among leaders in the 
Republic of China became more pronounced than ever. That April, U.S. officials noted 
“serious concern in GRC about eventual drift of US policy toward greater 
accommodation with Communist China.” While leadership on the island claimed to still 
trust the Johnson administration, they had their doubts about the American public. 
Noting the ongoing “domestic US policy debate,” they wondered how much longer the 
present American policy so favorable to their interests could be maintained. The 
Fulbright hearings had gotten Chiang’s attention, with the slogan “containment without 
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isolation” becoming the “center of much of this discussion.” To highlight their 
opposition to Doak Barnett’s proposed strategic shift, newspapers on the island used a 
Chinese translation of “containment” which was a synonym for “isolation,” allowing the 
officially-backed journalists to attack “faulty US logic.”3 
 The Taiwanese were correct to focus on words emanating from outside the White 
House and their effect on the general public. The March 1966 Fulbright hearings proved 
to be the beginning of a national conversation. According to a one-hour prime-time NBC 
special entitled “Dragon at the Crossroads,” “China-watching, once the esoteric pursuit 
of a few academicians and government officials, has become a national pastime. China 
policy is debated with a passion usually reserved for such topics as the length of 
women’s skirts.” Helping to foster this debate were events within China, particularly the 
beginnings of the most radical and public phase of the Cultural Revolution. Coupled 
with China’s indirect involvement in the Vietnam War, these mystifying and frightening 
events gave the acquisition of knowledge from behind the Bamboo Curtain an added 
urgency. To quote NBC correspondent Welles Hangen, “the most frightening thing 
about Communist China has always been our ignorance of it.”4 Events within China 
would soon begin to repeatedly put that assertion to the test, as well as limit the options 
for fruitful policy change. Rostow’s point man on China at the National Security Council 
Alfred Jenkins may have written in August 1966 when arguing for policy change and 
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refinement that “a semi-demented, Mao-led Communist China is perhaps the world’s 
toughest and most urgent problem.”5 Yet how could one deal effectively on a diplomatic 
level with a “semi-demented” regime? 
 These forces combined to move China policy during the second half of Johnson’s 
presidency on two tracks. To be more accurate, as the policy debate among the general 
public accelerated, the policy itself remained unchanged. Events within China reinforced 
the caution of Johnson and his officials. Yet within the U.S. itself, actions by members 
of congress forced Johnson to take an unprecedented public stand in favor of eventual 
change, which in turn pushed the debate forward. By the 1968 campaign to replace 
Johnson as president, China policy change had ceased to be a political lightning rod and 
was now a potential issue to be exploited. This was a sea change from all previous 
elections since 1952. Johnson helped to facilitate this change, but remained content with 
that limited historical role on this matter. What Jenkins termed “our near non-policy” on 
China remained precisely that.
6
 Those such as Jenkins who supported incremental 
change realized there had been a chance only well after they believed that chance had 
passed. Meanwhile, the argument that U.S. military involvement in Vietnam inoculated 
the administration against charges of softness if it reached out to China diplomatically 
became the predominant viewpoint. This encouraged a late push to remove travel and 
trade restrictions. Rusk, as always, stood in the way. But his methods during this period 
indicated that even he recognized the tide was turning. The Secretary of State’s remarks 
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became more measured, and even hinted at the inevitability of change. Internally, he 
shifted from open negativity to passive delay. Rusk sought to wait out the supporters of 
change in the short-term, seemingly knowing they were content to wait him and his ilk 
out in the long-term. All involved waited on Mao’s China to signal a desire to reengage 
the world in a productive manner. 
 Events occurring during the second half of Johnson’s administration confirmed a 
decisive shift in support for changing China policy, particularly among elites. This shift 
inspired the president to back rapprochement in his rhetoric, though not in his actions. 
He also sought the advice of increasingly influential and assertive China scholars, who 
inspired leading members of congress to call for policy change, isolating support for the 
status quo among the right-wing rump of the Republican Party. However, with China’s 
embroilment in the Cultural Revolution temporarily stalling the growth of its power, 
there was a less urgent need for policy change than had been the case earlier in the 
decade. U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War finally convinced some members of the 
administration that the road to peace must go through Beijing. But Beijing had for the 
moment placed itself off limits. These same officials belatedly realized there had been an 
opportunity for change earlier in the administration. Still, the groundwork had been laid 
for future progress. When the Chinese would again prove receptive, a future president 
could count on support from congress and at the very least public acquiescence. The 
election of 1968 reflected this new situation, as the Democratic candidate pushed for 
policy change, while his Republican opponent declined to make an issue of this one-time 
heresy. 
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Confronting an Altered Landscape 
 The period between April 1966 and January 1969 witnessed the erosion of the 
credibility of all past internal arguments against policy change. The media was on the 
side of change. Polling indicating the public increasingly if still tentatively felt the same 
way. Most important, congress had gone was an enemy of change to its friend. This left 
only one credible barrier to changing China policy – the Chinese. That barrier was only 
hardened. Curiously, the domestic supporters of the status quo were unable to exploit 
egregious Chinese behavior to reinforce their flagging cause. To a certain degree, this 
was because events in Vietnam and even in China itself played into their enemy’s hands. 
Since 1961, supporters of policy change used China’s growing menace and proven 
unpredictability as evidence its ruling regime needed to be engaged in an attempt to tame 
it. Now, the apparent effects of isolation were on vivid display. One could not accurately 
predict what sort of China would emerge from the cataclysm. But the ongoing course of 
events indicated it would not be congenial to U.S. regional interests. The risks of change 
now seemed to outweigh those of standing pat. Again, as in previous years, the 
administration followed rather than led. The difference was, in this period, the outside 
pressure finally proved impossible to ignore. Rather than fight senators and reporters and 
academics, Johnson and his officials sought to bring them aboard or meet them partway. 
 The internal policy debate occurred in two distinct stages. The first immediately 
followed the Fulbright hearings, and involved both long-term strategic considerations 
and short-term tactical policy proposals. The second occurred in the administration’s 
final months, at which point the long-term goal of policy change had effectively been 
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accepted by all involved and the debate revolved around the timing of removing travel 
and trade restrictions. While coming close to taking these initial actions, Johnson 
ultimately chose to leave matters entirely to his successor rather than start a process he 
could not hope to come anywhere near finishing. This course of events seemed on the 
surface to confirm the New York Times’s June 1966 assertion that revising U.S. China 
policy “is almost as difficult as revision of the Scriptures.”7 The Mosaic figure most 
committed to defending that which had been written in stone was clearly Rusk. Yet even 
he appeared to flirt with apostasy in testimony before Zablocki’s House Subcommittee 
weeks after the Fulbright hearings concluded. 
 At the end of lengthy prepared remarks reiterating the wisdom of present 
policies, Rusk argued for the need to “avoid assuming the existence of an unending and 
inevitable state of hostility between ourselves and the rulers of mainland China,” and 
tellingly emphasized that “we should continue to enlarge the possibilities for unofficial 
contacts between Communist China and ourselves, contacts which may gradually assist 
in altering Peiping’s picture of the United States.”8 What was more, Rusk prefaced this 
with an acknowledgement of China’s destiny to be “a great world power,” the peaceful 
attainment of which the U.S. would not impede.
9
 To the untrained or eager ear, Rusk 
was now singing from the Hilsman Hymnal. The closed executive session testimony was 
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swiftly leaked to Marvin Kalb of CBS, who reported it as the beginning of a new China 
policy in response to “growing domestic pressure for change, prompted by the war in 
Viet-Nam, and recent Congressional hearings on China.”10 Such apparent concessions 
on Rusk’s part to the shifting political winds left the Chinese Nationalists predictably 
“dejected.”11 The Secretary chose not to walk back his leaked remarks, or to lash out at 
the subcommittee for the leak. However, this new public flexibility would not be 
matched in his decisive role adjudicating internal policy debates. 
 In these debates, the ongoing tumult within China appeared to put the wind at 
least temporarily at the backs of those favoring reform. Edward Rice reiterated the now-
familiar call for “a live-and-let-live relationship with China,” warning that failure to 
move in that direction now would make it “much more likely to get into war with China” 
in the future,” adding somewhat more hopefully “if we do not now plant the seeds of 
doubt that this is so were are unlikely to gather their fruit.”12 Waiting for Mao to die 
would be to delay too long. Instead, the U.S. must quickly begin removing the trade 
ban.
13
 Jenkins began pressing these themes in late summer. As Thomson’s replacement 
under Rostow, he became the closest thing the administration would have to a China 
Hand, and through the new National Security Adviser his opinions frequently reached 
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the president. Alluding to recent events, Jenkins worried about a stronger China a decade 
in the future which was still “psychotic.” He proposed doing “what we can to get out of 
the devil’s role which China finds so useful, and do our part to help cure China’s rather 
alarming psychosis.” Among his proposals was official reference to the regime as “the 
People’s Republic of China” to indicate a modicum of respect.14 The psychiatric 
metaphor was reminiscent of Fairbank’s rhetoric before Fulbright’s committee. He 
continued in this vein in October, telling Rostow “Asian stability requires a well and 
sane China, not a sick and violated one.” Looking at the region as a whole, Jenkins 
argued the improved stability of U.S. allies in China’s vicinity reduced the dangers 
inherent in reaching out to a powerful adversary.
15
 
 While there was nothing in Jenkins’s and Rice’s statements which had not been 
in past memoranda by Thomson, Komer, or for that matter Rice, they were no longer the 
words of lonely dissenters, as the immediate means for policy change were being 
endorsed by ever-more-senior officials. Undersecretary of State William Bundy 
proposed to Rusk in October 1966 that the U.S. lift the trade ban as an indication “to 
other countries that our position on China is not absolutely rigid.”16 The proposal had 
been bandied about within Bundy’s Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs since April. Robert 
Barnett, who was one of two men immediately under Bundy, endorsed the proposal, but 
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worried about its political impact, and requested additional polling to gauge public 
opinion.
17
 In June, Barnett argued such a proposal would give meaning to his brother’s 
popular slogan, and again requested the conducting of opinion polling.
18
 While Barnett 
believed congress would be receptive, and a majority of Americans supportive, he still 
worried about “the vocal minority against any change in our China policy,” whom he 
believed cared about the issue far more than the supportive majority.
19
 
 The White House was informed in July of a Harris poll showing more than two-
thirds of respondents favored lifting the travel ban.
20
 A State-NSC China Working 
Group recommended lifting the travel ban in November, while remaining silent on the 
trade ban. Only Samuel Berger, sharing the same rank as Barnett, objected due to 
“unsettled political conditions” in China and fears of “adverse domestic reaction.” For 
his part, Jenkins argued doing nothing was the greater risk in terms of domestic politics. 
He particularly worried about how it would be received by the academic community.
21
 
Ultimately William Bundy did not choose at this time to press the matter too intently, 
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and it was quietly deferred for later. But there was now a clear groundswell among mid-
level officials at both the NSC and State for beginning some sort of policy shift. 
 Even without Rusk’s opposition, these proposals suffered from the existence of 
the negative restraining influence of fast-moving events inside China and the lack of 
positive inducements to act quickly. As always, the issue was timing, most specifically 
the timing of the P.R.C.’s admittance to the United Nations. A U.S. loss in the General 
Assembly had been predicted by proponents of policy change since early 1961, and 
without it their proposals would have lacked urgency. The tie vote in November 1965 
seemed to portend the fateful and long-predicted denouement had finally arrived. That 
this perhaps occasioned Rusk’s changed tone before the Zablocki Subcommittee in April 
was bolstered by his suggestion to Johnson in May that the U.S. move that fall to a “two-
china approach.” Recent polling indicated majority support in the U.S. for such a step. 
Taiwan could be brought on board by reminding them that even if such a motion passed 
the General Assembly, the Chinese communists would never accept it. It was thus 
merely a new method to achieve a traditional aim. But a new method was now necessary 
to avoid allied defections, led by the Canadians.
22
 Though Rusk in no way proposed the 
U.S. actually seek a two-China result, Rostow called the Secretary’s proposal 
“something of a landmark.” He even proposed reaching out to General Eisenhower for 
an endorsement of a larger policy evolution, indicating Rostow believed this portended 
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additional changes.
23
 Ambassador to Japan Edward Reischauer couched the shift as a 
move to appease world opinion, as well as a way to give substance to “the current semi-
official phrase ‘containment without isolation.’”24 
 That such a move was a feint in order to put the onus for hostility on the Chinese 
was further confirmed by Jenkins’s assessment that “there is no net US advantage to be 
gained from Chinese Communist participation in the UN’s political organization” at that 
moment, or for that matter so long as Mao remained in power.
25
 This lack of a 
comprehensive policy framework hurt those like Jenkins who advocated for 
incrementalism. By itself, lifting the travel and trade bans were hollow gestures. As 
those who supported the status quo had long pointed out, on a practical level the 
presence of U.S. citizens on the Chinese mainland required some sort of U.S. diplomatic 
presence to protect and assist them. Yet the Chinese would surely refuse to give the U.S. 
these benefits without the promise of getting a U.N. seat in return in the near future. As 
with the Kennedy administration, no one in the Johnson administration was willing to 
think in such comprehensive terms. They were content to try making China policy only a 
little bit pregnant. Subsequent events demonstrated that once the process began, it had to 
be followed to its logical conclusion. If one was afraid to reap the consequences, they 
should not attempt to begin matters. So long as the U.N. vote could be relied upon, there 
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was no reason to think on such a large and meaningful scale. Like before with the Sino-
Soviet split in the early part of the decade, the initial stages of the Cultural Revolution 
served to reverse Chinese momentum, the Albanian Resolution to seat the P.R.C. in 
place of the R.O.C. failing in both November 1966 and November 1967 by 11 votes. 
Mao had granted existing U.S. policy yet another temporary reprieve.
26
 
Powerhouse or Poorhouse? 
 That Chinese power was rising slower than had been expected also played a role. 
To quote Roger Hilsman, China was that curious amalgam of “an emerging nation” and 
“a great power.”27 For most of the 1960s, it displayed more attributes of the former than 
the latter, lessening the urgency of policy change. As U.S. News opined in late 1967, 
China was “more a poorhouse than a world power – and is likely to stay that way.”28 Yet 
no matter how many missteps the Chinese communists took, the assumption among 
those who favored eventual policy change always was they would get it right eventually, 
and turn their nation into a fully-fledged great power. The crucial question was when. To 
help provide an answer, long-time State Department official Joseph Yager was in mid-
1966 made head of the Long Range Communist China Study, which was a joint effort 
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with the Department of Defense.
29
 The group produced an analytical study in 1966, 
followed by a set of policy proposals based on their analysis the following year. The 
analysis did not differ from previous assessments by others in government, concluding 
that over the next decade Chinese leaders would lose their “revolutionary zeal” while 
making “significant” advances in nuclear weaponry. China’s detonation of a hydrogen 
bomb the next year, which given the country’s ongoing political anarchy came “as a 
sobering shock to the rest of the world” according to the New York Times, only 
confirmed this.
30
 Looking ahead, this study concluded the paramount U.S. goal should 
be ensuring that this new, more powerful, more moderate China orient itself “toward the 
free world rather than toward the Soviet Union.” Only by achieving this end could the 
U.S. claim “the strategy of containment” to be a success.31 To put it another way, 
containment could only work if isolation was abandoned. Continued pursuit of the latter 
would eventually undo the success of the former. 
 The proposals offered by the Study Group in 1967 attempted to construct a 
preliminary road map for encouraging Chinese moderation. They called for the 
immediate removal of travel restrictions, but the maintenance of trade restrictions until 
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the Chinese began offering their own reciprocal concessions.
32
 This focus on a long-term 
process of rapprochement was somewhat new. Previous proposals from erstwhile 
reformers often expressed an apparent urge to do something new for the sake of change, 
without expectations this would lead to larger and more substantive alterations. Their 
primary goal had been to remove internal inertia. As the belief in the value of change 
moved beyond the likes of Thomson, Rice, and Komer, that was a less pertinent goal. At 
the same time, how the Chinese would respond to such overtures became a more 
pressing concern. Here there was inherent tension between the reason outreach was 
urgent and its probability of success. In fact, in the short-term they were inversely 
proportional. As Rostow put it to Army Chief of Staff Harold Johnson in April 1967, “a 
‘sick’ China constituting a quarter of the earth’s population would be a serious drawback 
in the attempt to bring about the sort of world which it is basic U.S. policy to fashion.”33 
Yet the “sicker” the Chinese became, and the more hostile their posture, the less 
favorably they would respond to any softening of the U.S. position towards them. 
 With this in mind, the consul in Hong Kong emphasized the importance of 
staying the course for the time being, even though “eventual normalization” was in the 
nation’s – and the region’s – best interests. This communication also recommended 
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maintaining the trade embargo “so long as the Vietnam war continues.”34 That the war 
would end with a U.S. victory was not in doubt within the administration, at least before 
the Tet Offensive. Rostow predicted to Johnson 15 days before its surprise launch that 
“Vietnam will be over” by 1971.35 The China Study Group predicted in 1967 that “well 
before 1976 major hostilities will have ended in Vietnam, but that guerrilla warfare will 
still not have been suppressed,” necessitating the continued presence of U.S. combat 
forces in South Vietnam.
36
 
 There was no worry such a presence would provoke the Chinese. As of the spring 
of 1966, U.S. leaders no longer feared Chinese entry into the war, and believed China’s 
leaders had come to the same conclusion.
37
 So long as the existence of the North 
Vietnamese government remained unthreatened, China would not send combat troops.
38
 
China’s strategy remained opportunistic but fundamentally defensive in orientation.39 
Rather than inflame Chinese sensibilities, limited war in South Vietnam – successfully 
and prudently conducted – would have both a restraining and a domesticating influence. 
This could especially be the case if coupled with attempts at outreach. In August 1966 
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Komer proposed extending the Chinese an “olive branch” in order to affirm the U.S.’s 
“peaceful purposes in Vietnam.” The fact that the U.S. was taking a stand in South 
Vietnam in fact improved the U.S. bargaining position, allowing its leaders to act from a 
position of strength.
40
 Jenkins had similar thoughts the next month, around the same time 
he began pushing for significant policy change. He celebrated the “acute embarrassment 
of Maoism in Vietnam,” and claimed it was solidifying regional political and economic 
cooperation. Jenkins referred to this regional integration as “a bouncing baby – which 
could not have been born without Vietnam.”41 
 The same “bouncing baby” imagery could be used for the process of U.S. policy 
change. The collapse of South Vietnam in 1965 would have meant any future American 
outreach would have been from a perceived position of weakness, and thus politically 
unacceptable. On a less hypothetical level, the Fulbright hearings and the accompanying 
interest in China were driven by the Vietnam War, and fears of Chinese involvement in 
that war. Without the war, there would have been no hearings, no sparking of debate, no 
“containment without isolation.” The trajectory of Asia policy, including debates over 
changing that policy, would have been very different. It is important to remember that all 
the professors who testified before Fulbright’s committee on behalf of China policy 
change also offered their support for the Vietnam War. The second was a precondition 
for the first. This calls into question the notion that McCarthy-era purges of China 
experts from the State Department opened the door to the Vietnam War. With the 
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exception of Alexander Eckstein, all the leading China experts outside government 
supported going to war to protect South Vietnam from a communist takeover. Had 
relations between the U.S. and China begun to improve prior to 1965, it is possible the 
two nations could have worked out some settlement to avert war before the U.S. became 
directly involved. Since that was not the case, only proxy war could bring them together. 
 The Vietnam War also demonstrated the dangers of ignoring a powerful China, 
and the potential benefits of outreach. It thus reinforced the connection between threat 
and rapprochement. It is tempting to conclude a Democratic administration could not 
have seized the opportunity due to the lingering “Ghost of ’49.” But the war – fought in 
part because of fear of that ghost – had also exorcised its presence. Johnson proved his 
toughness against communism by going to war. The Fulbright hearings, moreover, had 
driven a stake through whatever lingering McCarthyist specter still hovered over 
Washington. What held Johnson back was his own diplomatic timidity, Rusk’s 
intransigence, and the chaotic situation inside China itself. 
 The two nations would eventually be brought together having been mutually 
humbled, and looking for relief, the U.S. from Vietnam and the Chinese from the 
external Soviet threat and self-inflicted internal traumas. Early U.S. reactions to the 
Cultural Revolution evinced a certain schadenfreude combined with allusions to 
contemporaneous youthful rebellions within the U.S. Rostow joked to the president in 
September 1966 that “the Red Guards are getting into more trouble than Stokely 
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Carmichael and SNICK.”42 (sic) Jenkins in turn told Rostow a year later that “China is 
putting on one hell of a happening,” and expressed “a certain exhilaration at being a 
leading determinant” of events, implying U.S. efforts in South Vietnam were 
exacerbating tensions within the Chinese leadership.
43
 Initial reactions were 
bewilderment and confusion, Rice writing in June 1966 that “at no time in recent years 
have there occurred on Mainland developments at once so important and so clouded in 
obscurity as those of the past few months.”44 What was unmistakable was that these 
events were weakening the Chinese communists at home and abroad. If the Great Leap 
Forward had destroyed the image of the Chinese economic model, and failures in 
Indonesia and South Vietnam the viability of wars of national liberation, then the 
Cultural Revolution dealt an additional blow to the political allure of the regime to other 
developing nations. Robert Barnett wrote in May 1967 that, internationally, “the lustre, 
the model value of this image is over.”45 
 The question then became what, if anything, the U.S. could or should do about it. 
China’s temporary weakness might offer an opportunity. Jenkins initially believed this to 
be the case, writing in August 1966 that “mainland events may prove to be exploitable 
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sooner than expected,” perhaps “within months.”46 Jenkins believed the time was “ripe” 
to move on loosening travel and trade restrictions in order to lessen the dangerous 
isolation of the Chinese people. Yet by the following April, Jenkins had changed his 
mind, advising Rostow that “I see little that can be done for the patient until this 
protracted crisis is over.”47 Once again, the timing was not propitious. China’s growing 
self-imposed diplomatic isolation no doubt played a role in closing this potential window 
of opportunity, Rostow telling Johnson in September 1966 that “today China’s leaders 
are more inflexible and hostile to the rest of the than they were in 1957.”48 That same 
month, Jenkins noted his equivalents at the State Department believed “this is a time for 
considerable caution on our part.”49 A conversation with Chinese defector Miao Chen-
pai confirmed his newfound caution. Reflecting the emerging consensus within the 
administration, Miao endorsed “bridge-building efforts” while insisting “China would 
not reciprocate until the post-Mao era.”50 Events in China seemed to validate both Mao’s 
fanaticism and the notion there was no credible partner for the U.S. to parley with in any 
meaningful fashion. 
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 Unlike during the Great Leap Forward, speculation about the potential collapse 
of the regime was limited. As U.S News put it during the height of the Red Guards’ 
prominence, it was “a struggle between Communist factions, not a fight to rid China of 
Communism.”51 The Republic of China told the U.S. Embassy in Taipei that the “GRC 
can afford to wait for an opportunity that will surely come,” reflecting both their 
continued belief in a return to the mainland and their realization the moment had not yet 
arrived.
52
 On the other hand, Joseph Alsop, who had led the talk of imminent collapse 
during the Great Leap Forward, predicted to Jenkins in July 1968 – even after the most 
chaotic parts of the Cultural Revolution had passed and the People’s Liberation Army 
was well on its way to restoring order in the provinces – that “chances are the regime 
may not hold together through this winter.”53 Academic experts did not share this 
opinion about communist party rule in general, but some leading lights did incorrectly 
gauge the firmness of Mao’s hold on power. In two October 1966 lectures, Doak Barnett 
declared “the end of the Maoist era in China is in sight,” since China’s leaders were 
“self-consciously defying Mao” at that time.54 For their part, in 1967 Time, U.S. News, 
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and Newsweek all questioned the army’s loyalty to Mao.55 These incorrect outside 
assessments could have been a result of incomplete information, since those inside the 
government more accurately saw events as a succession struggle under Mao’s control. 
Furthermore, while the chaotic events temporarily impeded the workings of Chinese 
foreign policy, it was during this period that Mao and other leaders began shifting their 
own posture to one of support for eventual rapprochement with the U.S.
56
 
 For the time being, China’s cultural status as the greatest geopolitical threat to 
the U.S. only solidified. The Avengers character Quicksilver no doubt spoke for many in 
the entertainment industry – particularly actors seeking Asian roles – when he asked in 
1965 “why need we concern ourselves with international affairs?”57 The Wall Street 
Journal reported in October 1966 that the Chinese had not only displaced the Russians 
as the leading villains in Hollywood, but that Russians were beginning to be “cast as 
good guys helping American heroes outwit the Orientals.” Mort Fine, a producer of the 
television show “I Spy” – which was largely filmed in Hong Kong – said Russians were 
no longer “acceptable as villains anymore” to the general public. In one of that show’s 
episodes, in fact, after defeating an Asian villain, the American protagonists were 
decorated by Soviet officials for their efforts. Another popular spy show from that 
period, “The Man From U.N.C.L.E.,” featured a Russian as one of its heroes, while the 
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film “The Russians Are Coming” sympathetically portrayed a Soviet submarine crew 
whose vessel ran aground off the coast of Maine. Khigh Dhiegh, the North African actor 
who had played the Fu Manchu-esque Wen Lo in “The Manchurian Candidate” and 
spent his career portraying Asian characters, complained “we’re getting back to the era 
of the ‘Yellow Menace’” and added “I don’t think this contributes anything to prospects 
for world peace.”58 Of course, fear of Chinese power, as expressed in movies and 
television during the 1960s, did reflect a public sentiment which paradoxically – if 
belatedly – contributed to, at the very least, a lessening of tensions in Asia. 
 Compounding this fear, even in the midst of Chinese external weakness and 
internal chaos, was that nation’s 17 June 1967 detonation of a three megaton hydrogen 
bomb.
59
 The press noted this significant leap in China’s nuclear capability.60 So did 
Dean Rusk. At a press conference in October of that year, the Secretary of State talked 
of a future China with “a billion people on the mainland, armed with nuclear weapons,” 
possessing an uncertain attitude towards their neighbors and the U.S.
61
 Such reasoning 
was being used at that time in the U.S and abroad not to stoke alarmism – as was Rusk’s 
intention – but to stress the need for rapprochement. It would soon form one of the 
pillars of Nixon’s China policy. But Rusk seemed unable to make the necessary 
counterintuitive leap to connect threat to outreach. 
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Eggheads in the Oval Office 
 At this point, academics were only in the earliest stages of collaborating with 
government officials. Doak’s brother Robert noted the State Department led the way in 
this endeavor, while the C.I.A. was either “indifferent” to or “scornful” of the value of 
outside expertise.
62
 The primary example of this newfound collaboration during the later 
Johnson administration was the China Advisory Panel. The panel consisted of ten 
outside experts, eight of whom were professors, and included Doak Barnett, John 
Fairbank, Alexander Eckstein, and Robert Scalapino.
63
 In a 1967 voter guide, the League 
of Women Voters called 1966 “A Year of Change” for China policy, noting the 
Fulbright hearings in March, a July speech on the subject by the president, and the 
formation the advisory panel in December.
64
 As the title indicated, it was intended 
purely to provide advice and expertise, rather than guide policy.
65
 The experts met in 
Washington five times over a two-year period, discussing topics such as the Cultural 
Revolution, the Vietnam War, Taiwan’s future, regional security, and the United 
Nations. During these meetings, they analyzed classified documents and discussed issues 
amongst themselves and with officials from the State Department and the NSC. 
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 After their first meeting, Fairbank noted the group was “pretty well homogenized 
in our thinking.”66 He described one session to a friend as “a sort of group therapy 
exercise, barely structured.”67 Jenkins informed Rostow that at the first two meetings the 
academics agreed a firm stance needed to be taken in Vietnam, which he found to be a 
pleasant contrast with his prior contacts with numerous academics.
68
 Rusk suggested to 
Scalapino after the first meeting the panel members offer their thoughts on policy, and 
by February 1968 Doak Barnett had drafted a memo which reflected the panel’s “general 
consensus.”69 They proposed immediate efforts “to bring China fully into the community 
of nations” and “offer it acceptable alternatives to isolation and belligerency.” These 
would include immediate lifting of the travel and trade restrictions, and support for U.N. 
admission.
70
 
 Rostow proposed the president reject this advice for the time being. Since Mao 
wanted “us in the devil’s role,” any attempts at softening the present hard line would be 
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fruitless as “it takes two to play some games.”71 Academics such as Barnett thus 
assumed the role of James Thomson, offering the most extreme acceptable position on 
the issue. The difference was that, even though unlike Thomson these experts were 
outside of government, their ideas were given greater consideration due to the changing 
climate of debate on the issue. Rostow did not argue with the wisdom of their policy 
recommendations, but only with the timing of their implementation. 
 There was one dissenter from the liberal academic monolith on the panel – 
George Taylor of the University of Washington. He wrote his own memo to Johnson 
detailing the reasons he still opposed any policy changes, quipping about the other 
panelists “there is nothing quite so funny as a ritualistic liberal trying to appear to be a 
practical realist.”72 Though Johnson’s policies followed Taylor’s recommendations and 
not Barnett’s or Fairbanks’s, administration officials equated academic status with 
liberalism, and liberalism with competence. In May 1966, William Bundy compiled a 
list of the leading China scholars for Rusk, categorizing 21 individuals by, among other 
characteristics, ideology. Bundy grouped scholars into four categories: Liberal, 
Moderate, Conservative, and “Conservative, but respected.” Only Taylor made it into the 
fourth category.
73
 Jenkins also revealed this assumption when he told Rostow that Franz 
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Michael – one of Taylor’s former colleagues at Washington – “is among the more 
conservative of the academicians with respect to China policy, but is a very competent 
sinologue.”74 This orientation could not help but be reflected in the officially non-
partisan non-lobby National Committee on U.S.-China Policy. In fact, Eckstein told 
Johnson in February 1968 that the N.C.U.S.C.R. “constituted an answer to the rigidities 
represented in the Committee of One Million.”75 The Committee was quick to recognize 
the threat posed by this new organization. As early as April 1966, Liebman told Douglas 
“I feel almost overwhelmed,” adding his group “is simply not able to match this in terms 
of organization and funds.”76 He correctly expected the rival group to raise a quarter of a 
million dollars in its first year of existence, quadruple his own budget.
77
 
 The N.C.U.S.C.R. had two advantages. First, it was tax-exempt, because unlike 
the Committee of One Million it did not take overt stands on political issues. Second, it 
represented what was now the prestigious and respectable side of the debate. McCarthy’s 
enemies – or at least those his movement had not discredited – could now have their 
revenge. The problem was, they were winning everywhere but in the actual making of 
policy. Johnson told the academics he welcomed the debate they were sparking, saying 
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to them “we have to keep hammering away at this.”78 The implication of these remarks 
was that the president was himself a spectator in this debate, and would prefer to remain 
so. Even after the setbacks of 1966, Walter Judd boasted about “how much has been 
accomplished for so relatively little.”79 Yet if the line was holding where they had feared 
most – in the Executive Branch – it was long-past breached in their once-strongest 
redoubt – the halls of congress. Jacob Javits drove this home in December 1966 when he 
sent the Committee a letter of resignation from the organization. In this letter, he argued 
“Peking’s threat to world peace is likely to grow in the immediate future, not diminish.” 
However, it was “precisely became Communist China is a world power” that U.S. policy 
must shift. Isolation only risked future war.
80
 In the letter’s margin, Liebman wrote “no 
way can contain if don’t isolate,” echoing the Taipei media’s response to Barnett’s 
phrase.
81
 
 The senator had left the organization before, and had already committed himself 
to a series of contrary policy steps back in March, after Barnett’s testimony. But Javits 
made a point of releasing his letter to the press, and the headline “Javits Disavows Anti-
Peking Lobby” appeared on the front page of the New York Times. The Committee 
pointed out Javits’s previous defections – usually shortly after he had secured reelection 
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– and speculated this latest instance was inspired by his vice-presidential ambitions.82 
But in trying to paint Javits as a craven opportunist, Liebman effectively conceded that 
calling for changes in U.S. China policy might now be a political plus, even in the 
Republican Party. An apostasy based on sincere principle would have been less 
damaging. Liebman still maintained his group was only up against a “pro-appeasement 
minority” led by a “Red China Lobby” of disloyal academics, avaricious businessmen, 
and naïve ministers.
83
 To bolster its moderate credentials, and help maintain some 
ideological balance after Paul Douglas’s defeat in November 1966, Liebman asked John 
Sherman Cooper to join the Steering Committee two years after deciding he was not 
worth pursuing. Cooper graciously turned down the offer.
84
 
 In 1967, other senators began to follow Fulbright’s example, opening up new 
opportunities for academic experts to exert influence. Democratic Senator William 
Proxmire, who the previous year withdrew from the Committee of One Million’s 
Steering Committee during the Fulbright hearings, held hearings on the trade ban in 
April. The idea had been suggested to him by Javits.
85
 In his remarks at the hearings, the 
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New York Republican reiterated his arguments that China was “a first-rate world 
power,” that there was “precious little time” to change how it wielded that power, and 
that beginning to trade with the Chinese communists was a good start. Going back to 
Barnett’s slogan, he hoped ending the trade ban would put “life in phrases like 
‘containment without isolation,’” which he feared were fast becoming “an excuse for 
nothing save their repetition.”86 The star witness was Michigan economics professor 
Alexander Eckstein, long considered the foremost U.S. expert on the Chinese economy. 
He explained how China had shifted its trading patterns during the Sino-Soviet split so 
that currently 70 percent of its trade involved non-communist countries, meaning the 
U.S. was doing a poor job of keeping its allies in line. “Depriving American 
businessmen of any share” of this trade served no purpose save protecting “our self-
delusion” about the success of the strategy of isolation.87 This statistic would become a 
go-to talking point for members of congress from both parties. 
 That the trade ban was by that point at U.S. expense and no longer hurting the 
Chinese had been a mainstay in the press for a couple years. But to have it put so 
succinctly by a credentialed expert – in fact the credentialed expert – influenced 
lawmakers as anecdotal evidence from less authoritative sources could not. Perhaps not 
coincidentally, the hearings occurred as the State Department began a new review of the 
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trade ban in light of the preliminary recommendations of the ongoing China Advisory 
Panel.
88
 Doak Barnett wrote Eckstein around this time emphasizing the need for 
academics to speak out and try to influence policy, particularly on trade.
89
 That same 
day, Barnett penned a letter to Rusk, calling on changes in trade policy as a means “to 
open the door to increased contacts and reduced tensions.”90 This did not have any 
immediate effect, and neither did Proxmire’s hearings, in part because – as with 
Fulbright – the senator refused to go beyond publicity. The Democratic-controlled 
Senate saw no need to embarrass their president with symbolic votes calling for policy 
changes the administration was unlikely to make. 
 What Democratic senators did feel comfortable doing was speaking out on their 
own as never before. Edward Kennedy led the way in May 1966, shortly after the 
Fulbright hearings. At that point, he called for no policy changes, and merely highlighted 
China’s “imposing presence on the world stage” and U.S. ignorance of that nation. All 
he called for was “a long-term process of public education,” led by the formation by the 
president of a “blue-ribbon commission” to make policy recommendations.91 This was, 
ultimately, what occurred, though the China Advisory Panel was in the works at least a 
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month before Kennedy’s speech. The White House did see fit to prepare for questions on 
the subject at an upcoming press conference after additional remarks by Edward 
Kennedy on 19 July.
92
 In March 1967, his brother and fellow senator Robert added to the 
gathering chorus, mentioning in a speech at the University of Chicago that the Chinese 
communists should be treated “with respect, dignity, and good will.”93  
 If any Democratic senators would have wished to embarrass Lyndon Johnson, it 
would have been the Kennedy brothers. The same could not be said for Majority Leader 
Mike Mansfield. Though a one-time professor of Asian history, Mansfield had kept a 
respectful distance on this issue for many years, softly mouthing the Committee of One 
Million’s party line while never affiliating himself with an organization that would have 
greatly appreciated his prestige. In June 1966, this began to change. At first, it was in the 
context of finding a way to preserve South Vietnam. He hoped the administration 
planned in the near future to “restore some ‘bridges’ to China,” and perhaps invite China 
to “an Asian conference” on Vietnam similar to one held five years earlier concerning 
Laos.
94
 This was a fairly moderate position at the time, even among senators, and given 
purely in the context of the Vietnam War. But that war would lead him to lead on the 
issue of China within two years. A sign of Mansfield’s evolution was a letter he wrote to 
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Johnson in April 1967 stating “the road to settlement with Hanoi now, very likely runs 
by way of Peking rather than Moscow.” To explore that road, Mansfield proposed “a 
quiet and conciliatory approach to China.” 95 Rostow reported Rusk’s objection to this
notion, and therefore the lack of a need for any conciliatory gestures.
96
 Yet the Majority
Leader would not be deterred, and within months was offering himself as the bridge, 
requesting permission to visit Beijing and speak to its leaders during a trip to Japan. 
Nicholas Katzenbach believed “it is quite mad for Mansfield to think of going” at that of 
all times, given the tumultuous events within China.
97
 Perhaps he had a point. Yet in the
years ahead Mansfield would continue to escalate his rhetoric, soon divorcing it from the 
issue of Vietnam entirely, and continue his attempts to visit the mainland. 
Johnson Speaks, Then Hesitates 
Amidst all this activity, it is not surprising Johnson decided that he could no 
longer remain silent. In fact, his decision to speak out predated that of most senators. 
The press anticipated something was afoot by late May, when Drew Pearson reported 
that Johnson “has authorized his diplomats to take some radical steps for better 
understanding in the Far East” because “you can’t ignore a nation of 700 million 
people.” The steps supposedly under consideration included a minister-level conference, 
U.N admission, and possibly even diplomatic recognition.
98
 Pearson had jumped the gun
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a decade before with similar claims about Eisenhower’s supposedly imminent moves on 
China. But while Johnson was not seriously considering such steps, he was going to – 
unlike Eisenhower – publically address the issue. This move was inspired by Columbia 
University Professor Donald Zagoria, who within days of his testimony before 
Fulbright’s committee talked to Jack Valenti about the possibility of a presidential 
speech on China. It would be the first such presidential address devoted to the subject 
since the communist takeover.
99
 In May, with Valenti’s assent, Zagoria wrote a memo
directly to the president explaining his reasoning. He argued presidential words of 
conciliation would appeal to world opinion and put the Chinese on the defensive. 
Domestically, it would placate liberal critics of the Vietnam War. Zagoria concluded 
Johnson “would have much to gain and little to lose by taking such an initiative.”100
Valenti was seconded in his efforts by Bill Moyers, who had a back channel to Thomson 
at the NSC, and played a part in crafting the address’s conciliatory language.101
In that rare instance of a president taking an academic’s advice, Johnson would 
make that speech in July. In a prime-time televised address entitled “The Essentials For 
Peace in Asia,” Johnson argued “a misguided China must be encouraged toward 
understanding of the outside world and toward policies of peaceful cooperation.” He 
trumpeted recent U.S. efforts to permit some scholars and doctors to travel to china, 
99
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overtures he noted the Chinese had rejected. His call for “reconciliation between nations 
that now call themselves enemies” was reminiscent of Abram Chayes’s proposed speech 
for Kennedy in 1961. As in that address not given five years before, Johnson made no 
actual policy proposals.
102
 That the speech was given showed how much had changed. 
That its content was so similar showed how little had. 
 The White House believed Johnson’s speech was well received at home and 
abroad, putting the Chinese on the defensive while expanding his options but still 
allowing Johnson to maintain his flexibility.
103
 Thomson liked what he saw as the 
rhetorical forward progress from Barnett’s – and Humphrey’s – “containment without 
isolation” to Johnson’s “reconciliation.” He noted that Johnson liked the phrase 
“firmness and flexibility” to describe his evolving China policy. The phrase had its 
origins in John Lacey’s policy memo written over two years before, in which it had a 
different, more traditional meaning applying only to containment and not referencing 
outreach. Now, it would take on a new significance. The soon-to-be-departed Thomson 
wondered at what pace the administration would “pour” substantive policy changes “into 
this new rhetorical container.”104 The answer turned out to be not at all, no doubt 
disappointing Thomson from his perch at Harvard, though hardly for the first time. 
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 Johnson would continue with his conciliatory rhetoric that October. In a speech 
given during a visit to Honolulu, Johnson echoed Fulbright’s assertion from nearly two 
years prior in New Zealand that China was destined to moderate and open up to the 
world. Stating “we do not believe in eternal enmity,” itself an almost verbatim echo of 
Kennedy’s most conciliatory words for China in November 1963, Johnson argued that 
only through exchanges of people and ideas “can isolation be ended and suspicion give 
way to trust.”105 Johnson made additional amicable gestures in his January 1967 State of 
the Union Address and in a press conference that July.
106
 Yet these public hints of a 
removal of the travel and trade bans proved to be feints. At no point did Johnson display 
any desire to override Rusk and side with his staff. Regarding statements made by these 
lower-level officials, internal directives made clear they should change their tone, but 
not their tune. While suggesting the use of such phrases as “we look forward to the day 
when hostility can be replaced by cooperation,” they were not to imply “any change in 
the policy enunciated by the Secretary and the President.”107 This was reflected in 
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson’s speech in Tokyo in February 1967, when he reiterated 
the old standby that “it has become increasingly clear over the years that Peking is not 
interested in any understanding with the United States, however limited, unless Taiwan 
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is turned over to them.”108 The goal merely seemed to be shifting the onus for bad 
relations onto Peking. That had been the most minimal goal of would-be policy 
reformers like Chester Bowles and Robert Komer as far back as early 1961. It was clear 
Johnson had decided he desired change, but was not willing to make serious efforts 
himself to seek it. 
 Part of his hesitation was due to the uncertainty concerning public reaction. 
Opinion polling on the issue remained both sparse and vague. A June 1967 Harris poll 
indicated a majority favored diplomatic recognition as well as U.N. admission. But the 
latter was only the case if Taiwan stayed in the organization, and an overwhelming 
majority opposed the Albanian resolution formula.
109
 Also, simple polls such as this did 
not gauge the importance of the issue, and the administration worried about a committed 
minority opposed to any policy changes. For this reason, as well as fear of showing 
weakness, Rusk told Johnson in February 1968 that in the near-term “only very limited 
steps” were feasible. The limited step he had under consideration was a slight relaxation 
of travel restrictions.
110
 The China Panel’s recommendations earlier that month were 
only the most ambitious of a series of proposals for policy reform to appear at that time. 
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 With the exception of the academics’ memo, all these papers concluded that 
while Mao would not reciprocate, moves at that time on travel and trade would lay the 
groundwork for better relations after his death. Travel restrictions on journalists, doctors 
and professors were eased in July 1966, medical supplies licensed for export in April 
1967, and Chinese journalists invited to cover the elections in 1968, but these were such 
minor and symbolic pinprick attacks on the travel and trade bans that they neither set a 
precedent, nor established momentum for policy change, nor moved the Chinese to 
reciprocate.
111
 While Secretary of State Rusk remained opposed to more substantive 
actions, National Security Advisor Rostow offered his support.
112
 However, his assistant 
Jenkins backed away from his prior stand. Again, the issue was timing. For once, an 
official said the time was right. But that was in retrospect, and in Jenkins’s estimation 
the moment had passed. That moment was before August 1966, when he began pushing 
for action. China’s accelerating internal chaos after than point created a situation where 
the U.S. would be best served by playing a “waiting game” while “China is trying to sort 
itself out.” In addition, that China was in a “weakened” stated removed the “urgency” of 
policy reform. With the threat lessened, there was reduced need for outreach.
113
 Now 
might not be the right time, even if yesterday had been. 
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 With the travel ban up for renewal on 15 March 1968, debate within the State 
Department continued. William Macomber noted to Rusk that lifting the ban “would 
please certain liberal elements in the Congress,” but did not believe the matter to be 
“pressing.” It would provide a larger political upside if announced the next year, at the 
start of Johnson’s next term.114 For his part, William Bundy renewed his endorsement of 
removing the travel ban, discounting any current danger to potential U.S. travelers to 
mainland China. Rusk disapproved of the proposal.
115
 With one item on what Jenkins 
referred to as the “dog-eared shopping list” no longer up for consideration, the focus 
turned to trade. Jenkins still supported some movement on this front, as did William 
Bundy, who saw it as “a tangible signal to China of our desire for a more normal 
relationship.”116 At this juncture, Rusk chose delay, and put the matter aside until after 
the November election. 
A Succession Crisis – In the United States 
 That campaign season proved to be both a watershed in the China policy debate 
and further confirmation of the trend over the past two years. The press noted “a 
perceptible evolution in American attitudes – academic, official and public – toward 
                                                          
114
 Macomber to Rusk, Subject: Proposal to Remove Travel Restrictions to Mainland China, Folder Travel 
Controls Jan.-Dec. 1968, Box 2, Subject Files of the Office of Asian Communist Affairs, 1961-1973, RG 
59, NARA. 
115
 Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy) 
to Secretary of State Rusk, Subject: Removal of travel restriction to Mainland China, 6 March 1968, 
F.R.U.S. 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, 667. 
116
 Jenkins to Rostow, Subject: Administration Goals in the Coming Months: China Policies, 8 April 1968, 
2, Folder Chicom General, Box 1, Jenkins Files, NSF, LBJ; William Bundy to Benjamin Read, Subject: 
New Foreign Policy Initiatives Between Now and January, 3 May 1968, 2, Folder Sino 1-6.68, Subject 
Files, Lot Files, RG 59, NARA. 
 224 
 
 
China.”117 In April, Vice-President Hubert Humphrey spoke of the need for “peaceful 
bridges to mainland China,” a noted change from “Communist China” or “Red China” 
which was seen as “an unmistakable olive branch” by the press.118 The administration 
contributed to this shift in the form of a May speech at the National Press Club by 
Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach. The State Department’s second-in-
command spoke favorably of ending the trade ban, though he also emphasized China’s 
lack of interest at that time in trade, and the limited results of such a move. In addition, 
he highlighted the regime’s recent mistreatment of diplomats as evidence that China was 
isolating itself.
119
 Though most of the speech’s substance highlighted reasons for 
continued U.S. hostility, the press focused on what separated it from past remarks by 
Rusk and others, concluding that it represented “a definite shift in official thinking” and 
calling it an endorsement of ending the trade ban.
120
 Change was not only non-
controversial. It appeared to be welcome. The media wanted to believe. 
 However, congress continued to lead the way and set the terms of the debate. 
While the administration was adopting the positions of senators circa 1966 by proposing 
acts of tentative outreach, Mike Mansfield raced ahead by discussing U.N. 
representation and diplomatic recognition. For the first time, a leading politician moved 
                                                          
117
 “China Policy in a Campaign Year, Folder 66-68, Box 329, Panzer Files, Johnson Papers, LBJ. 
118
 Joseph C. Harsch, “U.S. seeks to mend relations with Peking,” Christian Science Monitor, 27 May 
1968, Folder China 66-68, Panzer Files, Johnson Papers, LBJ. 
119
 Nicholas Katzenbach, “The U.S. and China Today,” 21 May 1968, 6, Folder China 66-68, Box 329, 
Panzer Files, Johnson Papers, LBJ. 
120
 “U.S. line on Peking relaxes,” Christian Science Monitor, 24 May 1968, “Door Ajar for Red China,” 
Houston Post, 30 May 1968, “Bringing China Into The World,” New York Times, 2 June 1968, all in 
Folder China 66-68, Box 329, Panzer Files, Johnson Papers, LBJ. 
 225 
 
 
beyond the doomed “Two-Chinas” formula. Instead, he proposed the U.S. adopt the 
position that “there is only one China and Taiwan is a part of it,” though reunification 
could only occur in the future “by peaceful means.”121 While the administration focused 
on Mansfield’s less original argument that “the Chinese Communist Government is here 
to stay and is a major power,” the press immediately recognized this as a new “One-
China” approach.122 It was a marked shift from Mansfield’s prior consistent opposition 
to recognition or U.N. admission.
123
 It also, in retrospect, offered what proved to be a 
viable path forward for rapprochement by finessing the major difference between the 
two countries in a manner both might accept. 
 Humphrey further showed his cards by openly consulting on China policy with 
academics such as Alexander Eckstein.
124
 On the Republican side, Nixon revealingly 
maintained his silence on the matter.  Journalists spoke of “a quiet revolution” on the 
issue, and argued that the “policy of boycott had lost its popular base.”125 Supporters of 
the status quo could only console themselves by the fact that they still had allies in 
                                                          
121
 China, Retrospect and Prospect, Lecture by Senator Mike Mansfield, University of Montana, Missoula, 
Montana, 29 March 1968, 26, Folder Memos Volume 12, Box 242, China CF, NSF, LBJ. 
122
 Rostow to Johnson, Subject: Mike Mansfield’s Speech on China, 29 March 1968, Folder Memos 
Volume 12, Box 242, China CF, NSF, LBJ; Murrey Marder, “Mansfield Urges ‘One China’ Policy, 
Washington Post, 30 March 1968, Folder Far East – China, 1966-1974, Box 47, Series 22: Senate 
Leadership, 1961-1977, Mansfield Papers, Missoula. 
123
 Mansfield to Helen Arthur, 25 August 1966, Folder Communist China re: recognition and admission to 
UN, Box 98, Series 13: Foreign Relations, Mansfield Papers, Missoula. 
124
 Humphrey to Eckstein, 27 May 1968, Folder China Advisory Panel, State Dept.: Miscellanea, Box 1, 
Eckstein Papers, Bentley. 
125
 William R. Frye, “The Search for a China Policy,” Folder China 66-68, Box 329, Panzer Files, Johnson 
Papers, LBJ. 
 226 
 
 
mainland China, who for the time being evinced no interest in reciprocity.
126
 By June, 
Liebman was forced to effectively abandon the Committee’s longstanding commitment 
to bipartisanship when he told Walter Judd that “American-China policy will become a 
partisan issue – something which we have successfully avoided for the past 15 years.” 
Even this was only a “hope” on his part. Humphrey had thrown in his lot with the 
enemy, as evidenced by his employment of Doak Barnett as a leading adviser. Now 
Nixon was the one, the only one, who could save them. Liebman confidently asserted “I 
know that Nixon is with us on China,” yet was unsure of where his advisers stood.127 
 This was where Judd came in. He had long known Nixon, and presumably could 
reach him. Liebman requested Judd draft a speech for Nixon on the subject. In an echo 
of the bipartisan consensus of former times, David Martin, a former aide to the recently 
departed Senator Thomas Dodd, wrote the speech.
128
 The text accused Democrats like 
Humphrey and Mansfield of catering to “the influential leftist minority” of their party. 
While “this is not the time for new initiatives,” Martin proposed “offering increased 
contact” to China as a reward for future good behavior, the closest the Committee could 
come to a concession to the shifting terms of the debate.
129
 Nixon campaign official 
Thomas Charles Huston, whom Liebman knew from when Huston had led the Young 
                                                          
126
 John Hughes, “Peking ignores U.S. hints,” Christian Science Monitor, 26 June 1968, Folder China 66-
68, Box 329, Panzer Files, Johnson Papers, LBJ. 
127
 Liebman to Judd, 14 June 1968, Folder Committee of One Million, Correspondence/Internal 1968-
1971, Box 183, Judd Papers, Hoover. 
128
 Liebman to Huston, 27 June 1968, Folder Statement on China for Nixon, Box 84, Liebman Papers, 
Hoover. 
129
 Notes on United States China Policy for the consideration of Richard M. Nixon, 1-2, Folder Statement 
on China for Nixon, Box 84, Liebman Papers, Hoover. 
 227 
 
 
Americans for Freedom, sent the Committee’s Secretary the Nixon-penned Foreign 
Affairs article “Asia After Vietnam” as a guide to where the candidate stood. He also 
confided to Liebman that Nixon was “particularly concerned with Red China as a 
potential nuclear power” and that Nixon had told Huston “China will be the most serious 
problem with which the next President will have to deal.”130 Huston dutifully passed 
Martin’s text to Patrick Buchanan, expressing his “hope this paper on China will not get 
lost in the files.”131 Huston reported to Liebman that Nixon had looked at the 
recommendations, wrote “Good” on the paper, but declined to speak on the issue at that 
time. Huston recommended Liebman forward the remarks to Texas Senator John Tower, 
one of the Committee’s last reliable mouthpieces on Capitol Hill.132 
 While the Democratic Platform that summer called for concrete policy changes – 
in the areas of travel and trade – the Republican Platform avoided mentioning these 
incremental steps and merely reiterated opposition to U.N. membership “under existing 
conditions.” This was a change from the 1964 Republican Platform, which explicitly 
opposed any weakening of the trade ban.
133
 No major figure was vocally on the China 
Lobby’s side anymore. Democratic leaders were in opposition. Nixon was for the time 
being neutral. And Republican liberals affiliated with Javits saw a political opening. For 
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close to two years now, prominent Democrats, including several administration officials, 
had talked of change. But they had yet to deliver in any meaningful manner. In April 
1966, a month after the Fulbright hearings, the liberal Republican Ripon Society argued 
in a policy paper that “Republicans must fill a leadership vacuum with has developed in 
the formulation of American policy toward China.” Its leaders should instead find a 
middle ground between “the rigid right and the sentimental left.”134 Within the 
Republican Party, there was thus a debate between traditionalists and reformers over 
whether the political calculus indicated if the political gains on the China issue were in 
opposing the Democrats, or beating them at their own game. 
Moving the Ball, then Punting 
 In his history of Johnson’s China policy, Michael Lumbers credited Johnson with 
“tentative bridge-building” in line with changing domestic attitudes.135 Johnson not only 
prevented the Vietnam War from exacerbating tensions with Chinese. He recognized the 
conflict as a reason to grope towards some sort of understanding, or at least towards the 
recognition that such groping was necessary. This matched the administration’s own 
assessments of their efforts and achievements. It credited itself with “major policy 
statements during 1966 and 1967” which affirmed hostility was neither permanent nor 
inevitable.
136
 In early 1968, Eckstein credited Johnson for “preparing ground” for future 
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potential change in consonance with “the improving climate of domestic public 
opinion.”137 But Eckstein remained skeptical of the prospects for change in the 
immediate future. Jenkins agreed, reaffirming that November that “it is not yet time 
energetically to woo China into the world.” Still, thanks to the administration’s efforts, 
when that time arrived, “the ground is well laid.”138 Until that day arrived, all Johnson’s 
successor appeared capable of doing was what Johnson had already done – wait. 
 With his internal focus on Johnson and his officials, Lumbers reduced outside 
actors like academics, senators, and journalists to little more than footnotes. Yet those 
were the actors driving debate during this period, and forcing Johnson and his officials to 
react. None of these actors was isolated from the administration, nor from each other. 
They were inextricably intertwined. Professors went from congressional committees to 
meetings with the president and back, with the media covering all of it and influencing 
events with its encouraging words. Left to their own devices, Johnson and his officials 
would in all likelihood have refrained from speaking out. Paralysis would have set in. 
Reformers like Thomson would have remained internal dissidents without allies higher 
up the chain of command. In other words, it would in all likelihood have been a repeat of 
the Kennedy experience, with the crucial difference being the recognition of the 
inevitability of change. Lumbers’s story thus lacked the prime movers, who were outside 
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the White House or Foggy Bottom. His was, for the most part, a story of a journey where 
the motor was missing from the vehicle. 
 Actions considered in the administration’s waning days indicated how little had 
really changed in terms of assumptions since 1965. A Policy Planning Council report 
prepared a month after Nixon’s election expressed the now familiar long-term goal of 
having China “become a constructive member of the world community” coupled with 
the longstanding caveat that this “will take a long time.” Nevertheless, lifting the travel 
and trade bans would encourage this evolution, or at least provide the future framework 
for a process of outreach.
139
 This paper was meant as advice for the incoming 
Republican administration, which might or might not choose to pick up where they had 
left off eight years before. If that was his goal, there would be virtually no actions Nixon 
would have to reverse or undo. All it would take would be a change in rhetoric. The only 
thing standing between the enactment of such a policy – aside from Nixon’s own deeply 
held and deeply concealed beliefs on the subject – was evolving public opinion as 
reflected by past statements from Johnson and his underlings. Posture had changed, not 
policy. 
 Before departing the scene, Rusk finally appeared to relent, recommending that 
Johnson relax the trade ban by allowing U.S. subsidiaries to engage in third-party trade 
with China. The fact that U.S. companies had to ensure that their components did not 
end up in products companies headquartered in other nations sold to China had long 
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been an irritant for these multinational enterprises. He believed congress would support 
such a preliminary move. Perhaps wisely, Johnson chose to deny Rusk’s request by not 
acting.
140
 Two weeks before leaving office was no opportune time for a president to set a 
precedent, particularly on an issue he had avoided acting upon for so long. Johnson had 
his chance. As he might have put it, and most of those working for him did in fact put it, 
he either actually had no chance or failed to exploit a narrow window to make minor 
changes at best. In his rhetoric, he broke new ground for a president on the issue, but still 
stayed behind what prominent senators advocated, or the leading media organs desired. 
Beset by other foreign policy problems, he believed the most he could achieve was to do 
no harm. In this he succeeded. It would be up to Nixon to decide if all a president could 
do on China policy was to always be waiting for something to happen. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 I WILL DARE: NIXON’S JOURNEY TO THE EAST, AND A REPUBLICAN’S 
ACHIEVEMENT OF DEMOCRATIC DREAMS 
 
“I do hope that China remains of interest to you and your boss. Deftly dealt with, it could 
make heroes of you both.”1 – James Thomson to Henry Kissinger, 5 October 1970 
 
 Richard Nixon loved to operate in secret. He also craved the public adulation 
garnered by big events. In this regard, his 15 July 1971 announcement that he would be 
travelling to mainland China in 1972 was his perfect coup. Yet while ostensibly 
concealing his specific intentions towards the Chinese from his 1968 presidential 
campaign onwards, Nixon could not help but drop hints both official and unofficial 
concerning this matter. Some of these signals were apparent only in retrospect to even 
expert observers, but many were noticed at the time they were given. That his general 
goal was to reach out to the Chinese communists in ways far more significant than his 
predecessors had even contemplated was noted nearly from the start of his 
administration. This he had to make clear, if only to get the attention of China’s leaders, 
whose participation was essential to the entire endeavor. That his specific goal was an 
unprecedented presidential visit to China was – while never directly enunciated – 
repeatedly hinted at by the president himself. Thus, the president’s surprise 
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announcement was quite possibly the most successful worst kept secret ever. How Nixon 
achieved surprise, and why he should not have, will be the focus of this chapter. 
 That this was an unsurprising surprise, at least in hindsight, quickly became 
apparent. While admitting he had been caught “by complete surprise,” Senate Majority 
Leader Mike Mansfield added that “in retrospect, however, it is a development which 
follows logically from the course which the President has been pursuing, to my 
knowledge, since February, 1969.”2 Mansfield was hardly a disinterested observer. Since 
early 1969, he had been in direct communication with Zhou Enlai about becoming the 
first American statesman to visit the People’s Republic, and in fact had received an 
invitation from the Chinese nearly three months before Nixon. In Washington, was one 
of several Senate Democrats pushing Nixon to do more to bring about rapprochement 
with the Chinese. They did so out of sincere belief this would improve the U.S. strategic 
position in the Pacific and accelerate an exit from South Vietnam, but also because they 
saw it as a potent political issue on which they could score points with voters at Nixon’s 
expense. By eventually acceding to – and in fact exceeding – their demands, he 
dramatically turned the tables on them, much to their pronounced chagrin and his 
palpable shadenfreude. Democratic leaders simply did not think him capable of such a 
maneuver. 
 From the opening days of his presidency, Nixon sent various signals as to his 
intentions regarding China. He had been both intentionally indiscreet about his desire in 
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order to secure the invitation from the Chinese, and unintentionally so in settings where 
his words served no strategic purpose. The best example of the latter was his surreal 
midnight journey to the Lincoln Memorial to meet with antiwar protesters on 1 May 
1970, following the Kent State shootings. In the middle of his rambling remarks, he 
discussed at length places these young Americans should visit. He cautioned them that 
Europe, while a popular destination, was simply “an older version of America.” Instead, 
they should travel to Asia – the continent of the future. He expressed “my great hopes 
that during their lifetime, that the great mainland of China would be opened up so that 
we could know the 700 million people who live in China who are one of the most 
remarkable people on earth.”3 These off-the-record remarks received no attention at the 
time. However, that October Time magazine reported his on-the-record statement that “if 
there is anything I want to do before I die, it is to go to China.”4 In April 1971, shortly 
after the beginning of Chinese diplomatic reciprocations had dramatically raised U.S. 
hopes of a breakthrough, he told the American Society of Newspaper Editors that he 
wished his daughter Julie and her new husband David Eisenhower could honeymoon in 
China and “see the great cities, and the people, and all of that, there,” adding “I hope 
they do. As a matter of fact, I hope I do.”5 By the summer of 1971, it could not have 
been any clearer that Nixon really wanted to go to China. 
                                                          
3
 Folder Memorandum of Events, May 1, 1970, 4, Box 11, Name/Subject File, President’s Personal File, 
1969-1974, RMN. 
4
 Folder 3: Material concerning preparations for HAK first China trip, Box 1031, China/Vietnam 
Negotiations, For the President’s Files, NSF, RMN. 
5
 Nixon, Remarks, American Society of Newspaper Editors, 16 April 1971, Folder US China Policy 1969-
1972 [1 of 4], Box 86, Country Files: Far East, Henry A. Kissinger Files, NSF, RMN. 
 235 
 
 
 Nixon achieved complete surprise when he announced his upcoming visit to 
mainland China largely due to the numerous previous failed expectations of progress. As 
long as there had been a policy of isolating communist China, many had anticipated that 
policy would soon begin to change. As sooner repeatedly became later, the hopes of 
those supporting change ebbed and the fears of those on the opposing side dulled. The 
announcement elicited widespread public elation, particularly but not exclusively among 
Nixon’s natural political adversaries on the left and among young adults. The media saw 
this epochal event coming, but only in retrospect. What historians would later view as 
obvious signals of Nixon’s intentions were entirely missed at the time. The breakthrough 
occurred both because Nixon was willing to reach out to the Chinese and because the 
Chinese were finally ready to respond affirmatively. While the Chinese were primarily 
motivated by increasing fear of the Soviets, Americans – and many U.S. allies – took 
advantage of China’s temporary fears because of their own fears of the long-term rise of 
a powerful China. Triangular diplomacy determined Nixon’s timing. It did not set his, or 
the nation’s, agenda. This largely accounts for the maintenance of “containment without 
isolation” after the demise of the Soviet Union, which rendered triangular diplomacy 
obsolete. 
Evolution of a Statesman 
 So why were the signals missed? Why did no one expect either a general 
diplomatic breakthrough with the Chinese or the specific act of a presidential visit? 
Three main reasons can be presented to explain this failure of imagination: U.S. inertia, 
Chinese intransigence, and Nixon’s reputation. First and foremost, the policy of 
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containment and isolation had been in place for so long, and survived so many false 
alarms about its imminent discarding, that even the most seasoned observers had grown 
complacent. After the end of the Korean War, after Eisenhower’s reelection, after 
Kennedy’s election, after Hilsman’s speech, and finally after Fulbright’s hearings, there 
had been reports in the press of imminent and significant policy alterations which 
cheered reformers and worried those who supported the status quo. None of these proved 
accurate. In fact, there is no written evidence that senior policy makers at any of these 
junctures even considered taking significant actions of any kind. By the beginning of the 
1970s, change in U.S. China policy was becoming like Charles De Gaulle’s famous 
comment on Brazil’s status as a great power, or jokes about soccer becoming a major 
sport in the United States – it was the wave of the future, and always would be. 
 At least while Mao Zedong remained alive and in power. By the middle of 
Johnson’s presidency, nearly all his foreign policy officials had come to the conclusion 
that ending China’s isolation was essential to U.S. and Asian security, but that the major 
necessary actions could not be taken until Mao had left the scene. It had long been 
recognized that Mao needed the U.S. as a bogeyman to remain in power, and that he 
initiated periodic military crises with the U.S. in order to enable the domestic mass 
mobilization campaigns that were his primary methods of transforming Chinese society. 
He could not abandon this hostile posture without calling his legitimacy into question. 
U.S. actions like lifting the travel and trade bans would not be met with the necessary 
reciprocity. At most, they would shift the “onus” for bad relations onto the Chinese. But 
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relations could not be improved without Chinese participation, which was not seen as 
forthcoming from the Great Helmsman. 
 Finally, there was Nixon’s own well-earned reputation as a staunch anti-
communist. Almost no one realized that he could use this reputation to his advantage. 
Generally, this idea is codified as “Only Nixon could go to China.” Yet it also worked in 
other, more subtle ways. Nixon made his reputation as, for lack of a better term, a red-
baiter. He attacked the loyalty and anti-communist credentials of liberal Democrats. His 
focus was domestic subversion. By concentrating on the menace within, he did not need 
to harp on the threats from beyond America’s borders, whether emanating from Europe 
or Asia. He saw no need to advocate the liberation of Europe’s “captive nations.” More 
relevantly, he did not need to partake in the “Who Lost China?” debate. Remarkable for 
a California politician holding national office in 1949, he kept his distance from Chiang 
Kai-shek and the Taiwanese cause. Furthermore, with Alger Hiss’s scalp on his belt, 
Nixon did not need to condemn “the Lattimores and the Fairbanks,” – as John Kennedy 
had – or call the Mao’s regime “a Slavic Manchukuo,” as Dean Rusk would. In short, he 
left a very slim paper trail for future actions to contradict. After 15 July 1971, he could 
have argued times had changed, and that the statements he made in the past were no 
longer applicable, but even these cursory actions were unnecessary. Existing historical 
investigations of Nixon’s China policy have all failed to note the fact that while Nixon 
was particularly anti-communist, he was never especially anti-Chinese communist. 
 In a speech early in 1969, University of Michigan Professor Alexander Eckstein 
expressed skepticism about any near-term change in U.S. China policy, citing as his 
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three reasons “inertia,” the “situation in China,” and the “structure of our foreign policy 
process.”6 Thus, he was at the time in agreement with two of my three retrospective 
reasons. His last reason – focusing on bureaucracy – was seen as less significant by 
others, in part because it had always been mid-level bureaucratic officials who led the 
fight for policy change. The leading individual who typified this – James Thomson – 
declined to subscribe to any of the three prevalent beliefs I identified, or to any of 
Eckstein’s three reasons. On the inside in Washington, James Thomson had been a 
gadly. From his outside perch at Harvard, he became a prophet. 
 In October 1970, while leading Democrats on Capitol Hill continued to harangue 
Nixon for inactivity, other academics bemoaned the lack of significant progress, and the 
media was largely silent on the issue, Thomson published an article in Pacific 
Community which he sent to Henry Kissinger, with whom he occasionally conversed on 
the subject of China policy. Kissinger thanked Thomson for the article, and pledged to 
distribute it to his staff.
7
 The article argued that Nixon alone possessed “the credentials – 
Republicanism, conservatism, and anti-communism” to act boldly on China policy 
without fear of domestic political repercussions. He commended the administration on 
the incremental steps it had already taken to relax the travel and trade bans. However, 
what was to date lacking was “the grand gesture, the gesture of magnanimity required of 
                                                          
6
 “American Approaches to China,” 1969, 5, Folder Talks: Talks and Lecture Notes on China, Box 7, 
Eckstein Papers, Michigan. 
7
 Kissinger to Thomson, 9 October 1970, Folder General China 1967-1970, Box 17, Subject Files: CO 
(Countries), White House Central Files, RMN. 
 239 
 
 
the greater power.”8 Yet Thomson, who had remained hopeful during his service in the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations, had not flagged in his faith. In fact, it was 
stronger than ever now that Nixon had made changing China policy bipartisan. In his 
accompanying letter to Kissinger, he concluded with the words “I do hope that China 
remains of interest to you and your boss. Deftly dealt with, it could make heroes of you 
both.”9 Not everyone was blind to the possibilities for Nixon to make major changes to 
U.S. China policy. Fittingly, the man who saw the open door had spent most of the past 
decade running into brick walls. 
 Nixon’s few early pre-presidential comments on China were mild boilerplate for 
the era, and focused on painting Democrats as Cold War losers. During the 1954 
midterm campaign, he blamed the result of the Chinese Civil War on “the Acheson 
policy of weakness, inconsistency and compromise,” arguing Republicans were superior 
negotiators.
10
 In the 1958 midterms, while advocating a more vigorous election-time 
debate over which party was superior in the field of foreign policy, he demanded 
congressional candidates state their opinions on U.N. admission, though at that time 
virtually no one on Capitol Hill was arguing in the affirmative.
11
 In late 1961, again 
regarding U.N. admission, he criticized “defeatist talk” of a “two China policy” 
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supposedly emanating from within the Kennedy administration, once again framing the 
issue as a matter of victory or defeat against global communism.
12
 As “Old Nixon” 
partisan rhetoric went, this was weak sauce indeed. 
 During his victorious 1968 campaign, Nixon kept his own counsel on China 
policy, much as he did on nearly all pressing matters of foreign policy. This left both the 
press and campaign aides in the dark. Howard Hunt urged Nixon to take a hard line and 
“not join the Democrats on this issue” because “Nixon came into the limelight through 
being an anti-communist.”13 Such an approach was consonant with the advice Walter 
Judd had offered, and Tom Huston had endorsed. However, neither Huston nor Hunt 
was taken seriously by their boss as foreign policy experts. Nixon’s own spokespeople 
were at a loss as to what their candidate’s views were on the issue, and were unable to 
respond to repeated press inquiries.
14
 When Nixon finally spoke on the matter, it was to 
a Milwaukee television affiliate – a minor provincial venue where his remarks would be 
unlikely to make waves. In this interview, he did hint at future change, remarking “the 
dialogue with Communist China must come, I think, during the next two terms of the 
next President. I can’t state the exact time.”15 This implied a continuation of the 
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Johnson-era approach of waiting for the opportune moment for outreach, and continued 
attempts at incremental change. 
 Nixon’s frequent overseas travels in the years immediately preceding his 
presidency no doubt exerted a significant influence on his future foreign policy actions, 
on China in addition to many other issues. Evelyn Goh credited Nixon’s desire for 
rapprochement with China to the influence of Charles De Gaulle, with whom Nixon held 
discussions in 1963 and 1967.
16
 Superficially, this makes sense. Nixon’s longtime 
admiration of the French President was well-known, as was De Gaulle’s desire to bring 
China in from the diplomatic cold. Yet Nixon’s own handwritten notes on his 1967 
meeting with De Gaulle revealed that by then he was “disillusioned about China” due to 
France’s lack of diplomatic influence in that nation.17 Having been a trailblazer, De 
Gaulle had now soured somewhat on his own pioneering venture. More typical of that 
period were Nixon’s interactions with West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. Nixon 
found China to be an “obsession” of the German leader, quoting Brandt as remarking 
that “12,000,000 Chinese born a year- each exists on bowl of rice,” after which he 
cupped his hand in a display of gelbe gefahr which would have made Kaiser Wilhelm II 
proud, and possibly able to temporarily overlook the fact that his successor state was 
now run by a socialist. What Brandt feared most was China’s threat in the “future – 
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when they have atomic weapons,” by which he surely meant intercontinental ballistic 
missiles able to deliver the hydrogen bombs China had recently tested.
18
 
 The need for outreach in response to future Chinese power – the world’s most 
populous state with the world’s most dangerous weapons – ultimately played a 
significant role in the Nixon administration’s decision making on the matter. Yet the 
future president could not yet grasp the counterintuitive reasoning required to understand 
that threat necessitated outreach, that fear must inspire favor. In his recollection of 
meeting with Chiang Kai-shek, Nixon wrote his personal conclusion that it was “ironical 
to say China the great danger and soften our policy toward them.”19 At the same time, as 
he made clear in March 1967 remarks to the Romanians, he recognized the “danger of 
isolating China,” a notion which would become a key selling point for his future policy 
alterations.
20
 It was at this time that he began to hear this message from key U.S. allies 
along China’s periphery. Their input was perhaps more important than that of more 
significant allies such as the leaders of France and West Germany, who did not live in 
fear of Chinese expansion and subversion. Singapore’s Lee Kwon Yew told Nixon it 
was “a mistake for U.S. to isolate them” and that the United States “now must establish 
contact.”21 One of the longstanding arguments against ending the policy of isolating 
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China was that vulnerable regional allies would feel betrayed and possibly go neutralist. 
Nixon now knew these allies themselves desired a change in U.S. policy. Most 
intriguing of all were Nixon’s conversations with Philippine diplomat and future Foreign 
Minister Carlos Romulo. While meeting with Nixon in Manila in 1967, Romulo 
suggested that if Nixon became president he should “go to China.” He then reminded 
Nixon he had given him identical advice when they last met in 1966, “at a lunch in 
Manila” Nixon noted from memory in the marginalia.22 This is the first recorded
mention of someone telling Nixon he should go to China. 
Expectations, but Not Great Ones 
Even without the knowledge of Nixon’s pre-presidential overseas conversations, 
no one expected a return to Eisenhower-era hostility. Despite Nixon’s reputation as a 
Cold War hardliner, many in the press expected the momentum for policy change built 
up during the second half of the Johnson administration to continue. The Wall Street 
Journal reported at the start of 1969 a rumor that Berkeley Professor Robert Scalapino 
had been offered – but declined – the position of Assistant Secretary for State for Far 
Eastern Affairs.
23
 Whether or not this was accurate, the mere fact that a leading
proponent of policy change was thought likely to assume the leading position in the 
State Department on China policy spoke volumes about the durability of the new 
bipartisan policy consensus. Additional stories in the weeks before Nixon’s inauguration 
reflected a sense that the new administration wanted at least a thaw in relations, and that 
22
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there was now a chance the Chinese felt the same way.
24
 Still, veteran foreign policy
observers failed to notice what in later years would be viewed as a major signal in 
Nixon’s Inaugural Address which alluded to his willingness to reach out to the Chinese 
when he said desired “a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry 
isolation.” Neither Chalmers Roberts nor Joseph Kraft, who had written on the subject 
for decades, referenced his allusion to China in their lengthy stories on the speech the 
next morning.
25
 For the time being, the sense was that the moment was ripe for change,
but Nixon might not be eager to harvest the fruit. 
The new president appeared to confirm this assumption at his first press 
conference, where one of his first questions was on China policy. In response, he gave 
no hint that change was afoot, instead reiterating U.S. opposition to P.R.C. membership 
in the United Nations and emphasizing U.S. policy would change when China’s posture 
had changed.
26
 Yet this did not squelch expectations of change. Newsweek noted how the
Chinese “gave unusually thorough coverage” to the press conference, yet “ignored his 
strong statement of support for the Nationalist regime on Taiwan,” indicating the 
24
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Chinese were changing their posture.
27
 Meanwhile, the Chicago Tribune, which was one
of the few leading national news sources which still opposed changing China policy, 
contrasted Nixon’s “public posture” with reports that administration officials were 
already sounding out the Chinese communists about improving relations.
28
 Time
magazine chose June 1969 as the time to call for significant policy changes, including an 
immediate end to the travel and trade bans as well as a soft-pedalling of opposition to 
U.N. membership for the P.R.C. Still, the magazine expressed doubts Nixon would 
follow their advice.
29
Nixon’s nebulous early position on China contrasted with the combination of 
changes in domestic public opinion as well as a growing abandonment by key U.S. 
allies, something which had been feared since France’s defection in 1964 but had so far 
not come to fruition. By the start of 1968, new and more leftist governments in Canada 
and Italy had let it be known they planned to normalize relations with the P.R.C.
30
Combined with increased domestic pressure from both sides of the congressional aisle, 
this created the appearance of an aussenpolitik-innenpolitik pincer movement on Nixon. 
The weekend after his inauguration, elected officials led by William Fulbright, Mark 
Hatfield, and Sherman Cooper met with experts in Santa Barbara, California at the 
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions to discuss the need for and possibility of 
27
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rapprochement with the Chinese. The hostile Chicago Tribune termed the conference 
“the resumption of a drive by Senate foreign policy liberals in both parties to reform the 
United States position on mainland China.”31 
 Much of the discussion that weekend centered upon whether the public was 
ready to support significance policy changes. The consensus among those assembled 
was no. Cooper claimed existing public opposition “make change in American policy 
toward Communist China, or support by the Congress extremely difficult.”32 
Representative Don Edwards largely agreed with Cooper. According to him, while the 
latest national polling indicated majority public support for lifting travel and trade 
restrictions, most individual congressmen would suffer with their constituents if they 
called for more significant policy changes.
33
 In April, liberal Republican Paul Findley 
agreed, telling the Washington Post that congress “isn’t ready for China yet.”34 Jacob 
Javits disagreed, telling the National Council on United States-China Relations that 
March “the people are well ahead of the government on this matter.”35 Soon, Javits 
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would be proven correct over Cooper and Findley. But for the time being, the shadow of 
the past weighed heavily on the minds of many reformers. 
 Naturally, Nixon’s early actions reflected this skittishness about mass public 
opinion. In a February 1969 memo to Kissinger, the president reflected upon a perceived 
divide between elite and mass opinion. While affirming his desire to “give every 
encouragement to the attitude that this Administration is exploring possibilities of 
rapprochement with the Chinese,” he cautioned it “should be done privately and should 
under no circumstances get into the public prints.” On the other hand, in terms of 
Kissinger’s “contacts with your friends” in academia and abroad, “I would continue to 
plant” the notion that the administration was seeking rapprochement.36 Meanwhile 
Nixon’s Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations William Macomber assured 
Majority Leader Mansfield that March the administration desired “greater contact and 
communication” with communist China.37 This fear of public opinion interfering with 
foreign policy was characteristic of how Nixon and Kissinger operated. In March 1971, 
Kissinger noted how between 1966 and 1970 there had been “a sharp change” towards 
support for various elements of U.S.-China rapprochement “without any leadership from 
anybody.” This of course ignored the Fulbright hearings, shifting editorial comments 
across the media spectrum, and congressional speeches, among other methods of 
influencing mass opinion. Kissinger also noted elite opinion had reached a consensus in 
                                                          
36
 Nixon to Kissinger, 1 February 1969, Folder President/Kissinger Memos (1), Box 341, Subject Files, 
NSF, RMN. 
37
 Macomber to Mansfield, 4 March 1969, 1, Folder Far East – China, 1966-1974, Box 47, Series 22: 
Senate Leadership, 1961-1977, Mansfield Papers, Montana. 
 248 
 
 
favor of rapprochement in 1966, yet failed to see how this elite consensus could over the 
next four years have influenced mass opinion.
38
 Nixon’s February 1969 strategy could 
be seen as an attempt to indirectly influence mass opinion by signaling to elite opinion, 
though that would probably be giving even him too much credit. 
 On 5 February 1969, four days after signaling to Kissinger that he should let his 
friends know Nixon was considering changes in China policy, Nixon directed his 
National Security Adviser to conduct an official review of U.S. policy towards China 
which would consider both “the nature of the Chinese Communist threat” and 
“alternative U.S. approaches on China.” This led a little over six months later to the 
creation of National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 14.
39
 Its broad brush-strokes 
confirmed the assumptions which had guided the Johnson administration: China was 
presently not a military threat to the United States; in the long term, it would become 
one, provided the U.S. did not reach out to Mao’s successors; and isolation was both 
counterproductive and ineffective.
40
 
 A meeting with the president and his advisers at his vacation home in San 
Clemente, California also concluded that failure to reach out to China soon would give 
the impression to the Chinese that the U.S. intended to “gang up” on China along with 
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the Soviets.
41
 Furthermore, continued Chinese hostility necessitated the continued 
deployment of large U.S. military forces in Asia, violating the recently enunciated Nixon 
Doctrine.
42
 These last two points shifted the timeline for action considerably forward 
from where it had been during the Johnson years. The memorandum itself offered little 
that was new in terms of assumptions, and nothing in the form of new policy 
prescriptions. Beginning by noting “the weight of China’s looming mass” on its 
neighbors and in the American and Soviet imaginations, it foresaw no breakthroughs 
while Mao remained alive, and limited ability to influence the succession struggle. In the 
long-term, the goal should be a combination of continued “deterrence” and new forms of 
outreach.
43
 At its most then, this only confirmed that Doak Barnett’s policy had gone 
bipartisan. But the all-important issue of timing remained undecided. 
 A sign that change might come sooner than later appeared in a memo written by 
Marshall Green later that month. A diplomatic veteran who had served the U.S. in and 
about Asia since the Eisenhower administration, the Undersecretary of State for Far 
Eastern Affairs had privately favored change during the Johnson years but officially 
argued for extreme incrementalism. Now, he was beginning to change his tune. The 
reason for this was that “the American mood is changing,” in favor of changing China 
policy as well as against continuing military commitments in Asia. This weariness 
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created “the need for a new approach.” To fulfill this approach, the U.S. should continue 
gradually lessening travel and trade restrictions and tentatively reach out to the Chinese 
leadership.
44
 Green had finally been moved to action. But it was to be a go-slow 
approach for the time being. Still, by the end of the year the media could sense 
something had changed. The New York Times noted Nixon possessed “more flexibility 
on the problem of China than the Democratic Administrations” which preceded his, and 
predicted “milestones” to come.45 
 The president’s strategy was based on a gradual escalation of signals, which 
allowed him freedom of maneuver. The first of these signals was a slight modification of 
travel and trade controls which made it easier for certain groups of qualified Americans 
(scholars, newsmen, students, doctors, scientists, and members of Congress) to travel to 
the mainland and allowed U.S. travelers there to purchase up to $100 of Chinese-made 
goods while in country. Taking the form of National Security Decision Memorandum 
(NSDM) 17, it was approved by Nixon on 23 June 1969 and went into effect on 21 
July.
46
 The press noted the change, but deemed the actions “more symbolic than 
substantive,” which they certainly were given continued Chinese refusal to grant 
Americans visas.
47
 This approach continued in 1970. In March, upon Secretary of State 
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William Rogers’s suggestion the previous month, the travel ban was lifted for all who 
wished to travel to China for “legitimate” purposes.48 In August, the U.S. slightly 
relaxed the trade ban by allowing foreign-made goods with U.S. parts to be sold to 
China.
49
 
Reaching Out 
 None of these actions indicated Nixon planned anything more than a continuation 
of Johnson’s program of halting outreach. The travel ban was still in effect, if now only 
being enforced by the Chinese, and the trade ban effectively maintained. In terms of 
rhetoric, what changed from Johnson were not the sentiments expressed by officials, but 
their rank. In August 1969 in Australia, Secretary of State Rogers said what Secretary of 
State Rusk never would, expressing hope that soon the U.S. and China could “enter into 
a useful” dialogue leading “to a reduction of tensions.” He also declared neutrality in the 
ongoing fighting between the P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R.
50
 One month later, Secretary of 
the Treasury Elliot Richardson argued that “longrun improvement in our relations” with 
the Chinese communists “is in our own national interest” and that the administration 
intended to improve relations with the Chinese as well as the Soviets.
51
 That December, 
Kissinger told the press the Chinese were “a great people” with which the administration 
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intended “to build a more permanent peace.”52 None of these early remarks was at all 
epochal. But they did signal to the Chinese increased U.S. interest in altering relations 
from the most senior members of the administration. 
 Since the Korean Armistice, the sole regular venue of contact between 
representatives of the Chinese and U.S. governments was in Warsaw, where diplomats 
from the two nations had met over 100 times between the mid-1950s and late-1960s. The 
chaos and radicalism of the Cultural Revolution had temporarily halted these meetings, 
but in late 1968 the Chinese expressed interest in their resumption after Nixon took 
office. However, the Chinese abruptly cancelled the planned 135
th
 meeting for 20 
February 1969 at the last minute. The official reason was the defection of a Chinese 
diplomat to the U.S. embassy in the Netherlands, though larger factional struggles within 
China revolving around the upcoming Ninth Party Congress were seen by the American 
media as a more likely culprit.
53
 However, the press viewed this as a temporary setback 
which need not derail U.S. efforts at outreach, particularly the lifting of the travel and 
trade bans.
54
 The 135
th
 Meeting eventually occurred exactly one year later. The primary 
agenda item at past meetings under previous administrations had been the release of a 
handful of U.S. civilian and military prisoners held by the Chinese. Their captivity had 
been a major stated reason for not lifting the travel and trade bans going back to Dulles’s 
tenure. But the Nixon administration aimed for something vaguer but larger. A month 
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before the meeting, Kissinger wrote Nixon that the goal was “to shape a climate” of 
cooperation between the two adversaries.
55
 
 This would prove a wise approach. Attempts to accomplish anything concrete, 
even on the limited issue of prisoner release, had long proven futile. Kissinger and others 
recognized the proper use of such meetings was to gauge Chinese receptivity to more 
substantive contacts. The Chinese themselves appeared to have the same idea. In his 
opening statement at the meeting, Lei Yang expressed Chinese interest in “higher level 
meetings” at the “ministerial” or “presidential envoy” level.56 Kissinger’s reaction to this 
was that China was returning to a Bandung-era approach to foreign policy. He recalled 
to Nixon how the Chinese had previously offered higher-level meetings in 1955, which 
the U.S. rejected, alienation the P.R.C. leadership and causing the Warsaw talks to 
become “sterile.” 57 Unlike it 1955, the U.S. public, the congress, and the administration 
were now all receptive to such an offer. 
 The administration’s primary means of communicating with the Chinese was 
through unofficial and official backchannels using private citizens and the leaders of 
other nations. The two vectors were Nicolai Ceausescu’s Romania and Yahya Khan’s 
Pakistan, both of which had strong connections to the Chinese at that time. In November 
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1969, a note from Theodore White to Zhou Enlai was passed through the Romanians via 
the U.S. embassy in Bucharest. White was a journalist whose Thunder Out Of China in 
the 1940s had marked him as the second leading sympathetic U.S. journalist to the 
Chinese Communist guerrillas, after Edgar Snow.
58
 In this letter, White referenced the 
chaos caused by the counterculture as a reason Nixon would be open to outreach, telling 
Zhou “there is a ferment in our country such as we have never experienced before.”59 
This upheaval had led to the questioning of old certitudes and the reevaluation of 
longstanding policies, including on the issue of China. 
 With Pakistan, the outreach was purely through official channels. Assistant 
Secretary of State Harold Saunders told Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States 
Agha Hilaly in August 1969 that Nixon no longer wanted China to remain isolated.
60
 In 
Islamabad, President Khan translated this message to the Chinese ambassador as “the 
U.S. is interested in normalizing relations with Communist China.” Hilaly reported this 
to Kissinger than December.
61
 Nixon reiterated to Khan in a letter that month his desire 
to create “a more meaningful dialogue” with China’s leaders.62 
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 The revelations in late April 1970 of the U.S. invasion of Cambodia outraged the 
Chinese and led them to once again temporarily call off the Warsaw meetings.
63
 Yet 
Vietnam proved only a temporary hindrance, as evidenced by the major breakthroughs 
of 1971 which occurred during the Lam Son 719 operation by the U.S. and the South 
Vietnamese in Laos. The more perennial hurdle was Taiwan. There was doubt as to how 
far the U.S. could or should go in alienating its treaty ally, as well as a continued desire 
to protect that regime’s existence. The issue most directly relevant to the R.O.C. was its 
U.N. seat, which the U.S. remained committed to defending. The notion that a loss in the 
annual vote would necessitate wholesale policy change on the P.R.C.’s terms went back 
at least to Robert Komer in 1961. This had been the original argument for what could 
then have been termed preemptive rapprochement. China’s own actions – first with 
Mao’s precipitation of the Sino-Soviet split in 1960 and then his launching of the 
Cultural Revolution in 1966, had undone years of positive momentum and bought the 
U.S. a decade of profitable inaction. But in November 1970, the vote to seat the P.R.C. 
and expel the R.O.C. was 51 for and 49 against, exceeding the tie vote if 1965 and 
giving the Chinese communists their first ever majority. This fell short of the two-thirds 
supermajority required to override U.S. labelling of the matter an Important Question, 
but it was clear this de facto veto could be overridden in 1971.
64
 That led to an extensive 
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internal reevaluation of the U.S. approach on the matter.
65
 This study would take into 
consideration both international and domestic public opinion on the issue, and seek to 
formulate a strategy which could satisfy both.
66
 
 The conclusion reached in March 1971 was that while the American public 
would accept the P.R.C.’s admission, perceived U.S. abandonment of Taiwan might 
“arouse a considerable last gasp effort of the right-wing remnants of the China Lobby.”67 
The new approach would be a variation on the “Two Chinas” policy proposed by Komer 
in 1961, although it would now be called “One China – Two States.”68 In his report on 
his matter to Nixon, Kissinger claimed this could be pulled off and prevent “Taipei’s 
expulsion, not just for a year or so, but for the foreseeable future.”69 The ultimate barrier 
was getting enough U.N. delegations to go along with this new approach. The immediate 
challenge was achieving Chiang’s acquiescence. U.S. Ambassador Robert Murphy met 
with Chiang in May, and believed he had reached an agreement. Chiang’s only proviso 
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was maintaining the Security Council seat.
70
 This somewhat complicated the U.S. 
approach, but Chiang insisted he would “rather be a jade broken than an earthen tile 
intact.”71 
Red Schism and Yellow Peril 
 The most common and parsimonious explanation of why Nixon went to China 
involves triangular balance-of-power diplomacy, specifically the role the increasing 
threat the Soviet Union posed to the Chinese and the United States as the chief causal 
variable. In the most recent and authoritative book on the subject, Chris Tudda endorsed 
this line of reasoning for both U.S. and Chinese actions.
72
 It seemed to be endorsed at the 
time by officials in the State Department, at least from China’s vantage point. A 1972 
memo claimed recent Chinese actions “should probably be viewed first of all in the 
context of its fear of the Soviet Union.”73 This was predicted in September 1969 by 
former general and longtime communist China observer William Griffith, who claimed 
growing Chinese fear of the U.S.S.R. “might also make it possible for us to work out a 
détente” with the Chinese.74 After his secret July 1971 visit to Beijing, Kissinger told 
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New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller “they are scared to death of the Russians or 
they wouldn’t be doing this.”75 
 On the Chinese side, this motivation was undoubtedly true. But on the U.S. side, 
it can only explain the timing of the policy shift. Whether the U.S. was primarily 
interested in “our position as ‘balancer’ in the evolving triangular relationship among the 
superpowers,” to quote Kissinger aide Richard Solomon, is open to dispute.76 The final 
breakdown of relations between the Chinese and Soviet communists as represented by 
the border clashes which began in March 1969 certainly influenced the timing of U.S. 
actions. But the decision to take those actions at the earliest possible moment had 
already been made. Nixon discussed his intentions with aides in January, and ordered 
Kissinger to get the bureaucratic wheels turning at the start of February, over a month 
before the first Red Army soldier opened fire on his People’s Liberation Army 
counterpart along the Ussuri River. Also, discussion of the Sino-Soviet split tended to be 
coupled with talk of the long-term Chinese threat. It was this looming Chinese threat, 
and not the Soviet menace, which guided U.S. decision making. 
 Complicating the triangular diplomacy narrative was Nixon’s ardent desire “to 
avoid creating the impression that we seek a better relationship with China merely in 
order to heighten Soviet concern,” as enunciated in NSSM-63 from September 1969, the 
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administration’s policy paper on the Sino-Soviet split.77 The goal instead was to improve 
relations with both rivals. At the same time, the document emphasized the need to 
pursue “the possibility of better relations in the longer-run with an increasingly 
powerful, nuclear-armed China.”78 Balancing mutual outreach to two enemy powers 
would prove tricky. On the eve of his first relaxation of travel and trade restrictions, 
Kissinger warned Nixon that he should make the change before his upcoming visit to 
Romania, lest it “give your decision overly anti-Soviet significance.”79 Nonetheless, it 
was still seen that way, one reporter calling the move “more of a threat to Moscow that 
the United States’s achievements on the moon.”80 Conversely, some in the press 
assumed his in retrospect anomalous and clumsy hard-line comments about China at this 
first press conference might have been a signal of reassurance to the Soviets.
81
 
 Nixon was not the only actor sending signals. Some seasoned observers 
wondered if the Chinese decision to escalate their border dispute with the Soviets was 
not a wink to the Americans.
82
 Kissinger’s lead China watcher John Holdridge in 
December 1969 similarly assumed the recent Chinese release of two U.S. yachtsmen “is 
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probably aimed mostly at the Russians.”83 Thus, arrows at the Soviets were olive 
branches to the Americans, and vice-versa. Behind all these machinations was a worry 
that if the U.S. did not act soon, the Soviets and the Chinese might patch up their 
differences and resume their mutual hostility towards the U.S., effectively wrecking 
détente.
84
 This was a fleeting opportunity which must be seized swiftly. Thus, the 
greatest role of the Sino-Soviet rift was in changing the crucial time variable in the 
equation of changing China policy. Officials in the Johnson and Nixon administrations 
subscribed to the same basic assumptions on changing China policy. In the Johnson 
administration, it was never the right time for change. In the Nixon administration, it 
almost always was. 
 The role played by perception of the Chinese threat was also complex. The long-
term threat, which had been present in policy circles since the beginning of the 1960s, 
retained its hold on the imagination. Yet due to economic stagnation, diplomatic 
setbacks, and the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, the short-term threat had receded. 
This created a window of opportunity in which a president could conduct a policy of 
rapprochement without seeming to most observers to be conducting a policy of 
appeasement. Pundits failed to notice both sides of this China threat coin, and rather 
focused only on one. Hong Kong Consul General Edward W. Martin wrote in May 1969 
that the time was finally propitious for policy change due to current Chinese weakness. 
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The Wall Street Journal credited the declining fear of “Chinese expansionism” with 
ongoing policy shifts. Newsweek claimed “a major assumption” of Nixon’s new 
approach was the realization China was “less of an immediate threat,” while the 
Christian Science Monitor credited the Warsaw thaw to China’s reduced capabilities.85 
 Still, for others, the long-term threat remained paramount. The Wall Street 
Journal, which by then was a moderate but consistent supporter of policy change, 
reminded its readers in 1969 that “brooding over all is the enigma of Red China, adding 
in 1970 that “for Red China the logical course of empire is – south.”86 Reflecting these 
fears, de Gaulle suggested to Nixon in 1969 that “it would be better for the U.S. to 
recognize China before they were obliged to do it by the growth of China.”87 A few 
experts did manage to square this circle and see the full situation. Stewart Alsop 
wondered at the start of 1970 if “we perhaps take Communist China too seriously?” For 
the time being, the answer to him was yes. Still, “the time will no doubt come when we 
will have to take Chinese power very seriously indeed.” In assessing China after two 
decades of communist rule, U.S. News followed the lead of other periodicals writing on 
the same subject by contrasting the apparently growing and prosperous China of 1959 
with the basket case of a nation it had temporarily become a decade later, observing that 
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“China is not an immediate military threat to either of the superpowers.” Nonetheless, 
both superpowers “worry about the day when the Chinese will have a respectable arsenal 
of nuclear weapons and of missiles to carry them.” The combination of atomic weapons 
and limitless manpower reserves was one “not lightly dismissed by experts.”88 The giant 
was no longer sleeping. It might be sick. But sickness was temporary. Changes had to be 
made before that time passed. 
Intellectuals, Red-Baiters, and Political Hacks 
 The few remaining opponents of change could not understand the reasoning 
behind such moves. In its story on the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine, the Chicago 
Tribune reminded readers that in his Guam speech the president “identified Red China as 
the greatest threat to the peace of the world.” In the view of the editorial writer, such a 
statement “can hardly be reconciled with gratuitous concessions to Peking.”89 This 
reflected Marvin Liebman’s retort to Jacob Javits’s embrace of Doak Barnett’s slogan – 
“can’t contain if don’t isolate.” Early on, Nixon paid at least cursory attention to the old 
China Lobby stalwarts, if only to keep them quiet. In September 1969 he instructed 
Kissinger to meet with Walter Judd.
90
 Before the meeting, Kissinger’s aide John 
Holdridge explained to his boss with condescension – if not also accuracy – that “Dr. 
Judd is about the last major proponent of the unreconstructed why-we-lost China 
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school,” and that Kissinger should “let him have his way” and blow off steam about his 
worries about Nixon betraying his old allies.
91
 As Nixon’s goal of policy change became 
apparent to the media, newspapers wrote stories on the China Lobby’s death at the hands 
of “a gradual shift in public opinion.”92 
 By 1971, their in-house ally Tom Charles Huston reported to Haig that his old 
friends in the movement “express alarm about a possible major shift in American 
policy.” Huston primarily worried about how to prevent right-wing anticommunists from 
attacking the administration.
93
 Haig’s response was that Huston could assure his friends 
that “there is absolutely no cause for alarm about a major shift in American policy.”94 
This was accurate at the time, since only after unexpected intervening events in April did 
the administration accelerate its long-planned program of rapprochement. After the 
whirlwind events of that month, Judd wrote to Nixon demanding “to know what we are 
doing – and why.” Following repeated and unreturned calls to the White House over the 
ensuing weeks requesting an answer from the president, Nixon aide Jon Howe concluded 
it would be best “to provide a brief non-substantive reply” to a man who less than two 
years before could demand an audience with the National Security Adviser. That reply 
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emphasized Nixon’s belief that peace in Asia depended upon “communication” between 
the American and the Chinese.
 95
 
 Part of the reason Nixon could now ignore the likes of Judd was that some of his 
leading compatriots had switched sides. Most notable among these turcoats was Anna 
Chennault, the Chinese widow of one of the Lobby’s godfathers. Nixon invited her to 
the White House in April 1971, and she proved supportive of his efforts to change 
policy, publicly endorsing a complete removal of the travel and trade bans.
96
 The 
movement of mainstream opinion away from the old certitudes of the Lobby was also 
reflected by the League of Women Voters’ endorsement of normalizing diplomatic 
relations in April 1969. The group reached this conclusion following a three-year study, 
presumably begun after the Fulbright hearings, held three years and one month earlier.
97
 
Democratic leaders attempted to capitalize on the changing national mood. Senator Ted 
Kennedy made normalization of relations with communist China a centerpiece of his 
then-frontrunning presidential campaign. He launched this effort in a March 1969 
address before the National Committee on United States-China Relations.
98
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 Despite such signs of changing times, Nixon remained cautious of congressional 
backing. He made sure to inform members of the House and Senate leadership from both 
parties prior to his first minor relaxation of the travel and trade bans in July 1969.
99
 In 
his October 1970 testimony before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, Marshall Green emphasized the gradual and incremental nature of Nixon’s 
approach to China while highlighting the “utility” to the Chinese communists of being 
able to cast the Americans in the “devil’s role.”100 As these moves accelerated in early 
1971, the media credited a new “China Lobby” led by the NCUSCR and its “scholars 
and specialists,” who “quietly laid the groundwork and acceptance for a reexamination 
of China policy.”101 By 1969, while Judd and his allies were being ignored in 
Washington, professors enjoyed access to both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. In addition 
to that, they established connections to big business, which the China Lobby had always 
feared would betray them. The Washington Post noted how the NCUSCR’s first national 
conference was funded by $50,000 in easily-obtained donations from “big 
corporations.”102 For a brief period, one might even speak of a Professor-Industrial-
Political Complex, with businesses funding the efforts of academics to advise the 
nation’s elected leaders and convince them of the wisdom of their policy prescriptions. 
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 As an academic, Henry Kissinger believed in the importance of backing from 
intellectuals to a politicians’ success on the national stage. At his first meeting with 
representatives of the Nixon campaign in June 1968, the then-adviser to Nelson 
Rockefeller argued that support from the “intellectual community” would “increase 
public support for Nixon’s programs,” while their opposition would lower his margin for 
political error. He blamed Johnson’s failures in part on that president’s failure to 
cultivate intellectuals as Kennedy had.
103
 Perhaps this plug from a professor on behalf of 
his own kind was in part self-serving. Still, using Kissinger as an intermediary, Nixon 
did proceed – at least on China policy – to patronize an influential coterie of largely 
liberal academics. The academics had already volunteered their services before Nixon 
took office. In December 1968, Doak Barnett, along with Harvard Law Professor Jerome 
Cohen and John Fairbank, sent Nixon an unsolicited 11-page memorandum on changing 
China policy. It laid out a combination of incremental policy changes and secret contacts 
to gain the enemy’s trust and possibly lead to a breakthrough, while cautioning against 
taking sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
104
 With the exception of an admonition to 
include Japanese leaders in any major moves and keep them informed, it reads like a 
remarkably accurate game plan for what was to follow. Two months before Nixon’s visit 
to China, the Los Angeles Times credited this “secret” study with laying the basis for 
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Nixon’s China policy.105 While this was something of an exaggeration, Kissinger’s 
closeness to the China Studies community and reliance upon their advice – particularly 
those in the community who taught at Harvard – was public knowledge.106 
 Though these assessments of the influence of academics on Nixon were 
retrospective, shortly after Nixon’s first step in altering the travel and trade bans, the 
New York Times claimed Nixon had adopted Barnett’s policy of “containment without 
isolation.”107 By that point, Barnett and other academics had already met with both 
Nixon and Kissinger at the White House to offer advice.
108
 At Barnett’s urging, a second 
White House meeting occurred in December 1970.
109
 During the deliberations of how to 
keep Taiwan in the United Nations, a third meeting took place in March 1971 on that 
particular subject.
110
 This was triple the number of meetings these China scholars had 
with Johnson during his presidency. 
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 By late 1970, scholars like Barnett were becoming frustrated with what they saw 
as the slow pace of change under Nixon to that point. However, by the end of that year, 
his signaling and attempts at outreach began to bear fruit. A letter he sent through the 
Pakistani president to Zhou Enlai impressed the Chinese Premier, who noted it was the 
first communication to “come from a Head, through a Head, to a Head.”111 Nixon 
reinforced the changing U.S. attitude in his February 1971 Foreign Policy Report, which 
referred to the “People’s Republic of China.”112 The wording was immediately 
recognized as a milestone – the closest the U.S. had come to recognizing the regime thus 
far.
113
 Nixon had used the phrase the previous October in a toast to Nicolai Ceausescu at 
a state dinner, but this was the first time it appeared in an official document. At a press 
conference in early March, the president stated his goal was to “normalize” relations 
with China, the first time he had used that specific word to define the goal of his 
attempts at rapprochement.
114
 It soon became widely known that Zhou had observed 
these signals with approval.
115
 
 It was now finally China’s turn to reciprocate. Since the dust had recently settled 
from the Chairman’s latest purges and marginalization of officials like Lin Biao who had 
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supported the continuation of the policy of hostility towards the United States, moderates 
like Zhou who now held Mao’s favor were free to let Nixon know his signals had been 
received loud and clear nearly two years after he began sending them. The opportunity 
came during the international table tennis championships in Nagoya, Japan, where 
Chinese players in early April welcomed the friendly entreaties of a 19 year-old 
American player named Glen Cowan. This led to an official invitation by the Chinese for 
the U.S. team to visit their country, the first time that regime had taken advantage of 
Nixon’s relaxation of the travel ban.116 The press termed the invitation “one of the most 
hopeful bits of news to come out of the Far East in some time,” and wondered if Nixon 
would respond by inviting a Chinese sporting delegation to the U.S.
117
 The 
administration immediately looked for ways to capitalize upon what they termed 
“‘peoples diplomacy’ with a vengeance.”118 State Department Press Secretary and 
former ABC News journalist John Scali proposed Nixon meet with the returning players 
the day of a scheduled major antiwar protest later that month to undercut coverage of 
that event, reflecting how much outreach to China was viewed as a public relations 
counterpoint to the continuing Vietnam War.
119
 
 This was in all likelihood the moment Nixon and others realized significant 
change could occur during Mao’s lifetime. Symbolically, Nixon responded by inviting 
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the Chinese table tennis team to tour the United States and visit the White House later 
that year.
120
 Shortly thereafter, Nixon’s public remarks acquired greater if still measured 
boldness. By the end of April, he referred at a news conference to “our new China 
policy” and mused that he expected “to visit Mainland China sometime in some 
capacity.
121
 He began to use the awkwardly mixed metaphor that he had “broken the ice” 
but now needed “to test the water to see how deep it is,” unwittingly implying his China 
policy would lead to his political demise.
122
 
 In a rare diplomatic pun, on a visit to Paris that April Marshall Green identified 
“the humble ping pong ball as a new ‘sphere’ of influence.”123 Longtime Asia policy 
observer Harrison Salisbury noted how U.S. policy makers recognized the connection 
between April’s “Ping Pong Diplomacy” and Nixon’s full lifting of the travel ban in 
March.
124
 Presumably with that in mind, within a week of China’s invitation Nixon 
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issued NSDM 105 further relaxing trade restrictions, though not yet eliminating them or 
putting Chinese trade on the same level as that with other communist nations.
125
 
 This was exactly what Nixon was proposing to Kissinger by the end of April, 
arguing that recent events had unexpectedly accelerated the timeline for his projected 
actions.
126
 That step would be taken in early June, after additional Chinese actions which 
would lead to the ultimate breakthrough.
127
 The press noticed the “absence of national 
uproar” to this action, though Joseph Alsop did report internal opposition from the 
Defense Department, which worried about Chinese access to technology with military 
applications.
128
 Eckstein’s fear of bureaucratic opposition proved largely unfounded. 
This was in large part because mid-level officials had been the first to openly support 
policy change in the previous administrations, and those such as Marshall Green who did 
not privately favored those who did. Only the Soviet desk opposed these initiatives due 
to their fears of Chinese rapprochement wrecking superpower détente. Yet Nixon 
leaning to one side would be counterproductive, and thus he was unwilling to heed their 
warnings. 
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 Just as the ending of the travel ban in March led to Ping Pong Diplomacy in 
April, the ending of the trade ban in June was intended to pave the way for Henry 
Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing in July. That visit was intended to secure an invitation 
for Nixon’s visit, which the Chinese readily offered, and Nixon announced to a shocked 
television audience at 10:30 p.m. Eastern Time on the night of 15 July.
129
 The invitation 
had been immediately offered to Kissinger by Zhou when they first sat down for talks on 
July 9.
130
 In the coming months, this itself led to the controversy of “Who Invited 
Whom?,” particularly after Zhou Enlai framed the invitation as Mao’s response to a 
prior request from Nixon. An NSC investigation of the chronology of events concluded 
that while technically the invitation was initiated by the Chinese, Nixon had repeatedly 
signaled he wanted such an invite, essentially arguing that the president had made 
himself available without appearing too desperate.
131
 
 Kissinger recognized this danger while meeting with Zhou, noting “the Chinese 
desire to make it appear that the President had asked for an invitation to visit China,” and 
he insisted the invitation refer to “a mutually expressed desire for a summit.”132 The first 
draft of the invitation, which was cleared with Kissinger, kept to this framework. 
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However, in the official announcement the Chinese added a preamble clause reading 
“knowing of President Nixon’s expressed desire to visit the People’s Republic of 
China,” putting the onus for the invite on the Americans and affording the Chinese a 
minor public relations advantage which no doubt irked the protocol-conscious Kissinger 
and cravenly insecure Nixon.
133
 
 Such prideful considerations had already become paramount. Throughout the 
process, Kissinger maintained in press interviews that Nixon had initiated the efforts at 
outreach towards the Chinese communists.
134
 Still, the public apportionment of laurels – 
even before Kissinger’s secret journey from Islamabad to Beijing – benefitted the 
gregarious Kissinger over the more reserved Rogers. The National Security Adviser was 
made aware in early June that the Secretary of State “had been terribly hurt” but his lack 
of mention in the press release announcing the lifting of the trade ban.
135
 In April 1971 
Rogers’ press aide John Scali noted how as events progressed “the question of who 
authored this policy will become increasingly important,” and that “Rogers is prouder of 
his role in China policy than anything else with which he has been associated.”136 Later 
that year, Scali would remark upon “the battle between Rogers and Kissinger” for credit, 
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and he noted Rogers’ disappointment in him for failing to push the policy making 
primacy of Rogers’ State Department to the press.137 Yet even when his department was 
given public credit, Rogers’ name was omitted. Instead, the media focused on the role of 
Marshall Green, whom Javits aide Peter Lakeland referred to as the “principal architect 
of Nixon’s China policy.”138 Rogers could not catch a break. 
 But Kissinger’s true rival – at least in his own mind – was not even a member of 
the administration. It was Senator Mansfield. Kissinger had long warned Nixon about 
Mansfield’s freelance diplomacy with the Chinese, arguing Mansfield was a partisan 
who did not have the president’s best interests at heart. He could not have been pleased 
when it was Mansfield rather than himself whom Zhou first invited to China in April 
1971.
139
 Kissinger suggested Nixon attempt to “hold him off” and delay a visit 
Mansfield had been seeking for over two years.
140
 Zhou offered Kissinger his own invite 
ten days later, on 21 April.
141
 Nixon appeared to have no problem sharing the limelight, 
suggesting to Kissinger that Mansfield and Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott could 
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accompany the president on his own eventual journey to China. Kissinger disagreed, 
worrying about sharing the moment “with the Democrats.” Nixon did not appear worried 
about that, reasoning that the Chinese would “know where the power is.”142 In his 
meetings with Zhou, Kissinger made sure to insist that the Chinese refrain from 
welcoming any members of congress until after Nixon’s visit, repeatedly saying he did 
not want the matter to “become a policy football.” 
Dancing in the End Zone 
 In addition, Kissinger said he worried a large delegation might antagonize 
opponents of rapprochement and “the China Lobby might start up again.”143 The 
transcript indicated Zhou nodded upon the mention of “China Lobby.” He had 
previously used the term himself in interviews with U.S. journalists, indicating the 
Chinese were well aware of the U.S. domestic political implications of the issue. In their 
second set of meetings in October 1971, Kissinger remarked to Zhou that “the radical 
right equals the radical left in their expression of violence, if not in the excellence of 
their grammar.”144 The afternoon after his 15 July announcement, Nixon expressed his 
worries to Kissinger that only liberals would applaud his moves, as well as his desire to 
receive more vocal support from conservatives on the matter.
145
 Even before the 
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announcement, conservatives in Houston had launched a “Reagan in ’72” committee due 
to dissatisfaction with the acceleration of détente with the Soviets and the Chinese.
146
 
Nixon made sure Reagan was one of the few politicians given prior warning of his 
announcement, though like all others he was not told in advance of the speech’s 
contents.
147
 
 Whether out of genuine support, gratitude for the attention, or pure careerist 
pragmatism, Reagan played the good soldier, warning the Young Americans for 
Freedom in September against opposing Nixon’s China trip.148 Other elected 
conservatives, even longtime China Lobby backer John Tower, muted their public 
criticism, though the senator did complain to Kissinger about his lack of White House 
access.
149
 The lone conservative voice Nixon worried about was William F. Buckley, 
which he made clear to Kissinger, requesting multiple times that he call Buckley. 
Kissinger procrastinated, instead placing an early call to the magazine publisher’s 
brother James, telling the senator “we don’t want to wind up being supported by the 
wrong people for the wrong reasons and lose our friends.”150 He only placed a call to 
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William Buckley after the publisher and ten other prominent conservatives announced 
they were “suspending” their support for the president over his perceived foreign policy 
weakness on a variety of issues, though as Buckley admitted during their conversation, 
the “catalyst” was China. Kissinger told Buckley that right-wing opposition helped the 
administration in its negotiations with the Soviets and the North Vietnamese, though not 
with the Chinese, cautioning Buckley not to “hit us too hard on China.”151 
 Nixon was in a strong position on this issue with American conservatives 
because, on this matter, they were, in addition to being isolated, internally divided. 
Right-wing academic and longtime movement member Henry Jaffa backed Nixon’s 
move, and worried that if conservatives lessened support for the president, he might lean 
more heavily on liberals. Businessman Henry Salvatori, one-time backer of the 
Committee of One Million and Reagan’s leading financial patron in California, also 
supported the move, but worried the administration was not doing enough to explain 
“the long range thinking” which lay behind its actions.152 Furthermore, Goldwater’s old 
allies were not the only important conservative faction by 1971. Nixon recognized this, 
and had Kissinger meet in August with Billy Graham and other religious leaders to sell 
them on the policy. The visit proved an unqualified success. Graham’s aides told Nixon 
they supported his policy “one hundred per cent.” One of them complimented Kissinger 
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on his “becoming modesty” and “great humility,” at least in comparison to that man’s 
past encounters with McGeorge Bundy and John Kenneth Galbraith.
153
 
 Unlike Buckley, Graham’s followers were swept up in the widespread euphoria 
inspired by the surprise announcement. The first polling survey conducted afterwards 
showed it was the second-most followed event in 1971 in terms of public awareness, 
trailing only the conviction of Lieutenant William Calley.
154
 The connection to Calley 
was by no means coincidental. Nixon’s failure to end U.S involvement in the Vietnam 
War had been a drag on his popularity, particularly among the young. The invasion of 
Cambodia not only temporarily alienated the Chinese, but led to the most widespread 
antiwar demonstrations in U.S. history. Events at Kent State and in the days afterward in 
May 1970 gave the impression of a nation on the verge of civil war. Nixon going to 
China was the first unalloyed feel-good story since the moon landing two summers 
before. In the days afterwards, the administration took notice, and eagerly sought to 
highlight this phenomenon. Kissinger explained to Mary McGrory how the upcoming 
visit “proves we are still an optimistic people.” He told Nixon “the whole country is 
looking up.” Others in the administration noticed a national mood of “relief” and 
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“happiness.” White House aides proposed Nixon capitalize on this national mood to take 
a literal victory lap and hold a series of “non-political” events across the country.155 
 The first post-announcement poll recorded 67 percent of Americans calling the 
upcoming visit a “good thing,” including 78 percent of young people ages 18 to 20.156 
That poll also recorded a 57 percent job approval rating for Nixon among 18 to 29 year-
olds, up from 46 percent in June.
157
 Nixon demanded the administration trumpet this 
China bounce among America’s youth, the very group with which Nixon’s political 
support was supposed to be weakest. Haldeman was informed that the Opinion Research 
Council, which conducted the poll, claimed the sample size of this demographic was too 
small to be statistically valid without confirmation from additional surveys, though 
Haldeman insisted to Colson the White House get “maximum mileage out of it.”158 
Colson proved happy to oblige, sending out a press release before the month was over. 
 Since this was Nixon, the president took the greatest satisfaction in how much his 
diplomatic coup discomfited his Democratic adversaries. Even back in May, Charles 
Colson noted Nixon’s desire to publicize that their presidential candidates “have been 
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strangely silent on the China issue.”159 After the announcement of the upcoming visit 
Rockefeller observed to Kissinger the administration had left the democrats “absolutely 
quiet.” The silent voice Nixon most wanted to hear was that of Ted Kennedy. The 
youngest brother of the man who had defeated him for the presidency had been the 
loudest voice calling for policy change, and the man most critical of Nixon on the 
matter. Nixon noted Kennedy’s silence two days after the announcement, and joked that 
the Democrats “are going through the agonies of hell.” On Nixon’s orders, Colson 
informed multiple newspaper columnists of Kennedy’s silence, forcing him to utter a 
statement in support of Nixon’s breakthrough. “It must have pained him to do it,” 
Colson duly reported to the president.
160
 For once, Nixon could take an action which 
equally satisfied the greater and lesser angels of his nature. 
 Most intriguing of all were the reactions of Democrats who served in the 
previous two administrations. “I am jealous,” McGeorge Bundy told Kissinger in 
support of his trip and its results.
161
 The support was anomalous, though not the jealousy, 
among Bundy’s former colleagues. Predictably, Dean Rusk expressed doubts about what 
the trip would achieve, and about Nixon’s ability to bargain successfully when Zhou 
Enlai. More surprising was the opposition from Averell Harriman and Adlai Stevenson, 
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who had both opposed Rusk by leading an unsuccessful fight to change the policy and a 
successful one to change the posture of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. 
Harriman worried about alienating the Soviets, while Stevenson fretted about upsetting 
allies in Asia. For these two  men to fall back on the arguments of their longtime 
opponents at the time their preferred policy was being enacted most likely reflected 
frustration that they were not involved in the victory.
162
 
On Second Thought   
 It soon became clear that Nixon’s achievement had been predictable, but only in 
retrospect. Signals of his intentions which seemed obvious afterwards went unnoticed at 
the time. Hours before his announcement, Nixon told Kissinger that his 1967 Foreign 
Affairs article was “really a damn good prophetic thing.” Yet it went unremarked upon 
during the presidential campaign, and for long after. Huston forwarded a copy to 
Liebman in 1968, thinking at the time it reflected Nixon’s support for the status quo. 
U.S. News noted it as a signal of Nixon’s future intentions – in August 1971.163 This is 
not to say no one – save James Thomson – saw change coming. Some could even 
conceive of the form it would take. Harry Schwartz speculated in the New York Times in 
the wake of Ping-Pong Diplomacy that Nixon “could score a major political coup” by 
visiting China in the summer of 1972 during the Democratic Party Convention, but 
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termed this prediction “sheer fantasy.”164 The week Edgar Snow’s interview with Mao 
appeared in Life, in which the Chinese leader welcomed visits from Nixon and other 
Americans, Secretary Rogers termed a presidential visit “possible,” though not in the 
near term. In June, Joseph Alsop suggested “a promising longshot bet” of the 
establishment of “state relations” between the U.S. and the P.R.C. before the 1972 
election.
165
 What all these predictions had in common was the low probability placed on 
them coming true. The notion of Nixon going to China was out there. It was spoken of. 
But it was not seen as very likely. 
 In the weeks after the announcement, multiple stories appeared in the press 
detailing how Nixon had decided at the start of his administration to pursue a wide-
ranging rapprochement with the Chinese communists. They referenced a 1 February 
1969 meeting with Kissinger which presumably began the bureaucratic process of 
reviewing and altering existing policy.
166
 Yet this meeting had already been publicly 
noted by multiple outlets in the spring of 1971.
167
 Presumably the meeting and its 
contents were leaked with Nixon’s approval in the post-Ping Pong period of optimism, 
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when secrecy appeared less important. The most extreme example of ignored signs was 
the reaction – or lack therof – to the president’s 6 July 1971 address to a convention of 
media executives in Kansas City. This was Nixon’s first speech devoted to China policy, 
and an obvious effort to prepare the country for the news of Kissinger’s imminent visit 
to Beijing. It was his last best chance to sell his policy to the American people. 
 Therefore, the arguments he used in this setting are historically important. They 
may not reflect Nixon’s true motivations, but they reveal what he believed the public 
wanted to believe his motivations were, which is nearly as important. The focus of this 
speech was the rise of an economically powerful China. “Inevitably,” a communist-led 
China would become “an enormous economic power,” and “that is the reason I felt it 
was essential that this administration take the first steps toward ending the isolation of 
Mainland China from the world community.” In the future, an isolated and powerful 
China “would be a danger to the whole world.” Integrated into the global economy, the 
Chinese colossus would still present “an immense escalation of their economic 
challenge” in terms of industrial competition, but that was by far the lesser of two evils. 
Echoing Hilsman’s speech, he claimed all he was doing was “opening the door.168 The 
remarks failed to make news, presumably because they did not hint at the highly 
newsworthy events it was preemptively justifying. One man who noticed the speech was 
Zhou Enlai. At their first meeting three days later, the National Security Adviser found 
himself being “questioned at length” by the Chinese Premier about the text of a 
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presidential address he did not yet even know existed. Realizing his interlocutor’s 
ignorance, Zhou provided Kissinger with an English-language copy of the text.
169
 The 
only man who appeared to hear Nixon’s remarks was half a world away, and he was a 
leader of the state which was the speech’s subject. Not for nothing in Kansas City did 
Nixon refer to the Chinese as a “clever” people. One might also add observant. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION: RISE ABOVE: 
NIXON’S “JOURNEY FOR PEACE,” THEN AND NOW 
 
“Since 1950 Washington has officially sent more men to the moon than it has to 
China.”1 
 
 Though he was the first sitting president to travel to China, Richard Nixon was 
not the first American president to visit that country. This honor fell to William Howard 
Taft, who traveled there in 1905 while serving as Secretary of War.
2
 The China Taft 
visited could not have been more different than the one Nixon saw. In 1905, the Qing 
Empire was in its death throes, facing widespread internal discontent amidst halting 
attempts at reform, all while struggling with a recent military defeat by the Japanese and 
the crushing indemnity imposed by the European powers after the Boxer Rebellion. 
Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of Russian and Japanese soldiers were waging a war 
on what was still technically Chinese soil, and there was nothing the Qing could even 
consider doing to stop them. In 1971, the Chinese people might have been 
psychologically traumatized by the Cultural Revolution, saddled with a stagnant and 
dysfunctional economy, and subject to the whims of a capricious leader. But the regime 
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which ruled over them was a projector of power abroad, rather than an absorber of the 
aggressions of others. As Sun Yat-sen predicted in 1912, China had woken up. As Mao 
vowed in 1949, China had stood up. But it still had yet to live up to its potential. That 
was of course a large part of why Nixon went there, and why the American people 
supported his journey so wholeheartedly. 
 There was also the novelty of such high-level summitry, particularly when its 
ceremonials were conducted on television for all to witness. Adding to this show 
business aspect were the events of 1971 which brought this trip about, particularly Glenn 
Cowan’s seemingly random encounter with the Chinese ping-pong team and Henry 
Kissinger’s secret trip from Islamabad to Beijing. Cowan sought to make the most of his 
brief time in the spotlight, getting profiled in Seventeen magazine and attempting to 
launch a television talk show, which his agent billed as “an underground newspaper of 
the air.”3 For his part, Kissinger boasted to Nelson Rockefeller that “it was real James 
Bond” when he slipped his press detail in Islamabad to make history.4 Recognizing that 
event’s dramatic qualities, President of Universal Television Sid Sheinberg – who within 
a few years would get credit for discovering a young director named Steven Spielberg – 
proposed a treatment for a live action dramatization entitled “Journey to Peking.” 
Kissinger would provide narration for the reenactments, which would seek to follow 
events as closely as possible, since “the facts would be more intriguing than our 
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fiction.”5 In his pitch to Kissinger, Taft Schreiber wrote of wanting to tell the American 
people about “the events, the mystery, the suspense, the excitement of the arrangements 
that were made for the trip,” and asked for government footage from his arrival in 
Peking, provided such footage existed. The program – hopefully airing shortly before 
Christmas – would end before the point where Kissinger sat down with Zhou. For once, 
Kissinger chose to duck the limelight.
6
 
 On the eve of Nixon’s trip, Kissinger sent the president a lengthy memo detailing 
the potential pitfalls of his upcoming meetings with Zhou, Mao, and other Chinese 
leaders. Recognizing the largely symbolic nature of the endeavor, he wrote that “the 
intangibles of your China visit will prove more important than the tangible results.” 
However, Kissinger cautioned on the need for “the careful scaling down of 
expectations.”7 Both men recognized that the euphoria in the U.S. which allowed them 
to bask in such adulation the previous July created its own pitfalls, and that the Chinese 
leadership could shift away from the U.S. as quickly as it had shifted towards. Helping 
reassure the communists was their admission in October 1971 to the United Nations, 
definitively signally the end of a generation of international isolation. In the months 
between the announcement of Nixon’s visit and the U.N. vote, the administration 
retreated to an embrace of the Two Chinas approach which some had advocated since 
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1961. Renamed “One China – Two States” by Secretary of State Rogers, the goal was 
the seating of both the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China in the 
General Assembly, with the permanent seat in the Security Council passing to the 
communists.
8
 In his speech at the General Assembly in October, Rogers pointed to the 
de facto existence of two sovereign governments in Chinese territory, as well as the fact 
that Chiang’s regime ruled a larger population than that of two-thirds of the current U.N. 
member states.
9
 
 The question behind the administration’s push to maintain Taiwan’s presence at 
the U.N. was whether or not it really wanted to win. The Chinese communists were 
adamant in their desire to see the Nationalists removed from the U.N. and further 
delegitimized on the international stage. Were the U.S. to prevail in the vote, the Chinese 
communists would be quite displeased. The Wall Street Journal predicted that “the U.S. 
won’t fight very hard on Taiwan’s behalf. And Washington could even hope to lose.”10 
Ronald Reagan worried about this in a telephone conversation with Kissinger the day 
Rogers announced the new approach. The governor wondered if the administration had 
gone “soft on China.” Kissinger assured Reagan that he believed the nationalists would 
not be expelled.
11
 In a conversation between Kissinger and Ambassador to the U.N. 
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George Bush, when Bush informed Kissinger of his extensive efforts to preserve the 
Nationalists’ membership in the General Assembly, the National Security Adviser asked 
“do we want to win it that badly?” Bush responded in the affirmative, arguing that “to 
win this would be very helpful.”12 He did not intend to play the sacrificial pawn in a 
game of diplomatic chess. 
 But Kissinger had other ideas. He chose to make a second visit to Beijing in mid-
October on the eve of the vote, sending an unmistakable signal to U.S. allies on where 
the administration’s priorities were. For the Committee of One Million, this was the 
ultimate betrayal. Judd complained that “just at the time when Secretary of State Rogers 
and Ambassador Bush were announcing an all-out effort to prevent the expulsion of the 
Republic of China, the White House ostentatiously sent Kissinger to Peking. Other 
nations got the signal, and voted accordingly.”13 Marshall Wright predicted the Chinese 
communists would not prove to be much trouble, emphasizing “the lucid realism that 
remains constant under the rhetorical flourishes.” The regime “accepts reality, and 
attempts to manipulate it.” On issues concerning Africa, “China will play Robin Hood to 
our Sheriff of Nottingham.”14 Still, while this might prove a minor irritant, it was one the 
U.S. could easily manage. 
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 While 68 percent of Americans polled in October 1971 expressed approval of 
Nixon’s upcoming trip, 52 percent also worried he could “get fooled and trapped” by his 
hosts. The same poll showed a drop in those who feared the Chinese over the Russians 
from the last time the question was asked in 1967, though the drop was only from 71 to 
56 percent, and Americans still claimed by a more than two-to-one margin that the 
Chinese would in the near future pose a greater threat to world peace.
15
 Nixon continued 
to sell his trip as the best way to deal with a rising China. At an August news conference, 
he noted China was “the most populous nation in the world” and “potentially in the 
future could become the most powerful nation in the world.” In a speech that September, 
he told the Economic Club of Detroit that “ten, fifteen years from now, there will be 
between 900 million and a billion people in Mainland China. Ten or fifteen years from 
now, they will be a very significant nuclear power.” Considering this long-term threat, it 
was desirable to him “that we will talk about them [our differences] and not fight about 
them, now or fifteen years from now.” To continue to isolate such a potential colossus 
would only endanger the U.S. and the world.
16
 
 Long gone was the era when the Chinese communists could be termed “a passing 
and not a perpetual phase.” One leading voice who had stuck with his predictions of 
regime collapse longer than just about anyone was Joseph Alsop. In late 1972 and early 
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1973, he conducted a lengthy tour of parts of southeastern and southwestern China he 
had visited more than three decades previous. He marveled at the people’s improved 
standards of living, the advanced infrastructure, and what he evaluated as a sophisticated 
and flexible approach to agricultural and industrial development. As he ended his 
journey, Alsop argued that “a truly successful China cannot help but be a superpower, 
even a supergiant power.” He predicted that someday that nation would economically 
become “a China-sized Japan,” exporting massive quantities of industrial and consumer 
goods across the globe and competing with existing advanced economies in North 
America and Western Europe. This would result by the end of the century in “a sudden 
tilt in the overall balance of this changing world such as no one has seen since the 18
th
 
century when the Industrial Revolution began in England.”17 The American Century 
might be replaced by the Chinese Century, with the East overtaking the West. 
 Part of this admiration mixed with anxiety was influenced by a contemporary 
sense of decline occasioned by the domestic tumult of the late-1960s and early-1970s. In 
Power and Protest, Jeremi Suri saw this unrest – not only in the U.S. but also in the 
U.S.S.R and the P.R.C. – as a reason for the flowering of the era of détente. Each power 
needed breathing space to regroup and reassert the primacy of domestic elites before 
rejoining the superpower struggle in earnest. There is evidence some contemporary 
observers came to a similar conclusion. When meeting with Zhou Enlai in 1971, former 
U.S. diplomat John Service told the Chinese Premier “American youth is unhappy and 
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alienated.” This domestic unrest, coupled with a loss of “US prestige,” was in his 
opinion a major spur for Nixon’s zeal for rapprochement with the Chinese.18 Also, in an 
article published shortly before Nixon’s 1972 visit, John Fairbank claimed it was 
destined to succeed “because both parties are in trouble.” Mao’s recent purges of the 
Party’s senior leadership, combined with “Nixon’s troubles at home,” would bring the 
two former adversaries together, leading to “a Sino-American détente, perhaps an 
entente.”19 Domestic discord could and would lead to international concords. 
 At the same time, some leading U.S. officials who observed the Chinese saw less 
of this current unrest and more of the country’s latent power, particularly in comparison 
to what at the time seemed an exhausted and possibly decadent America. After visiting 
China in the summer of 1972, future president and current House Minority Leader 
Gerald Ford could not help but be ominously impressed by what he had seen. His 
compliments verged deeply into envy. Describing “China’s colossal potential,” he 
recalled feeling “this sense of a giant stirring, a dragon waking,” which gave him “much 
to ponder.” He approved of the “State-directed conformity” he had witnessed. Ford 
contrasted this Chinese “unity of effort and purpose” with the current situation in his 
own nation, writing that “where people are free to live and work and choose and read 
and think and disagree as they please, there has been widespread division, discord and 
disillusionment and a pervasive permissiveness straining the fibers of our national 
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character.” He concluded by wondering “if our self-indulgent free society will be able to 
compete effectively fifty years hence with this totalitarian State,” given China’s 
population, natural resources, and “total commitment to national goals.”20 One can 
readily imagine, and in fact find surely find examples of, expressions of similar 
sentiments among leading American visitors to China twenty or thirty years later, or 
even in our own time. Americans were unsure if their nation could compete with the 
Chinese long before that competition had begun, generally for the same reasons, and 
based on the same evidence, both real and imagined. 
 Nixon’s own assessment of the effects of his visit on moderating Chinese 
antipathy towards the U.S. was modest. In March 1972, he wrote Kissinger that “they 
still see the United States President as a devil but the horns might not be as prominent as 
they were previously.”21 The taming of the dragon had begun. Whether it could have 
begun earlier remained an open question. There were two sets of impediments, one 
foreign and the other domestic. The U.S. could do little to control China’s grand 
strategy. So long as fomenting hatred of the U.S. was in Mao’s domestic political 
interest, American overtures would prove of little value. Domestically, more could be 
accomplished. Yet the administrations preceding Nixon’s had at best an intermittent 
interest in shifting the public away from the bitter hostility of the Korean War period. 
Despite expectations to the contrary, Eisenhower reinforced this hostility and 
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antagonized the Chinese, often gratuitously. He had his own domestic constituencies to 
worry about. Kennedy and Johnson, both having endured the McCarthy Era, showed 
little interest in changing China policy. Their Secretary of State Dean Rusk was actively 
hostile to any policy alterations, though many below and around him fought a persistent 
low-level guerrilla campaign which achieved occasional local successes. 
 What ultimately proved decisive in moving both elite and mass opinion were the 
actions of outside actors. An informal alliance of academics, journalists, and 
congressmen provided assistance to resistance fighters in the State Department and 
National Security Council, and vice-versa. Over time, they overwhelmed and overcame 
their enemies in the realm of public opinion, taking stronghold after stronghold until 
their once-dominant adversaries were left isolated and powerless. Into this changed 
policy landscape stepped Richard Nixon, who recognized the existence of an opportunity 
to improve America’s standing in the world as well as his own domestic political 
reputation. As David Horowitz wrote in Ramparts in late 1971, in a survey of China 
policy over the previous two decades, “when the time came for an accommodation to the 
reality of Chinese power in Asia, the outlines of a new policy would already have been 
agreed upon.”22 Nixon received the triumph without having to fight hardly any of the 
battles. 
 By this point, some of the losers wondered if the fight was ever worth having in 
the first place. Managing Editor of the National Review James Burnham was the leading 
conservative foreign policy theorist of the early Cold War. He had long been a hard-liner 
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on dealing with the Chinese communists. Yet defeat brought him both resignation and 
recrimination. Near the end of 1971, with the Chinese communists in the U.N. and 
Nixon about to pay them a visit, he argued that “I think we should have ‘taken our loss’ 
in 1954 or possibly in 1957.” Fighting so successfully for so long had only made defeat 
worse. Burnham explained that “by failing to take our loss at the most advantageous 
time instead of stubbornly postponing it until this year, we have deepened the loss, as we 
can already see – and there is a lot more extra damage to come.”23 Burnham in 1971 was 
belatedly agreeing with Robert Komer and Chester Bowles in 1961 that defeat had 
always been inevitable, and the sooner it had occurred the better. 
 The years Burnham cited for an advantageous surrender will be familiar to the 
reader. This story began in 1954 with the first U.N. vote on admission of the Chinese 
communists and the formation of the Committee of One Million to publicize the 
opposition of the U.S public to that potentiality. Speculation of Eisenhower recognizing 
the P.R.C. peaked in early 1957 at the start of his second term, and Dulles’s speech that 
year in San Francisco was in large part motivated by this phenomenon. The problem 
with the notion of making changes in this earlier period was that it offered little if any 
political dividends for Eisenhower. The public was overwhelmingly opposed at that time 
to rapprochement. This opposition appeared soft on certain incremental steps like lifting 
the travel and trade bans. These actions could have occurred with little if any political 
fallout, but also with little if any political gain for the administration. A revolution in 
public sentiment would need to occur before a revolution in diplomacy would prove 
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beneficial to any president. Eisenhower deliberately delayed and deferred the moment 
this would occur with his administration’s acts of hostility and disrespect towards the 
Chinese. His two successors would not act in a similar manner, but neither did they do 
much to further the process of change. Nixon, had he assumed office in 1961, would in 
all likelihood have continued the Eisenhower-era approach, in which case the 
breakthrough might not have occurred until even later. 
 Such a delay would no doubt have hindered the U.S. in its Cold War competition 
with the Soviet Union. As Chen Jian noted in the conclusion to his Mao’s China and the 
Cold War, Nixon’s visit essentially removed China from the Cold War. It would still 
compete for influence in the developing world with the Soviet Union – particularly in 
Africa – and independently support the operations of anti-Soviet guerrillas in 
Afghanistan, but the messianic quality of its foreign policy between the mid-1950s and 
mid-1960s was long gone. China became a regional power with regional ambitions and 
regional concerns. Its foreign policy became non-ideological in an era still defined by 
ideology. In other words, its grand strategy assumed an almost post-Cold War posture 
nearly two decades before the Cold War had ended. 
 This is fitting, and connected to the reasons for Nixon’s outreach, because China 
could never rise so long as the Soviet Union stood in its way. While the two superpowers 
stood at nuclear-tipped daggers drawn, there was no room for China to rise beyond the 
status of a mere great power-designate. Only in a post-Soviet world, in which China 
could gain full entry to U.S.-led economic institutions which were now truly global in 
scope, could it achieve its economic potential. Only with the Soviet military threat gone 
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could the Chinese reorient to a maritime strategic policy which directly threatened U.S. 
hegemony in East Asia in a way American policymakers had always feared. By trying to 
manage the Cold War, Nixon was laying the foundations for the global order of the next 
era. As long as the Soviet Union existed, its very presence would manage and contain a 
rising China. Only when it was gone would the U.S. have to worry about what Nixon 
and so many others feared. 
 In his textbook on the history of U.S.-China relations, Warren Cohen referred to 
the period from 1949 until 1971 as “The Great Aberration,” since it was the one period 
when these two polities were officially isolated from one another. This formulation 
focused on contact to the exclusion of power, which is unfortunate because contact was 
reestablished, bringing this “great aberration” to an end, due precisely to considerations 
of power. Scholars such as Cohen have defined eras in Sino-American relations based on 
prevailing U.S. sentiment towards China and the Chinese. They identified periods of 
admiration, contempt, fear, sympathy, and so forth. By this standard, relations have 
followed a pendulum-like motion. In place of the metaphor of the pendulum, I would 
offer that of the light switch, in which the light is Chinese power. Before 1949, the light 
was off. At various times, Americans might have cursed the darkness, or mocked the 
darkness, or wanted to care for those living in the darkness. But regardless, they still 
feared the potential of the light. In 1949, that light switched on. While it flickered, and 
slowly brightened, and flickered some more, many wondered if it would short-circuit or 
burn-out. They sought to isolate the light, to block the windows, to keep anyone from 
entering, and to wait for the darkness to return. Eventually, Americans concluded this 
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was a light that would never go out, and began to come to terms with its potentially 
glaring brightness. They decided to let the light dissipate outwards, lest it eventually 
burn with sun-like intensity, and also bask in the light themselves. 
 The history of Sino-American relations can thus properly be divided into the 
eras: the Era of Chinese Powerlessness, and the Era of Chinese Power. The latter era 
contains two periods: The Period of Containment and Isolation, lasting from 1949 until 
1971, and the Period of Containment without Isolation, lasting from 1971 until and 
presumably beyond the present day. This dissertation has sought to account for why the 
second period replaced the first. It sees most of the first period as a time of transition. 
The policy of isolation was inherently unstable, but it held a certain stubborn appeal. 
Much had to occur for the inertial forces to be surmounted. Driving the transition was 
the very fact of Chinese power itself, and the potential scope of that power. It was an 
adversary which could not be conquered like Germany or Japan, or driven to 
disintegration like the Soviet Union. It would have to be engaged, altered, and hopefully 
coopted. As Nixon explained in his Kansas City speech, such an approach would 
ironically augment the very power the U.S. sought to contain. But this was thought to be 
the lesser of two evils.  The hope was engagement would prevent Yellow Power from 
becoming a Yellow Peril. 
 Jack London’s 1909 short story “The Unparalleled Invasion” prophesized that 
the united and still-imperially dominant white nations would in 1976 exterminate an 
increasingly powerful Chinese nation to prevent it from gaining a global hegemony it did 
not yet seek. By the actual 1970s, not only were the white nations neither united nor 
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truly imperial, but China had yet to become the economic powerhouse London saw as its 
inevitable destiny. His story, while still seen today by some as a celebration of racial 
genocide, was actually a parody of that impulse and desire. London greatly admired the 
Chinese people, much as Richard Nixon did. Both saw them as industrious, creative, and 
destined for greatness. It is tempting to imagine Jack London covering Nixon’s trip as a 
journalist, and filing reports on that momentous historical event. China had changed 
markedly since he travelled there in 1905, as had the entire world. Would he have seen it 
as a modern-day tribute mission, as William Buckley did? Or would he, like Nixon, have 
viewed it as a way to manage change, to guide shifts in the balance of power, to prevent 
war and to preserve peace? In other words, to keep his prophecy in the realm of science 
fiction. Just as Jack London’s world is long gone, so is Richard Nixon’s. But their fears, 
their hopes, and their attempts to harness one to bring the other to fruition, remain.
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